Redundancy in Copyright Law by Michael Abramowicz
American Law & Economics
Association Annual Meetings
Year 2004 Paper 2
Redundancy in Copyright Law
Michael Abramowicz
George Washington University
This working paper site is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be
commercially reproduced without the publisher's permission.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art2
Copyright c 
2004 by the author.1
Redundancy in Copyright Law
by Michael Abramowicz
￿ ￿￿￿
At first glance, copyright law might appear to reflect little concern with redundancy, 
allowing creation of works expressing similar ideas as long as their expression is 
different. In this Article, Professor Abramowicz argues that copyright law should pay 
attention to redundant works, and moreover that it already does so. New works that 
are close substitutes for old works add less economic value than more original works 
equally profitable for authors. First Amendment and pragmatic constraints prevent 
copyright law from awarding authors monopolies to particular ideas, but in a variety 
of  ways,  copyright  law  seeks  to  reduce  the  costs  associated  with  production  of 
relatively redundant works. The most important of these is the broad derivative right, 
along with associated doctrines that give authors exclusive rights in characters and 
plots  that  they  create.  Concerns  about  redundancy  provide  a  more  plausible 
explanation than incentive and other theories of this right. The importance of the 
broad derivative right in turn provides a stronger justification of the long copyright 
term,  because  the  derivative  right  increases  in  importance  relative  to  the 
reproduction right late in the copyright term. Concerns about the costs associated 
with  redundant  production  independently  help  justify  a  wide  range  of  copyright 
doctrines, ranging from fair use to the originality requirement.
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INTRODUCTION
The consumer of copyrighted works buys in markets overflowing in variety. Hollywood 
offers two separate movies about asteroids hitting the earth.
1 Radio stations play songs by both 
the Backstreet Boys and ’N Sync.
2 Every television network has offered a reality program in 
which contestants are gradually eliminated until a sole winner remains.
3 A law professor can 
choose from at least a dozen civil procedure casebooks,
4 and a reader of romance novels faces a 
far  wider  selection.
5 A  well-stocked  newsstand  carries  multiple  magazines  on  almost  every 
hobby  or  interest.  An  Internet  user  can  surf  on  Internet  Explorer,  Netscape  Navigator,  or 
1 See DEEP IMPACT (Paramount Pictures 1998). But don’t see ARMAGEDDON (Touchstone Pictures 1998).
2 But cf. Lauren Armstrong, Move Over, ’N Sync: The Backstreet Boys Are the Best Boy-Band Around, GREENSBORO NEWS & 
REC., June 29, 2000, at 12 (purporting to identify some differences between the two bands).
3 CBS inaugurated the genre with Survivor and Big Brother. NBC integrated the concept with a dating show in Chains of Love
and with a game show in The Weakest Link. ABC offered The Mole. Fox’s Boot Camp prompted a lawsuit by CBS, which 
alleged that Boot Camp infringed its copyright on Survivor. See Phil Rosenthal, Reality Shows Wage Turf War, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
April 11, 2001, at 55.
4 See,  e.g.,  JOHN  J.  COUND  ET  AL.,  CIVIL  PROCEDURE:  CASES  AND  MATERIALS  (8th  ed.  2001); ROBERT  M.  COVER  ET  AL., 
PROCEDURE (1988); DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2001); RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE:  MATERIALS  FOR  A BASIC COURSE (7th  ed.  1997); RICHARD D.  FREER &  WENDY COLLINS PERDUE,  CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2001); JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN ET AL., THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (2002); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL—CASES AND 
MATERIALS (8th ed. 1999); A. LEO LEVIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2000); RICHARD L. MARCUS 
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2000); JEFFREY A. PARNESS, CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE 
COURTS (2001);  MAURICE ROSENBERG  ET  AL.,  ELEMENTS  OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th  ed.  1990);  STEPHEN C.  YEAZELL,  CIVIL 
PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2000). For a recent critique of textbook publishers for producing too many textbooks and charging too much 
for them, see Erwin V. Cohen, Same Book, New Look, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at A31. Although Cohen suggests that “the 
industry should stop producing books that merely duplicate old ones,” id., he does not acknowledge that no individual textbook 
company  has  an  incentive  to  stop  producing  duplicative  books  if  each  duplicative  book  takes  business  away  from  earlier 
publications.
5 The publisher Harlequin estimates that heroines in the romance novels that it alone has produced since 1949 have married at 
least 8000 times. See Lynn Van Matre, Harlequin and Gowns Enjoy Perfect Marriage, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2001, at 7.
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countless imitators, each of which will allow browsing of the same news story from any of a 
number of media outlets. While validating copyright law’s success in providing an incentive to 
generate  new  works,
6 such  diversity  might  appear  to  indicate  that  copyright  law  embraces 
redundancy, or at least does nothing to stem it. This Article will argue, however, that copyright 
law  in  fact is  concerned  with  reducing  the  costs  associated  with  production  of  redundant 
copyrighted works.
From the consumer’s perspective, the wide variety of copyrighted works, though perhaps 
annoying  on  occasion,  seems  more  like  beneficial  product  diversity  than  wasteful  product 
redundancy. Some adolescents will count themselves as better off for being able to listen to both 
the Backstreet Boys and ’N Sync instead of just one of these groups. While few law professors 
will dare assign their classes two civil procedure casebooks, one text might match a particular 
professor’s style and pedagogy better than its competitors. And some Internet users find Explorer 
useful for some tasks and Navigator, for others. In all of these areas, competition may spur 
innovation and lower prices.
7 Past a certain point, though, the benefits to consumers of similar 
copyrighted works may be small. Law professors and their students probably would not be much 
worse off if they had to pick from six casebooks instead of twelve. Most of those who chose to 
see both asteroid movies would have been almost as satisfied if one of those movies simply had 
never existed, and movie buffs perhaps might have substituted other natural disaster flicks. And 
though  many  readers  were  presumably  upset  when  Mademoiselle  magazine  folded,
8 they 
probably found solace in alternatives like Allure ,  Cosmopolitan, Glamour, In Style, Jane, Marie 
Claire, and Self .
9
6 The purpose of providing such an incentive is arguably enshrined in the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
(authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). As the Supreme Court has noted, “[T]he ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422  U.S.  151,  156  (1975).  See  also 1  PAUL GOLDSTEIN,  COPYRIGHT §  1.1  (1998 )  ( stating  that  copyright  law  attempts “to 
encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of literary, musical and artistic works”). The Constitution, however, 
does not specify that its goal is to maximize production of literary works, only that its goal is to promote progress.
7 Edmund  Kitch  has  noted  the  price  effect.  “[C]opyrights  do  not  prevent  competitors  from  creating  works  with  the  same 
functional characteristics, as evidenced, for example, by the numerous dictionaries available, by the many television shows, 
novels, and movies with similar themes and characteristics, or by the many competing software programs,” Kitch observes. 
Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 
1730 (2000). Such redundancy, Kitch explains, helps explain why copyrights are not monopolies. See id. at 1729-38.
8 See Alex Kyczynski, Goodbye to Mademoiselle: Conde Nast Closes Magazine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at C2.
9 I do not mean to suggest that women buy more redundant magazines than men. The success of Maxim, after all, spurred a large 
number  of  imitators.  See Matthew  Castellan,  Magazines  Jump  on  Maxim’s  Bandwagon,  FOX  NEWS,  July  30,  2002,  at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,59051,00.html.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press4
The production of even a relatively redundant copyrighted work will always increase 
consumer welfare at least a bit, but it may reduce social welfare. The more works that exist, the 
more likely a consumer will be able to find a work that is just what she is looking for, and at a 
lower price because of greater price competition. The more crowded the market, however, the 
weaker these effects; once there are already 1341 books on how to use Microsoft Word,
10 the 
1342
nd is less likely to fill a unique niche or have a significant effect on prices. Meanwhile, 
production of each copyrighted work consumes real economic resources, and as Glynn Lunney 
has pointed out, the resources that are invested in copyrighted works sometimes might produce 
greater social returns if invested elsewhere in the economy.
11 The sales of the most redundant 
copyrighted works come largely at the expense of other copyrighted works. It might be in the 
private interest of the author and publisher to create such a work, because profits from sales 
taken from other works are just as good as profits from sales to consumers who otherwise would 
not have purchased a copyrighted work at all. The work, however, can still reduce social welfare, 
if the cost of creating the work is greater than the increase in consumer welfare that it produces. 
The  divergence  between  private  and  social  incentives  is  possible  because  the  producer  of  a 
copyrighted  work  does  not  care  about  the  losses  that  publication  will  inflict  on  competing 
authors and publishers.
This insight has received considerable attention recently. In An Industrial Organization 
Approach to Copyright Law,
12 I explained that as a result of this divergence between private and 
social incentives, the social value of marginal copyrighted works, i.e. those that authors and 
publishers are most unsure about whether to create in the first place, will be relatively low on 
average.
13 Other  commentators  have  recently  made  related  points  in  passing,  relating  the 
economic literature on product differentiation to markets for copyrighted works.
14 The product 
differentiation literature, however, addresses markets as a whole, and although it models product 
10  This  is  the  number  of  books  on  Microsoft  Word  listed  in  a  recent  search    on  Amazon.  See
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/4192/ref=br_bx_1_c_2_6/103-9771097-3974227 (last visited July 25, 2003).
11 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 487-88 (1996).
12 See Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author).
13 This analysis makes more attractive copyright policies that increase consumers’ access to digital works at the expense of a 
modest decrease in incentives to produce new works. See id. For example, peer-to-peer file sharing technology appears less 
dangerous to the copyright system, because any reduction in the number of new works that it causes may be of relatively little 
significance.
14 See infra Part I.A.
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diversity  by  imagining  products  distributed  in  “product  space,”
15 it  generally  assumes  that 
products are uniformally distributed in that  space.
16 A convenient assumption for most purposes, 
this obscures an important phenomenon, that some copyrighted works are more redundant than 
others, meaning in effect that some portions of product space are more crowded than others. The 
more crowded a particular portion of product space, the more likely it is that a marginal work in 
that portion of product space will reduce rather than increase social welfare.
This Article thus applies an additional theoretical apparatus, rent dissipation theory, to 
copyright. Entry into markets for copyrighted works can dissipate the rents, or profits, that the
owners of existing copyrights enjoy. A copyright law that maximizes social welfare from an 
economic perspective should prevent entry when the rent-dissipating effects of entry are greatest. 
Copyright law can seek to attain this goal only under many constraints, including noneconomic 
concerns such as free speech and indirect economic effects such as the administrability of the 
copyright regime. This Article argues, however, that within those constraints, copyright law to a 
surprising extent does represent the fundamental insights of rent dissipation theory. A number of 
features  of  copyright  law  prevent  or  discourage  some  of  the  most  flagrantly  rent-dissipating 
entry, a phenomenon that I will call entry deterrence. 
The Article’s primary task is to show that entry deterrence can explain some of the most 
perplexing  aspects  of  copyright  law.  Most  significantly,  rent  dissipation  theory  provides  a 
foundation for the derivative right. A straightforward incentive theory cannot easily explain the 
derivative right or such expansive copyright scope, because that right plausibly discourages the 
creation of as many works as it encourages. Pe rmitting unlimited  unauthorized exploitation of 
derivative works would be likely to lead to a large number of particularly redundant works, 
however, as publishers would compete in adapting successful works. Though each unauthorized 
adaptation would contain unique expression, different adaptations of the same work would be 
strong substitutes for one another and thus relatively unlikely to benefit consumers enough to 
offset  the  competitive  harm  to  producers.  Relatedly,  rent  dissipation  explains  copyright’s 
15 The  literature  uses  geographical  space  as  a  metaphor  for product  space.  The  most  famous  article  on  spatial  competition 
generally is Harold Hotelling’s, which considers decisions of where to locate along a straight line. See Harold Hotelling, Stability 
in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41  (1929),  reprinted in 1 PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY J. 3 (Charles K. Rowley, 1993). This can be 
viewed most easily as geographical space, for example with the producers as ice cream sellers deciding where along a beach to 
place their carts. It can also be viewed, however, as representative of decisions to choose product characteristics. For example, 
the straight line could be viewed as corresponding to the visible portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, and the producers as 
bathing suit manufacturers deciding what color to make bathing suits.
16 See infra note 28  and accompanying text (discussing a model that assumes uniform distribution of products in product space). 
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protection of elements of copyrighted works, such as characters and plots. Because competitors 
would create adaptations as long as they expected profits, such entry would tend to eliminate the 
rent that a copyright owner in a regime with the derivative right and related rights can extract 
from sequels and other transformative uses of the original work. 
An important corollary to rent dissipation theory’s explanation of the derivative right is 
that rent dissipation theory helps explain the long copyright term. The derivative right increases 
in  its  importance  relative  to  the  reproduction  right  later  in  the  copyright  term,  and  so  rent 
dissipation theory, unlike an incentive justification, can explain even retroactive extensions of 
the  copyright  term.  At  the  least,  rent  dissipation  theory  reflects  the  actual  motivations  of 
companies that sought the long copyright term. Of course, rent dissipation theory can explain 
only why there is a long copyright term for the derivative right and suggests that perhaps the 
derivative right and the reproduction right, which have become essentially interchangeable in 
copyright doctrine, should be more clearly separated. By providing an economic foundation for 
the  right,  however,  rent  dissipation  theory  points  to  a  straightforward  doctrinal  test  for  the 
derivative  right,  which  focuses  on  competition  among  potential  derivative  works  rather  than 
competition  between  such  works  and  the  original  work.  Even  assuming  the  copyright  term 
remains the same for both the derivative and the reproduction right, this test at least has the 
potential to resolve significant doctrinal confusion concerning the derivative right’s scope.
The scope of derivative rights is the most important application of rent dissipation theory 
and  entry  deterrence  in  particular  to  copyright  law  because  the  need  for  a  foundation  is  so 
desperate. Many features of copyright law, however, may make more sense once rent dissipation 
considerations are taken into account. Rent dissipation theory can also help explain limits on the 
scope of copyright’s exclusive rights. The first sale doctrine, for example, helps minimize the 
costs associated with producing a sufficient number of copyrighted works to meet consumer 
demand.  Similarly,  rent  dissipation  theory  can  help  explain  some  sui  generis  features  of 
copyright law, such as the unique treatment of sound recordings. Music may be unique from a 
copyright  perspective  because  consumers  may  benefit  more  from  what  might  seem  to  be 
redundant performance by different artists of the same work than consumers would benefit from 
analogous competition in other areas. Rent dissipation theory also informs fair use doctrine. The 
first fair use factor as interpreted by the courts explicitly considers an aspect of redundancy by 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art27
evaluating the extent to which the use is transformative, and other aspects of the fair use calculus 
also can be understood in rent dissipation terms. Rent dissipation theory not only suggests that 
parodies  should  fit  within  the  fair  use  exception,  but  also  account  for  the  Supreme  Court’s 
otherwise puzzling indication that parodies might not be fair use where they sufficiently interfere 
with nonparodic derivative works that the copyright owner might exploit.
Rent  dissipation  theory  also  may  help  understand  doctrine  concerning  copyrightable 
subject matter, but the theoretical picture is more complicated and less certain here. Copyright 
law  at  times  may  reduce  rent dissipation  by  facilitating  entry  that  would  occur  anyway,  for 
example by permitting copying of preexisting works, a concept that I will call entry facilitation. 
Where  copyright  law  cannot  prevent  entry  and  thus  eliminate  all  rent  dissipation  with  entry 
deterrence, for example because of free speech concerns, it can use entry facilitation to reduce 
the fixed cost of entry and thus the magnitude of rent dissipation. Because entry deterrence and 
entry facilitation are opposite strategies for achieving the same goal, we must be cautious in 
assessing whether doctrine concerning copyrightable subject matter is consistent with the rent 
dissipation goal. This Article will offer a tentative argument, however, that doctrine concerning 
copyrightable  subject  matter  reflects  considerations  of  both  entry  deterrence  and  entry 
facilitation, and that the most difficult cases are those in which it is hardest to determine which 
consideration is the weightier. Entry deterrence, for example, can help explain why works that 
require  very  little  investment,  such  as  many  unartistic  photographs,  are  copyrightable,  while 
entry facilitation can explain why other works that require a great deal of investment, such as 
phonebooks, perhaps should not be. 
Part I of the Article reviews the recent literature on product differentiation and copyright, 
and it introduces rent dissipation theory as a complementary theoretical apparatus. Part II offers a 
positive theory of copyright’s derivative right and related doctrines, and it offers a refinement of 
derivative  rights  that  flows  from  this  theory.  Part  III  uses  rent  dissipation  theory  to  explain 
doctrine on use of copyrighted works, and Part IV explains how rent dissipation theory might 
help explain doctrine on copyrightable subject matter. In all of these sections, I do not intend to 
provide comprehensive normative defenses of the relevant policies. While rent dissipation theory 
makes copyright law less puzzling from a positive standpoint, whether rent dissipation concerns 
are  sufficiently  weighty  to  justify  policies  such  as  the  long  copyright  term  is  beyond  my 
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immediate scope. A more generous treatment of parody might well be justified on free speech 
grounds, and this Article’s analysis is intended only to crystallize identification of the competing 
policy  interest,  not  to  validate  that  competing  interest  as  sufficient.  Rent  dissipation  theory 
provides a new theoretical lens for evaluating copyright policy, but the challenge of balancing 
various aims of copyright law remains.
I. A RENT DISSIPATION THEORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Although  the  economics  of  product  differentiation  are  complex,  there  is  a  simple 
underlying idea that is relevant to a consideration of redundancy of copyrighted works, that of 
demand  diversion  or  business  stealing.  Part  I.A  will  review  the  recent  literature  noting  the 
existence of this possibility and describing the countervailing forces that act against overentry. 
Part I.B describes an alternative theoretical framework for understanding copyright redundancy, 
and that is the phenomenon of rent-dissipating races by private parties. Given the subject of this 
Article, it is worth noting that this framework is not redundant. Not only does it provide an 
intuitive basis for applying the core theoretical insight to legal doctrine, but it also makes it 
possible to imagine product space that is more crowded in some areas than others, which will 
prove central to the later analysis. After reviewing the literature on rent dissipation in other areas 
of law, this Part will imagine a hypothetical copyright regime with stronger property rights. This 
hypothetical  regime  would  limit  rent  dissipation, but  it  would  introduce  other  problems  and 
concerns, particularly about freedom of speech. 
A. Product Differentiation Theory
In models of competitive markets, goods are often assumed to be homogeneous.
17 This 
model is effective for commodities like wheat, and homogeneity may also be an appropriate 
assumption for many products sold monopolistically, such as electricity, but many consumer 
products are differentiated. Restaurants all serve food, but they may serve different types of food, 
with appropriate or inappropriate decor, and varying levels of quality and service. And while 
books all share something in common, they describe different subjects and tell their stories in 
different ways. Markets for books and other copyrighted works, like markets for restaurants, are 
thus markets for differentiated products. Economics analyzes such markets with a framework 
17 See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 87-88 (3d ed. 1966) (defining perfect competition ).
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called  imperfect  competition,
18  and  that  framework  has  spawned  a  literature  on  product 
differentiation that considers, among other questions, the welfare effects of producer entry into 
imperfectly competitive markets.
19
Although the literature on product differentiation was well developed by the end of the 
twentieth century, it received no  attention in the copyright literature until recently. In 2001, 
Michael Meurer noted the possibility of production of redundant copyrighted works in a brief 
discussion in an article on price discrimination in markets for copyrighted works.
20 “[M]ultiple 
producers,”  Meurer  observes,  “sometimes  race  to  get  to  the  market  first  with  essentially 
duplicative works.”
21 Excessive entry into a market was particularly dangerous “when there are 
close  substitutes  for  a  new  product  in  a  market  niche  already  crowded  with  other  similar 
products.”
22 The  possibility  of  excessive  production  of  copyrighted  works  was  relevant  for 
Meurer’s  project  because  Meurer  was  evaluating  an  argument  that  price  discrimination  by 
copyright owners is welfare-increasing, allowing copyright owners to obtain greater profits and 
thus induces them to produce more works. As Meurer correctly observes, we cannot assume that 
more  is  necessarily  merrier  in  markets  for  copyrighted  works,  and  therefore  it  is  not  clear 
whether doctrine encouraging price discrimination raises social welfare by increasing incentives 
to produce new works.
Though made to evaluate copyright’s treatment of price discrimination, Meurer’s point 
about the value of incentives has broader resonance, potentially applying to any copyright issue 
that  might  affect  incentives  to  produce  copyrighted  works,  and  possibly  to  areas  besides 
copyright. Indeed, in a 2002 article, Richard Markovits argues that a range of governmental 
policies might produce excessive research expenditures.
23 Markovits distinguishes two types of 
such expenditure: production-process research, designed to decrease the cost of producing goods, 
18 For a significant early article, see Chamberlin, Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition ?, 51 Q.J. ECON. 557, 566 (1937). For 
an overview, see JAN KEPPLER, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: ORIGINS, RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS (1994).
19 For some extended treatments, see Simon P. Anderson et al., Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation (1992); JOHN 
BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION (2002); and 1-2 JACQUES FRANCOIS 
THISSE & GEORGE NORM, THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION (1994);
20 Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 96-97 (2001). For an article that 
touches on the possibility that there might be an excessive number of content producers, though not necessarily an excessive 
amount of content, see C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 339-40 (1997).
21 Meurer, supra note 20 , at 96.
22 Id. at 97.
23 Richard S.  Markovits,  On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique of 
Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63 (2002).
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and quality-and-variety investments, designed to increase the quality and variety of products.
24
Markovits argues that we may have too little of the former and too much of the latter. Although 
Markovits’s analysis takes into account some factors not explicitly considered by Meurer, such 
as the effects of monopoly distortions, the central insight is similar, that marginal investments in 
improving product quality and variety withdraw resources from other projects.
25 If the social 
benefits of the improvements are small, then the social costs of such research may exceed the 
benefits. Markovits concludes his discussion with a two-page analysis of intellectual property 
law, noting the possibility that “broadening copyright protection will increase misallocation by 
increasing the allocative excessiveness of the investments we make in the relevant types of . . . 
artistic creation.”
26
To see concretely how copyright law might produce excessive entry incentives, consider 
the following example. Suppose that you are the author of the world’s only vegetarian cookbook, 
and if no one enters the market, your future profits, in expected value terms, will be $100,000. 
Let us suppose that I am considering writing another cookbook, different enough for purposes of 
copyright law but similar enough so that no consumer would ever care to buy both cookbooks 
and so that all consumers essentially would be indifferent between the two. If I expect that my 
entry will not affect the price of cookbooks, then I would be willing to spend up to $50,000 
(including the opportunity cost of my time) to take away half of your market and half of the 
expected profits. From a social perspective, my $50,000 investment is wasteful rent dissipation, 
with no consumer benefiting and another producer $50,000 worse off, a loss that the literature 
refers to as “demand diversion” or “business stealing.”
27 Society would be better off if I had put 
this  investment  to  alternative  uses,  for  example  by  becoming  a  cook  instead  of  a  cookbook 
writer.
This is a stylized example, because in real markets, there are more works in any given 
subgenre and each work is sufficiently different from every other such that no two works are 
perfect substitutes. There are, however, more elaborate models that can produce the same result. 
Steven Salop, for example, created a model in which different firms located around a circle.
28
24 Id. at 68-69.
25 Id. at 80.
26 Id. at 118.
27 See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Winston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND. J. ECON. 48 (1986).
28 See Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141 (1979).
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The circle represented the geographical space analogue of product space, and Salop’s model 
recognized that larger numbers of firms would reduce both prices and the “transport costs” that 
consumers bear when there is no product that exactly matches what they want.
29 Under fairly 
general  assumptions,
30 Salop shows that twice as  many  firms enter the market as is socially 
optimal because each entrant does not take into account the effect of entry on rivals.
31 Salop’s 
analysis, however, provides just one way of modeling product diversity, and in other models, 
overentry is less likely to occur.
32
Recognizing this complexity, in An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 
I offer a systematic treatment of product differentiation theory’s relevance for copyright law’s 
incentives-access  paradigm,
33 the  oft-noted  tradeoff  between increasing  incentives  to  produce 
new works and access to existing works. If there is excessive production of copyrighted works, 
then  there  is  no  tradeoff  from  a  social  welfare  perspective.  My  intent,  however,  was  not  to 
suggest that there indeed was excessive production, but rather to note that even if production 
incentives are the paramount goal of copyright law, such incentives are less important at the 
margins. The article includes a simulation model suggesting that markets for copyrighted works 
might have excessive or inadequate investment, but that either way, under certain conditions 
increasing  access  to  copyrighted  works  by  allowing  greater  noncommercial  copying  could 
increase social welfare.
34 The analysis thus strengthens the case for placing considerable weight 
in the policy calculus on access to existing copyrighted works, for example making legalization 
of peer-to-peer file-sharing seem more attractive than it otherwise might appear.
35
Reinforcing the observation that product space can quickly become crowded, Christopher 
Yoo apparently observed the connection between copyright and product differentiation at about 
the  same  time  as  me  and  distributed  a  working  paper
36 shortly  after  I  distributed  mine.
37
29 Id. at 144.
30 Though Salop’s assumptions given the circular model are general, Salop acknowledges that the circular model itself may not 
be robust to alternative specifications. Id. at 156.
31 Id. at 152.
32 See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. 
REV. 297 (1977). For a critique of the Dixit-Stiglitz approach, see John S. Pettengill, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum 
Product Diversity: Comment, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 957 (1979), and for a response to the critique, see Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Reply, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 961 (1979).
33 See Abramowicz, supra note 12 .
34 See id. at app. 1.
35 See id. at 58-62.
36 See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Fortunately for us, our articles were not redundant and thus they would cause little business 
stealing if law review articles were a type of copyrighted work that generated business. Yoo does 
briefly consider demand diversion, calling it a “countervailing consideration” to the main thrust 
of his argument.
38 Yoo’s  thesis is that the products differentiation literature helps to explain 
several puzzles arising from theories treating copyrighted works as public goods, which imply 
that copyrighted works should sell at constant marginal cost and that markets for copyrighted 
works should exhibit natural monopoly properties.
39 Though we focus on quite different things, 
both Yoo’s analysis and my earlier one recognize that copyrighted works may be substitutes for 
one  another  and  thus  imply  that  copyright  redundancy  may  have  benefits  and  costs  for 
consumers.
While both my previous analysis and Yoo’s allow for generalizations about copyright 
law, neither they nor the works they are based on take into account the variable density of 
product space. The product differentiation approach is difficult to apply to concrete doctrinal 
problems  because  every  copyrighted  work  faces  a  different  set  of  substitutes,  and  even 
identifying that set of substitutes proves to be a complicated problem. Shubha Ghosh has written 
a working paper that makes progress in this direction, considering the challenges of exploring 
market definition in copyright law.
40 Though more familiar to antitrust analysis, Ghosh notes that 
market definition is at least implicitly relevant in a number of copyright doctrines, including fair 
37 That version initially encompassed both that article and parts of this one. See Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract_id=374580 (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
38 Yoo, supra note 38  (manuscript at 41 -45). Yoo argues that “the differentiated products approach undercuts the conventional 
understanding  that  any  measure  that  enhances  dynamic  efficiency  necessarily  reduces  static  efficiency  by  showing  how 
encouraging entry can promote both considerations simultaneously.” In other words, Yoo argues that if copyright can increase 
incentives  to  create  new  works  (thus,  Yoo  assumes,  enhancing  dynamic  efficiency),  that  change  will  also  increase  static 
efficiency, because additional entry will drive down prices and thus benefit consumers. The simulation analysis in my article 
offers a similar finding. There is an important difference in emphasis between Yoo’s approach and mine, however. Yoo notes 
correctly that changes in copyright law may increase authors’ ability to appropriate surplus, and he suggests that these changes 
will in effect increase dynamic efficiency by lowering prices and thus increasing access to consumers. What Yoo does not discuss 
is that a policy increasing the appropriability of consumer surplus may have other direct consequences, which might decrease 
consumer access with a potentially negative effect on social welfare. Consider, for example, a law facilitating crackdowns on file 
sharers. Yoo’s analysis emphasizes that the law will increase appropriability, indirectly leading to a greater number of works and 
thus lower prices. My analysis would also emphasize that the increase in the number of works may only contribute slightly to 
consumer welfare, even taking into account lower prices, as in the Salop model; meanwhile, the direct effect of the law would be 
to limit consumer access to copyrighted works by discouraging file sharing. 
39 Id. (manuscript at 15-20, 28-33). While Yoo’s project shows successfully that the public goods model does not fully explain 
markets for copyrighted works, my earlier analysis focuses on the observation that once copyrighted works are produced, they 
have many of the characteristics of public goods, namely nonrivalrous consumption. 
40 Shubha Ghosh, Rights of First Entry in “Derivative Markets”: Exploring Market Definition in Copyright (2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http://www.serci.org/congress/papers/ghosh.pdf).
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use
41 and  copyright misuse.
42 Perhaps in the long term work such  as Ghosh’s will allow for 
copyright analysis that is extraordinarily sensitive to the particular nuances of individual markets 
for copyrighted works.
43 In the meantime, a theoretical apparatus is needed that reflects the basic 
insights  of  product  differentiation  theory  and  still  allow  us  to  make  at  least  some  tentative 
generalizations  about  how  copyright  law  might  encourage  useful  and  discourage  wasteful 
redundancy. To such an apparatus we shall now turn.
B. Rent Dissipation Theory
1. The Rent Dissipation Literature
The most familiar example of rent-seeking in the legal and public choice literatures is the 
lobbying of public officials to secure a private monopoly,
44 a source of inefficiency that may 
even  exceed  the  deadweight  loss  associated  with  monopoly  pricing.
45 Any  investment  by  a 
private party to capture rents, protect rents, or take rents enjoyed by another party can constitute 
rent-seeking, however.
46 An example not involving lobbying is that of the gold rush.
47 Suppose 
that I have found a gold mine worth $100,000, but because of an absence of property rights, 
anyone who is willing to pay $1000 for equipment can get an equal share of the mine’s gold at 
no further cost. Then, 100 people will enter, for a total fixed cost of $100,000. Society is thus no 
better off than if the gold mine had never been found, as the rents that I would have earned if I 
were able to remove all the gold myself are dissipated away. A similar example is that of a 
valuable shipwreck.
48 When anyone can salvage the ship, the societal investments to find it will 
approach the value of the ship. If the social investments equal the value, even if the party to 
41 Id. (manuscript at 4).
42 Id. (manuscript at 5).
43 Economists have done some work in creating empirical models of particular markets for copyrighted works, but there are 
substantial methodological complications. See, e.g., See MARC RYSMAN, COMPETITION BETWEEN NETWORKS: A STUDY OF THE 
MARKET FOR YELLOW PAGES (Boston Univ. Industry Studies Project Working Paper No. 104, Feb. 12, 2002).
44 The seminal works are Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974); 
and Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
45 Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
46 A related expense is by individuals seeking to prevent the rent-seeking activities of others. See John T. Wenders, On Perfect 
Rent Dissipation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 456, 456-58 (1987).
47 For a study of how emerging property rights helped prevent rent dissipation during the California gold rush, see John Umbeck, 
The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 197 (1977). See also Stephen 
N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1970) (explaining 
how rent dissipation may occur with any non-exclusive resource).
48 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (5th ed. 1998).
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reach the ship is allowed to keep it in its entirety, society as a whole is no better off than if the 
treasure had never even existed.
Even for those who are familiar with those examples, the stark conclusion that society 
will entirely waste rents in seeking them may seem counterintuitive. The California Gold Rush 
may have been counterproductive, but surely, one might insist, the country was better off than if 
there had been no gold in California. Indeed, there are a number of reasons that competition may 
not  entirely  dissipate  a  rent.  First,  if  some  of  the  participants  are  risk-averse,  as  behavioral 
economics would predict at least when individuals are racing to capture a gain rather than avoid 
a loss,
49 then the total investment in the search will be less than the prize.
50 Second, because rent 
dissipation  reflects  in  part  opportunity  costs,  a  rent  will  be  entirely  dissipated  only  if  each 
participant is indifferent between participating in the activity and in some other activity.
51 Third, 
if the parties are not identically situated, rent dissipation may be reduced or eliminated.
52 To take 
an extreme example, if it is apparent that no matter what the efforts of others one party will 
definitely arrive first and capture all of the gold, then no one else will enter the race.
53 Fourth, 
rent-dissipating  races  can lead  to  earlier  achievement  of  a  goal,  resulting  in  an  end  to  rent-
dissipating  activities.
54  Fifth,  rent  dissipation  may  produce  third-party  benefits.  Those 
participating  in  the  California  Gold  Rush  may  have  provided  positive  externalities  to  other 
settlers of California, and treasure hunts may result in benefits to archaeologists.
55
49 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1, 20-22 (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (summarizing experimental evidence indication that individuals are generally risk-
averse as to gains and risk-averse as to losses); see also Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 177 (2000) (explaining prospect theory and applying it to the litigation context).
50 See generally Arye L. Hillman & Eliakim Katz, Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94 ECON. J.
104 (1984) (offering a careful analysis on the effect of risk aversion on rent dissipation).
51 Id. at 104 (“[B]ecause of intrinsic second-best considerations resources used in rent seeking may not have positive shadow 
prices, implying that individuals’ quests to secure biddable rents need not always entail socially wasteful activity.”).
52 See, e.g., Christopher Harris & John Vickers, Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 193 (1985); 
Wing Suen, Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals, 97  J. POL. ECON. 1384 (1989). Full
analysis of the dynamics of rent-dissipating races where the parties are not identically situated requires game theory. See, e.g., 
Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization, 77 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 176 (1987).
53 For a game theoretic analysis underscoring the possibility of incomplete rent-seeking, see Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent-
Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 97 (1980).
54 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 48 , at 41 (noting that entry by multiple parties to find a shipwreck might lead to the wreck being 
found earlier).
55 Archaeologists, however, argue that treasure hunters have generally caused archaeological damage. See, e.g., Christopher R. 
Bryant, The Archaeological Duty of Care: The Legal, Professional, and Cultural Struggle over Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks, 
65 ALB. L. REV. 97 (2001).
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These caveats suggest that in real-world settings, rent dissipation will be incomplete. 
Perhaps the most significant factor reducing rent dissipation, however, is property rights. If, for 
example, the law specifies a unique party that  has the rights to a sunken vessel,
56 then no one else 
will enter, thus entirely avoiding the rent-dissipating race. The owner of the vessel then has an 
incentive to raise the vessel when the benefits of doing so are greater than the costs. The owner, 
for example, may wait, if technology for the task is expected to improve or become cheaper to 
overcome considerations of the time value of money. Similarly, consider the example of public 
fisheries.
57 The  existence  of  rent  dissipation  in  the  absence  of  property  rights  is  particularly 
apparent here, as competition may lead to overfishing and the destruction of the fishery. The 
problem, however, is broader than overfishing. If the government, for example, permitted fishing 
each year until a sustainable 1000 fish were harvested, an inefficiently high number of fishermen 
would still enter the market, dissipating the value of each harvest. But if the right to the 1000 fish 
were  granted  to  a  single  fisherman,  perhaps  by  an  auction  proceeding,  then  the  fisherman’s 
private incentive would be to maximize the value of this rent by minimizing the cost of seeking 
the 1000 fish. Similarly, if the entire fishery were sold, then the owner would have both static 
and dynamic incentives to engage in the optimal amount of fishing.
Although rent dissipation has received little attention in copyright law, the potential of 
property rights to reduce rent dissipation animates Edmund Kitch’s prospecting theory of patent 
law.
58 Research  into  potential  innovations  can be  a  form  of  rent  dissipation.  If  there  were  a 
million  dollars  in  potential  profit  to  be  made  in  developing  an  invention,  for  example  by 
marketing  and  improving  the  light  bulb,  then  in  the absence  of  patent  protection,  producers 
would dissipate away this potential profit. Such rent dissipation is less obvious than the rent 
dissipation of the gold rush, because the competition is likely to increase consumer welfare, but 
it is possible that the costs of such rent dissipation may exceed the benefits.
59 Kitch’s observation 
is that patent law does for innovation policy what a prospecting system does for a gold rush,
60
providing  property  rights  that  reduce  the  possibility  of  rent  dissipation.  In  the  absence  of 
56 The law attempts to do this. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq (2000).
57 See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
58 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
59 Rent dissipation theory is thus insufficient to make a priori welfare assessments, a task which industrial organization attempts. 
See infra Part II.A.
60 Kitch, supra note 58 , at 271 -75.
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property  rights  in  the  gold  context,  no  one  has  an  incentive  to  prospect  for  gold,  unless  a 
discovery can at least temporarily be kept secret, because others will immediately converge to 
share in any reward. Just as a property right solves this problem, so too does patent law provide 
an incentive to generate innovation despite the possibility of second-mover advantages.
61 That 
point is a twist on the traditional incentive rationale for patent law,
62 but Kitch also emphasized
that a patent improves post-invention incentives,
63 because there is no risk of a rent-dissipating 
race to improve a patented product. In the absence of patent protection, such a race might result 
in  excessive,  partly  redundant  research,  as  well  as  earlier  than  optimal  deployment  of  an 
invention.
64 More inventors may pursue a particular line of research than is socially optimal.
65
Patents, however, cannot eliminate rent dissipation altogether, as Donald McFetridge and 
Douglas Smith pointed out shortly after Kitch.
66 Rather, patent protection pushes rent-dissipating 
entry to an earlier stage. Instead of competing to improve and market an existing innovation, 
private parties in a patent regime will compete to obtain the patent.
67 The result is a patent race. 
That patent races are examples of rent dissipation may seem counterintuitive, because scientific 
races, whether or not for patents, often accelerate the pace of innovation.
68 Yet patent races can 
61 First-mover advantages may give some incentive to innovate even absent patent protection. See, e.g., Cecelia C. Conrad, The 
Advantage of Being First and Competition Between Firms, 1 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 353 (1983); Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence 
in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 97 ECON. J. supp. at 99 (1987); Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation 
Advantages of Pioneering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1982). 
62 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 497 n.2 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic economic 
function of the patent system is to encourage the making and commercialization of inventions . . . .”).
63 Kitch, supra note 58 , at 285 -86.
64 See generally Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968) (discussing the possibility of 
earlier than optimal deployment of an invention).
65 See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAIN TY AND INFORMATION 260 (1992).
66 Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 
198 (1980).
67 Patents do not, however, eliminate post-patent rent-dissipating races, because inventors may still seek to invent around existing 
patents. The courts have embraced inventing around as an important benefit of the patent system.  See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. 
Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that inventing around is “one of the important 
public benefits that justify awarding the patent owner exclusive rights to his invention”); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 
751  F.2d  1226,  1235-36  (Fed.  Cir.  1985)  (arguing  that  inventing  around  “bring[s]  a  steady  flow  of  innovations  to  the 
marketplace.”). Yet inventing around can be redundant too, especially if the new invention offers no advantage over the previous 
one. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1869 (1984); Donald F. 
Turner,  The  Patent  System  and  Competitive  Policy,  44  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  450,  455  (1969).  A  recent  analysis  suggests  that 
“between-patent” competition, i.e. competition from others with similar products, may cost an innovator as much as “within-
patent” competition, i.e. competition from generic products after a patent expires. See FRANK R. LICHTENBERG & TOMAS J. 
PHILIPSON, THE DUAL EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGULATIONS: WITHIN AND BETWEEN PATENT COMPETITION IN THE 
US PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Harris Sch. of Pub. Pol’y Working Paper No. 02.09, 2002).
68 A recent example was competition in sequencing the human genome. See Eliot Marshall, Rival Genome Sequencers Celebrate 
a Milestone Together, 288 SCIENCE 2294 (June 30, 2000) (reporting on the early completion of an initial sequence). For an 
argument  that  patent  races  often  accelerate  innovation  and  lead  to  inventions  entering  the public  domain  earlier  than  they 
otherwise would, see John Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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also produce redundancy, especially if different competitors run down the same blind alleys, 
unaware of their competitors’ successes and failures.
69 Thus, patent races are a useful example of 
rent dissipation that has some benefit for third parties, consumers who eventually will receive 
surplus from the invention.
70 The ultimate cost-benefit balance is theoretically indeterminate, and 
presumably  varies  from  one  patent  race  to  the  next.  Even  more  theoretically  complex  is  a 
comparison  of  the  harm  from  pre-patent  and  post-invention  rent  dissipation. Though  an 
important  qualification,  the  McFetridge-Smith  analysis  thus  does  not  necessarily  seriously 
undermine  Kitch’s  suggestion  that  patent  law’s  concentration  of  prospecting  rights  promotes 
efficiency.
Kitch’s argument, in any event, is more positive than normative, as he identifies various 
features of patent law that are consistent with  reducing rent-seeking.  For example, just as a 
prospector in a gold rush does not have to establish that mining is likely to be productive in a 
particular  area  to  obtain  a  prospecting  right,  so  too  does  an  inventor  not  have  to  prove 
commercial significance to obtain a patent.
71 Mark Grady and Jay Alexander extend this positive 
insight by arguing that patent law seeks to provide a balance between the inefficiencies of patent 
races  and  of  competitive  development  of  existing  innovations.
72 “Sometimes  the  threat  of 
improvement-stage rent dissipation calls for broad protection; sometimes no such threat exists, 
making  patent  protection  less  important,” argue  Grady  and  Alexander,
73 who  are  the  first to 
elaborate a connection between the patent and rent dissipation literatures.
74 Patent law grants 
broad protection when an “invention signals a set of improvements,” and patents in such cases 
69 While patent races may accelerate the point at which a patent is awarded, they also can delay that period. Participants in a 
patent race may reveal enough information to prevent their competitors from obtaining a patent first, in effect moving the end 
point of the race farther away. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000) (discussing the 
possibility of strategic disclosure); Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175 
(2000) (providing a model of the incentive to engage in strategic disclosure). Such strategic disclosure can enhance efficiency, by 
limiting the scope of patents and thus reducing deadweight costs, but also may decrease the incentives to obtain patents in the 
first place. See Parchomovsky, supra, at 944-45.
70 Robert Merges and Richard Nelson argue that Kitch understates the value of competition among researchers. See Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,  872  (1990).
71 Kitch, supra note 58 , at 271 -75.
72 Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 317 (1992) (“[A] full accounting of 
the effects of the patent system must balance the savings in reduced follow-on investment against the losses from accelerated 
pioneering investment. It may be that the avoidance of follow-on rent dissipation more than makes up for the consequences of the 
race to be first.”). This account thus balances the costs of both types of rent dissipation. A broader theory might also consider the 
benefits, such as the extent to which competition is likely to increase the amount of innovation.
73 Grady & Alexander, supra note 72, at 318.
74 Kevin Rhodes briefly makes such a connection before Grady and Alexander. See Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal 
Circuit’s Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1051, 
1088 (1991).
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preclude “any possibility of a rent-dissipating rush to discover the modifications.”
75 Patent law 
limits protection where patent races present the greater rent dissipation danger. For example, 
Grady  and  Alexander  suggest  that  patent  law’s  utility  requirement
76 precludes  patenting  of 
compounds that have no known use because “a rule allowing chemicals to be patented before a 
use could be demonstrated would prompt a race to claim as many chemicals as possible, in the 
hope that some would prove useful during the patent term.”
77
2. A Preliminary Rent Dissipation Model of Copyright Law
The  extent  to  which  Grady  and  Alexander’s  rent  dissipation  theory  of  patent  law 
accurately captures both doctrine and actual judicial decisionmaking is beyond the scope of this 
Article.
78 The central observation for present purposes is that it is possible that legal doctrine 
may seek to minimize the sum of various forms of rent-seeking, while paying attention as well to 
independent policy goals. At first, it might appear that copyright law does not attempt such an 
accommodation, because the property rights of copyright law are much weaker. While a patent 
prevents follow-on innovation, copyright, in both doctrine and rhetoric, encourages authors to 
take  earlier  authors’  ideas  and  improve  upon  them,  as  long  as  they  do  so  with  original 
expression.
79  If  copyright  law  were  designed  single-mindedly  with  minimization  of  rent 
dissipation as a goal, it likely would not allow this. Instead, copyright law might grant the first 
author in a particular genre the right to that genre, at least for some period of time. And so, J.K. 
Rowling might have to pay royalties to J.R. Tolkien, or the first cookbook to illustrate recipes 
with step-by-step pictures might be able to prevent publication of subsequent works.
Such a copyright law is not attractive, but let me offer a brief endorsement before I point 
out the obvious flaws. In a copyright regime with strong copyrights, there would be far less 
redundancy. If I created the illustrated cookbook genre with an Italian cookbook, for example, I 
75 Id.
76 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
77 Grady & Alexander, supra note 72, at 339.
78 For evaluations of the Grady-Alexander thesis, see Donald L. Martin, Reducing Anticipated Rewards from Innovation Through 
Patents: Or Less Is More, 78 VA. L. REV. 351 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the 
Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 (1992); and A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-
Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 284-86 (1996).
79 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 102 (1879) (“To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art 
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the 
public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.”).
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might refuse to allow a large number of illustrated Italian cookbooks with similar recipes. At the 
same  time,  I  would  have  strong  incentives  to  license  the  right  to  copy  my  innovation  for 
somewhat different products, so I likely would permit illustrated cookbooks for other cuisines. It 
might even be profitable to license (or create myself) an illustrated Italian cookbook that offered
different recipes or addressed in detail a subset of Italian cooking. Thus, there would almost 
certainly be fewer works, probably dramatically fewer, but copyright holders would still author 
or license a range of works to appeal to a range of consumers and to encourage some consumers 
to buy more than one. In short, I would have incentives to create new works but not redundant 
works, just as a patent holder has an incentive to improve on the patented product but not to 
develop a product with a similar function through a different mechanism.
Of course, just as patents solve post-invention rent dissipation only at the expense of 
races to obtain patents, the value of such a robust copyright would produce races to obtain these 
copyrights.
80 Yet it seems likely that  any rent dissipation here would be  less harmful to the 
public. Such a copyright system would place a premium on originality, for it would only be by 
executing an idea for a new genre of work that one would receive protection. The result might 
well be many works that are junk, but there would be little of the redundancy often associated 
with  patent  races.  In  the  patent  context,  the  desired  outcome  is  often  obvious—a  cure  to  a 
disease, for example—but the means to obtaining that outcome mysterious, and experimentation 
thus results. With copyright, though, there is less guesswork (though considerable elbow grease) 
involved in transforming idea to expression, and so while it is possible that there sometimes 
might be a race to get out the first work in a newly created genre, that possibility is much less of 
a concern. This robust copyright would thus stimulate the creation of truly original works, while 
giving copyright owners appropriate incentives to develop new works.
The first piece of bad news is that the system might still be very inefficient, probably far 
more inefficient than the copyright system that we have. Copyright would confer power not only 
to control the number of new works, but also to set the price of existing works.
81 The owner of 
80 Copyright races are rare under the current copyright law, because the first person to obtain a copyright does not obtain a 
copyright on the genre as a whole. If patent law were also nonexclusive, there similarly would likely be fewer patent races, and 
indeed one commentator has suggested a nonexclusive patent system for this reason. See John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a 
Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251 (2002). The difficult question is whether the nonexclusive patent system would 
lead  to  more  redundant  development  or  less.  Leibovitz  points  out  that  inventors  would  have  an  incentive  to  license  their 
technological advances to firms lagging beyond them in development, since those firms would be able to obtain patent rights as 
well. Id. at 2272. But laggards might be less likely to drop out of a patent race for precisely this reason. 
81 If copyright is a natural monopoly, some form of natural monopoly regulation might be used to control prices. See generally
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the copyright to illustrated cookbooks would set a relatively high price for cookbooks, acting as a 
monopolist. Thus, the robust form of copyright would allow producers to obtain rents only at the 
cost of limiting consumer surplus. While in theory it is possible that the increase in producer 
welfare would offset the decrease in consumer welfare, it seems likely that this would not be so, 
for the familiar reason that monopoly pricing produces a deadweight loss. A world with very few 
copyrighted works and very high prices seems sure to hurt consumers more than it would help 
producers. Whether this holds, however, might depend on how robust the copyright was. If there 
were thousands of different copyright holders with rights to make different types of cookbooks, 
for example, the copyright holders would need to compete against one another, and so perhaps 
the  system  might  produce  relatively  little  deadweight  loss  while  still  substantially  reducing 
redundancy.
This observation, however, points to an equally fundamental problem of this hypothetical 
copyright regime, that it would be difficult to administer. How robust would a copyright be? 
Would the first illustrated cookbook provide a copyright over all future illustrated cookbooks, or 
only  an  illustrated  cookbook  for  the  same  type  of  cuisine,  or  only  a  cookbook  with  the 
illustrations arranged in the same way? Moreover, how innovative would a new work have to be 
to obtain copyright protection? Would the new work need to create a new genre or sub-genre, as 
the above examples seem to suggest? Or would merely a new idea suffice, so that the first Italian 
cookbook to suggest a new technique for rolling out pizza dough could prevent others from 
adopting that technique?
82 How clearly would a new idea need to be stated to be entitled to a 
copyright? Patent law confronts such questions, and perhaps a copyright office could make such 
assessments. But the universe of ideas that would be copyrightable subject matter would be 
larger than the universe of patentable subject matter, and the number of copyrights (under current 
rules at least) dwarfs the number of patents.
83 The challenges of developing this robust copyright
law accordingly likely would be greater than in the patent context.
POSNER, supra note 48 , at 377 -96 (describing the regulation of common carriers). The task might be far more difficult given the 
number and diversity of copyrighted works, however.
82 Current copyright law would not allow the cookbook to monopolize the technique, even if other cookbooks’ descriptions of it 
might seem to reflect copying of the original. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 107 (refusing to allow the owner of a 
copyright in a book describing a new accounting system and providing forms for execution of the system to prevent others from 
selling similar forms).
83 In 2001, the Copyright Office registered 601,659 claims. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS at 1 (2001),  
available at www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2001/law.pdf. In the same year, 326,508 patent applications were filed with the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  See U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790-2001 (updated yearly), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm.  This  understates  the  difference  between  the  number  of 
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It is, of course, the specter of such a copyright office that would be the greatest concern, 
even if we had confidence that the relevant officials had all the tools they would need to make 
copyright run smoothly. Freedom of speech may not be absolute, but preventing someone from 
expressing an idea or writing in a particular genre would seem to be a gross violation of freedom 
of speech. First Amendment doctrine, of course, tolerates the current copyright regime,
84 but 
granting  the  copyright  office  or  even  the  courts  the  power  to  determine  whether  an  idea  is 
original  or  derivative  would  be  dangerous,  as  would  be  a  copyright  regime  that  allows  the 
initiator of an idea to prevent others from repeating it. For this reason and the others, then, this 
robust copyright regime is unimaginable. At least, modifications would need to be made to make 
such a regime palatable. For example, we might modify the regime to allow free copying of 
ideas. Similarly, we might limit the genres over which a copyright owner could exert control to 
those in which the genre is encapsulated by the copyright owner’s expression (for example, in 
delineating a particular character) rather than by an idea. We might carve out special exceptions 
for  speech  that  would  be  infringing  but  produce  substantial  social  value  that  could  not  be 
achieved  without  allowing  some  borrowing.  These  are  big  exceptions  but  they  would  not 
eliminate copyright law’s concern with redundancy altogether. What would such a copyright 
system look like? Much like the one that we actually have.
C. Toward a Positive Theory of Copyright Law
A  recognition  of  the  normative  significance  of  both  rent  dissipation  theory  and  the 
possibility of overentry, though important for analysis of particular doctrinal issues in copyright, 
need not lead to wholesale reform of copyright law. To the contrary, the remainder of this article
will  argue  that  copyright  law  already  substantially  reflects  concerns  about  wasteful  rent 
dissipation. More precisely, copyright law generally minimizes the fixed costs associated with 
redundant entry. There are several important aspects of this statement. First, copyright law is 
particularly  concerned  with  fixed  costs,  such  as  the  cost  of  producing  and  marketing  a 
copyrighted work. If books could be written and marketed with no effort, then copyright law 
would present no problems of rent dissipation. Second, copyright law seeks to avoid fixed costs 
copyrights and patents, however, as registration is not required for copyright protection.
84 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, slip op. at 28-31 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2003); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 
1099 (2d Cir. 1982) (“No circuit . . . has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct 
from any accommodation embodied in the ‘fair use’ doctrine.”). 
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only when those fixed costs would produce relatively redundant works. As the above discussion
suggests, copyright law cannot eliminate all redundancy, but this section will show that some 
aspects of copyright law consider redundancy. Third, copyright law may minimize fixed costs 
either by providing a broad or narrow scope of protection. Broad protection may prevent entry, 
but where entry is inevitable, narrow protection may make entry less expensive.
That copyright might already reflect a principle that has received no direct attention by 
copyright theorists or in copyright case law may seem too good to be true. There is, however, a 
simple public choice reason that copyright law should take into account rent dissipation. Authors 
and  publishers  have  a  strong  incentive  to  seek  a  legal  regime  that  will  prevent  others  from 
cannibalizing their profits. Those who would engage in such cannibalization, by contrast, have 
little incentive to engage in lobbying, because there is little profit in being a second mover if
third,  fourth  and  fifth  movers  will  immediately  follow.
85 At  the  same  time,  no  one  has  an 
incentive to support an expansive copyright rule where the copyright holder would not gain from 
the property right.
86 Private parties’ incentives will thus tend to induce policymakers who seek 
contributions implicitly to take into account rent dissipation concerns. 
I do not mean to suggest that private lobbying in general will lead to optimal results, or 
even that copyright law is optimal as a result of private parties pursuing their own legislative 
interests. Some organizations may serve as proxies for consumers in legislative bargaining,
87 and
legislators should be expected to take consumer welfare somewhat into account in all but the 
most cynical theories of public choice, but producers have an obvious lobbying advantage.
88
Thus, deviations of copyright doctrine from a hypothetical optimum that would take into account 
consumer welfare as well as rent dissipation should be expected, and indeed I will point out 
instances in which copyright law seems to protect producers at the expense of consumers. The 
analysis here, however, suggests simply that legislators seek to avoid rent dissipation and that 
85 William Landes and Richard Posner have noted that a relatively weak copyright may benefit authors, because it allows them to 
use others’ work more. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 325, 332-33 (1989). Authors’ incentives in general, however, are to seek a copyright law that allows use of others’ work 
only where such use will not result in direct competition with those whose work is used. There is not much profit in engaging 
along with many others in such direct competition, and there is a substantial rent to protect in preventing it.
86 For a historical analysis of copyright lobbying, see Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to 
Proposed Copyright Reforms Since the 1909 Act, 36 J. COPR. SOC’Y 109, 127 (1989).
87 See, e.g., infra note 266.
88 See,  e.g.,  John  Borland,  RIAA  Boosts  Anti-Napster  Lobbying  Efforts,  CNET  News.com,  Feb.  27,  2001,  available  at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023 - 253215.html?legacy=cnet  (reporting  on  the  Recording  Industry  Association  of  America’s 
lobbying efforts).
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some aspects of copyright law that might seem either to be giveaways to content producers or to 
be strange exceptions to such giveaways at least have some economic foundation.
Even where rent dissipation is relevant, copyright doctrine might deviate from the policy 
recommendation that rent dissipation theory would make. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, copyright doctrine reflects many considerations, both economic and noneconomic, and as 
the  analysis  of  the  hypothetical  copyright  regime  above  demonstrated,  at  times  these 
considerations will be in tension. I do not mean in introducing this positive theory of copyright to 
deny the relevance of other possible positive considerations. Rent dissipation theory helps to 
resolve some of copyright law’s puzzles, but these are only puzzles in the first place because 
they reflect deviations from some hypothetical copyright law that reflects the considerations that 
we already know are important. Moreover, there may be alternative, sometimes complementary 
explanations  for  these  puzzles.  Douglas  Lichtman  has  recently  argued,  for  example,  that 
copyright doctrine seeks to save the courts from decisions of evidentiary complexity.
89 This helps 
to  explain,  among  other  things,  copyright  law’s  requirement  of  creativity,
90  which  rent 
dissipation  also  helps  to  explain. My  theory  is  merely  that  rent  dissipation  is  an  important 
consideration in a copyright law that is also influenced by other considerations and constraints.
Second, copyright law is made by both legislators and judges, and the political economy 
of  the  legislative  process  is  absent  in  the  independent  judiciary.  There  are,  however,  some 
reasons to think that judges would take into account rent dissipation as well. Copyright doctrine 
is at least in theory an exercise in statutory interpretation, and so case law roughly may reflect 
legislative purpose.
91 In addition, many judges may adopt a vaguely natural law approach to 
copyright,
92 believing that authors generally should have control over development of their work, 
and this reasoning happens to cohere with rent dissipation theory. More important, some aspects 
of rent dissipation theory are quite intuitive. Judges may intuitively see works that are largely 
redundant as less valuable than works that are more distinct. Similarly, judges may recognize 
that it is inefficient to require authors to duplicate the work of others if ultimately they will be 
89 See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 2003 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
90 Id. (manuscript at 23-29).
91 Similarly, judges may seek to make decisions that Congress is relatively unlikely to overturn, and of course “good law” 
consists of judge-made law that has not been overturned. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988) (assessing the extent to which legislative inaction validates past interpretations).
92 For a more explicit natural law approach to copyright, see Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
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allowed to enter the market anyway. Thus, while judges may not make rent dissipation theory an 
explicit basis of their decisions, the intuitive pull of rent dissipation concerns may affect the 
conclusions that they reach. I do not, however, mean to ascribe copyright’s accommodation of 
rent dissipation concerns entirely to motivation, even to subconscious motivation. Some of the 
compatibility  of  copyright  with  rent  dissipation  concerns  may  be  coincidence,  and  this 
contribution to the positive theory of copyright is not primarily a causal one.
II. THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT AND RELATED DOCTRINES
Copyright  law  routinely  allows  entry  of  works  that  will  dissipate  the  rents  of  earlier 
works by using their ideas, but it prevents entry of works that would dissipate the rents of earlier 
works by using too much of their expression,  even when the new  works would divert little 
business from the works being copied. Copyright theory has offered no persuasive justification 
for this distinction, embodied in copyright’s derivative right. This Part offers a new theoretical 
justification for the derivative right, following straightforwardly from the rent dissipation theory 
sketched above. Copyright law must tolerate the general crowding of product space,
93 but the 
derivative right, complemented by the reproduction right as applied to particular aspects of a 
work such as characters and plots, prevents the extreme local crowding of product space that 
would  exist  if  anyone  could  create  an  unauthorized  adaptation  of  any  other  work.  After 
introducing this theory in Parts II.A and II.B, Part II.C explains how the theory may strengthen 
the  case  for  a  long  copyright  term,  and  Part  II.D  shows  how  the  theory  may  help  reduce 
incoherence in doctrine concerning the scope of both the derivative and the reproduction rights.
A. The  Puzzling  Derivative Right
Commentators explain the derivative right with the same incentive rationale generally 
applied to justify copyright as a whole. Paul Goldstein, for example, uses Gone with the Wind
94
to explain how the derivative right extends copyright’s basic logic
95 Copyright’s reproduction
right
96 provided Margaret Mitchell and her publisher an incentive to “invest time and money in 
93 See supra Part I.B.2.
94 MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936). Goldstein’s choice of an example anticipates a later case considering the 
circumstances in which the fair use doctrine can overcome the derivative right. See infra note 320.
95 See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (1983); see also
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3 (2002) (repeating the analysis).
96 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (2002).
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writing, editing, producing and promoting the popular novel, . . . knowing that no one may copy 
the work’s expressive content without their consent.”
97 In contrast, the derivative works right 
“enables prospective copyright owners to proportion their investment in a work’s expression to 
the returns expected not only from the market in which the copyrighted work is first published, 
but from other, derivative markets as well.”
98 Mitchell and publisher “can hope to monopolize 
not only the sale of the novel’s hardcover and paperback editions, but also the use of the novel’s 
expressive elements in translations, motion pictures and countless other derivative formats.”
99
The  copyright  owner’s  ability  to  exploit  a  copyrighted  work  not  just  through  exclusive 
reproduction, but also through adaptation to various derivative formats, increases the potential 
returns  from  creation  of  a  copyrighted  work.  The  derivative  right  thus  allows  a  prospective 
copyright owner to “proportion . . . investment” accordingly.
There are two ways that the derivative right might increase investment, though in each 
case the effects may be small. First, the derivative right could lead someone who otherwise
would not have created a copyrighted work to create one. For someone who is unsure of whether 
to write a book, the possibility of royalties from adaptations may be the decisive consideration. A 
problem  with  this  explanation  is  that  revenues  from  adaptations  ex  ante  may  be  far  more 
significant for some works than others, and the works most likely to be adapted—John Grisham 
novels, for example
100—are likely to be so successful in and of themselves that they will be 
inframarginal works that would be produced anyway, not works where financial factors make 
authors close to indifferent about whether to create them. Of course, sometimes works of which 
little is expected end up being bestsellers, and the fantasy of fame, fortune, and film adaptations 
may drive some  yet unheralded writers.
101 Publishers, moreover, may implicitly factor in the 
97 Goldstein, supra note 95 , at 214.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 It is possible, of course, that Grisham would have written fewer books if he were able only to exploit the books themselves 
Whether John Grisham would have produced fewer or more books if he received no compensation for movie rights depends on 
the balance of income and substitution effects. Cf. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Partha S. Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public 
Goods, and Economic History, 38 REV. ECON. STUDS. 151, 159 (1971) (claiming that income tax increases sometimes have lead 
workers to work more rather than less). In effect, the existence of the derivative right increased Grisham’s revenues per book, and 
it is possible that Grisham might have made so much money from his first few works that he chose to allocate more time to 
leisure than he would have if he had made less money. The Grisham example, however, also suggests that if copyright law were 
suddenly to eliminate derivative rights, authors who have previously profited from them might no longer see it as worth their 
while to keep writing, as the expected royalties from subsequent works would be only a small percentage of royalties already 
received.
101 Markets for copyrighted works are sometimes described as winner-take-all markets, in which the most successful contributors 
receive a high portion of total profits. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 9 (1995) 
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possibility of revenues from derivative rights even where these rights are rare; even if an author 
retains film rights, adaptation is likely to increase sales of the original, explaining the lamentable 
practice of placing movie stills on the covers of books that have been adapted. In sum, derivative 
rights presumably do have some effect on the number of works created, but probably a large 
number of works, and especially a large number of the works most likely to be adapted, would 
be created even in the absence of derivative rights.
Second, the derivative right might lead someone to invest more in a copyrighted work to 
preserve and maximize opportunities for adaptation. Consider, for example, Laura Hillenbrand, 
whose  nonfiction  best-seller  Seabiscuit
102 became  a  movie.
103  Hillenbrand  insists  that  in 
developing the initial book proposal for Seabiscuit, which was based in turn on an earlier article 
that she had written,
104 the possibility of a movie never occurred to her,
105 suggesting that she 
would  have  written  the  book  even  in  the  absence  of  the  derivative  right  to  film  adaptation. 
Hillenbrand,  however,  ended  up  with  a  movie  contract  before  writing  the  book,
106 and  it  is 
plausible to imagine that she devoted more time to researching and writing the book once she 
knew that the book would become a movie. Of course, Hillenbrand would have had incentives to 
write a strong book in any event, so it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the effect. More 
generally, the derivative right may tend to steer investment of both time and money to works that 
are most likely to be adapted, potentially increasing the quality both of those works and of the 
adaptations as well.
Though these effects are modest, if they were the only consequences of the derivative 
right,  the  incentives  case  for  the  derivative  right  would  remain  strong.  The  derivative  right, 
however, can also decrease the number of new works by reducing the number of adaptations. If 
there were no derivative right, anyone could write a sequel to a book or adapt the book into a 
film, and we might end up with numerous adaptations rather than with just a small number. 
Uncopyrighted works often result in more adaptations than copyrighted works. Consider, for
(“Book publishing is a lottery of the purest sort, with a handful of best-selling authors receiving more than $10 million per book 
while armies of equally talented writers earn next to nothing.”).
102 LAURA HILLENBRAND, SEABISCUIT: AN AMERICAN LEGEND (2001).
103 SEABISCUIT (Universal Studios 2003).
104 See Laura Hillenbrand, Four Good Legs Between Us, AMERICAN HERITAGE, July 1, 1998, at 39.
105 See  Michael  Neff,  An  Interview  with  Laura  Hillenbrand,  available  at  http://www.webdelsol.com/SolPix/sp-
laurainterview.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
106 Id.
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example, the four movie versions of the uncopyrighted Les Liaisons Dangereuses,
107 or the three 
television dramatizations of the Amy Fisher saga.
108 While we cannot be sure how many movie 
versions of Harry Potter
109 would exist in the absence of the derivative right, it seems plausible 
that there might be several, and Harry Potter aficionados would argue about which movie was 
the best one. At least, it is certain that there would be many written adaptations of Harry Potter, 
as  amateur  authors  presumably  would  create  a  large  number  of  unauthorized  sequels  and 
adaptations to other cultural contexts.
110
The incentives justification for the derivative right thus rests on an enthymematic and 
uncertain empirical claim, that the increase in the number and quality of original works that the 
derivative right effects more than offsets any decrease in the number of derivative works. That is 
possible, but there are reasons to think that it is unlikely. The derivative right provides only one 
factor in the calculus of a prospective writer of an original work, but it provides an absolute bar 
to creating and commercializing unauthorized adaptations. Even in the absence of an exclusive 
derivative right, authors of original works would have some ability to exploit derivative works, 
assuming that trademark law will prevent unauthorized adapters from passing off their derivative 
works as created by the authors of the original. The only reason that abolition of the derivative 
right would decrease authors’ incentives to create original works is that others also would have 
incentives and ability to create adaptations, so it seems unlikely that the eliminated incentives 
could be greater than the new incentives created.
111
In the absence of an empirical study refuting this logic, is there any way to salvage the 
incentives justification for the derivative right? One approach might be to view the derivative 
107 See  CRUEL  INTENTIONS  (Columbia/Tristar  Studios  1999);  DANGEROUS  LIAISONS  (Warner  Studios  1989); 
VALMONT (MGM, Inc. 1989); LES LIAISONS DANGEREUSES (Wellspring Media, Inc. 1959).
108 Linda Saslow, The Victim Forgives, Others Wish to Forget; Freedom Looms for Amy Fisher, and the Island Groans, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 11, 1999, at 14LI.  
109 See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (1998).
110 A recently lawsuit charged a Russian author for creating an unauthorized adaptation of Harry Potter into a Russian cultural 
context, even though the book did not use the name of Potter. See ‘Russian Harry Potter’ Courts Trouble with JK Rowling, 
EVENING STANDARD (London), Nov. 7, 2002, at 8, available at  2002 WL 101326209.
111 I do not mean to imply that it is impossible for the eliminated incentives to be greater than the new incentives. One possible 
story if of second-mover advantages. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708-09 (2001) (explaining how second-mover advantages may provide a justification for 
patent protection). Imagine a world in which books are inherently money-losing ventures, but book sales help determine which 
books would make profitable movies. Books are thus in essence the first stage of investment toward development of a movie. In 
the absence of a derivative right, no one would want to undertake this first stage, because if a book were successful, the producer 
of the book would not be able to capture the rents from production of the movie. In this world, the derivative right is essential to 
both the market for books and thus indirectly for movies adapted from books. Similar less extreme dynamics may well operate in 
real markets, but because many books are themselves profitable, 
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right as a backup to the reproduction right. If the copyright holder did not hold an exclusive 
derivative right, then a would-be copier would change just enough of the original work to ensure 
that  the  copying  was  beyond  the  scope  of  the  reproduction  right.  If  the  reproduction  right 
covered only literal copies and trivial variations, this defense of the reproduction right might 
seem sensible. But the reproduction right goes much further this, covering even the borrowing of 
characters and plots, as we shall soon see,
112 so the derivative right has little to back up. And 
even if the reproduction right were narrowed, the derivative right extends considerably further 
than  necessary  to  make  it  economically  prohibitive  for  pirates  to  avoid  liability  through 
transformation.  Moreover,  if  the  concern  were  simply  to  solidify  the  reproduction  right,  the 
logical course would seem to be expansion of that doctrine, rather than creation of a new one. It 
is legitimate to be concerned with discouraging the making of changes solely to avoid copyright 
liability,
113 but this concern cannot save the incentives justification of the derivative right.
An alternative approach to saving the incentives rationale might be to argue that although 
the  derivative  right  may  not  result  in  copyright  law’s  maximizing  the  number  of  works,  it 
provides the strongest incentives for the most important works. Even if the incentives rationale 
results in the creation of only a few more original works, some of these works may result in the 
production  of  a  large  number  of  derivative  works.  The  derivative  right  may  prevent  the 
production of many derivative works, but these derivative works will be of less importance, 
because  they  are  less  likely  to  lead  to  creation  of  second-order  derivative  works.  This 
explanation is closer to the correct one, but ultimately it is just a reformulation of the same 
empirically  tendentious  claim.  The  argument  equates  importance  with  the  total  number  of 
derivative works that will flow from a particular work, and any argument that a law constraining 
production of derivative works will increase the number of derivative works at least demands 
some empirical support. In all likelihood, we could obtain more derivative works by eliminating 
the derivative works right, because then prospective creators of derivative works rights would 
have a vastly greater number of works that they could adapt without authorization, even if there 
might be slightly fewer original works overall.
112 See infra Part II.B.
113 See infra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
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To make the importance argument work, we must recognize that the relative importance 
of a work depends not solely on whether it will generate derivative works, but also on the extent 
to which it contributes to consumer surplus directly. That depends in turn on the extent to which 
revenues from the work are attributable to demand diversion rather than demand creation. If the 
revenues  are  largely  the  product  of  demand  diversion,  then  in  the  absence  of  the  work, 
consumers might have satisfied themselves almost as much with some substitute, but where the 
revenues are largely the product of demand creation, consumers who otherwise would not have 
made a purchase will do so. The more redundant a copyrighted work is likely to be, the stronger 
the case for copyright law to prevent the creation of that work by declaring it an infringement on 
an existing work. In general, derivative works will tend to be among the most redundant of 
works, because they borrow not just the ideas but also some aspect of the expression of the 
original  works. Whether  or  not  derivative  works  tend  to  be  so  redundant  that  they  reduce 
consumer welfare, copyright law may well maximize social welfare by incentivizing a smaller 
number of original works rather than a larger number of derivative works.
Rent  dissipation  theory  thus  provides  a  straightforward  explanation  of  the  derivative 
right. Note  that  the central  concern  is  not  that  derivative  works  may  be  redundant with  the 
original.  If  redundancy  between  the  original  and  derivative  works  were  the  concern,  then 
copyright law could employ additional strategies to discourage even the original author from 
creating  derivative  works,  for  example  by  providing  that  derivative  works  do  not  enjoy  the 
protection of copyright’s reproduction right. Under such a bizarre rule, J.K. Rowling would have 
exclusive rights to writing a Harry Potter sequel, but anyone would be able, subject only to 
trademark restrictions,
114 to sell pirated copies of that work. Such a rule would be not only unjust 
but also unwise, because derivative works are rarely redundant in the critical sense with the 
corresponding  original  works.  A  derivative  work  will  rarely  steal  business  from  the  earlier 
original work, so even if a derivative work and the original work share many similarities, the 
later work will almost never be a substitute for the earlier one.
115
114 The Supreme Court recently showed some reluctance to allow trademark doctrine to protect works no longer protected by 
copyright. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003) (holding that the Latham Act does not 
require copiers of an uncopyrighted work to credit the original authors of the work).
115 In some contexts, it may be straightforward to imagine knockoff derivative works that would steal business, for example 
purses that borrow themes from designer models. Fashion designs, however, are ordinarily not protected by copyright. See 
generally Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: Renewing the Proposal for 
Folding Fashion Works into the United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 341 (1991) (discussing copyright’s treatment 
of fashion design). At the same time, it is difficult to think of knockoffs in categories of derivative works. Even if Harry Potter
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The  concern,  rather,  is  that derivative  works  will  be  redundant  with  one  another.  If 
anyone were allowed to create derivative works, entry would come close to dissipating entirely 
the rents associated with commercial exploitation of the relevant expression. Rent dissipation 
might not be complete; moviegoers might prefer the authorized Harry Potter sequel or movie to 
unofficial  imitators,  so  the  original  author  would  still  be  able  to  exploit  the  work  through 
transformations to some extent.
116 But the competition among the unauthorized creators probably 
would at least dissipate any rents for unauthorized versions, plus a portion of the rent that the 
original author otherwise would enjoy from authorized derivatives. Once again, the concern here 
is  not  with  redundancy  in  an  informal  sense,  for  derivative  works  will  general  bear  more 
resemblance to an original than to one another. Rather, it is with redundancy in an economic 
sense. Even if a group of derivative works differ in dramatic ways, they may all be targeting the 
same consumer demand.
Some derivative works will have high social value, but copyright law does not prevent 
the production of such works. Rather, it places the decision whether to produce derivative works 
associated with a particular instance of expression in a single actor, the copyright holder, who 
has internal incentives to consider both the demand diversion associated with the new work as 
well as demand creation, the demand that otherwise would go unsatisfied. The copyright holder’s 
incentive is to maximize the rent and thus to minimize wasteful rent dissipation. Of course, there 
are circumstances in which a copyright holder might seek to block a derivative work not because 
the copyright holder fears business stealing, but because the derivative work entails a message 
that the copyright holder dislikes or fears will undermine the original work. These circumstances, 
however, are for the fair use doctrine to take into account.
117
Even where the derivative right does lead to maximization of the rent, the provision of 
the derivative right is not without social cost. The copyright holder may be able to charge more 
for derivative works because of the exclusive derivative right, thus increasing deadweight loss. It 
is  possible  that  this  social  loss  even  exceeds  the  benefit  of  minimizing  rent  dissipation,  but 
Congress  at  least  plausibly  has  struck  the  right  balance.  Allowing  monopolization  of  genres 
leads to creation of some additional books about wizards, it seems unlikely that many customers who otherwise would have 
purchased Harry Potter would have purchased these books instead.
116 See supra note 52  and accompanying text (noting that rent dissipation will not be co mplete where parties are not identically 
situated).
117 See infra Part III.B (discussing the fair use test).
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defined by ideas might create too much market power, but allowing monopolization of genres 
defined by expression seems less likely to do so. Not any one can make a Freddy Krueger film, 
but Freddy at least has to compete with Jason for ticket and video sales.
118 Even the most popular 
derivative works are generally priced no higher than other works,
119 but in a world in which all 
Italian cookbooks shared a publisher, considerably higher prices would result.
Does the derivative right provide the optimal copyright law? Certainly the derivative 
right  leaves  many  forms  of  redundancy,  including  redundant  development  of  uncopyrighted 
works.
120 Perhaps a copyright law single-mindedly devoted to stomping out redundancy would 
provide a mechanism for placing the derivative right to uncopyrighted works in private hands. 
This would be logistically complicated, however, and even if some form of auction could be 
used to revitalize expired derivative rights, at some point copyrighted expression becomes so 
foundational that the costs of forcing authors to avoid it might be unacceptably great. At the 
same time, the derivative right might be narrower. For example, copyright law might explicitly 
consider  the  number  of  existing  or  planned  derivative  works  to  determine  the  extent  of 
redundancy and allow works where derivative rights in essence have been abandoned.
121 That 
rent dissipation concerns cohere with copyright doctrine, however, does not mean that copyright 
doctrine would be improved if rent dissipation concerns were considered explicitly in each case. 
The expense and uncertainty associated with such analyses might not be worth any benefits.
Copyright law generally and the derivative right specifically are blunt instruments, but at least in 
an approximate way they reflect rent dissipation concerns.
B. Related Doctrines
Even in the absence of the derivative right, the reproduction right may be robust enough 
to discourage the most blatantly redundant transformations. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of 
118 Unless, of course, the owners of the respective copyrights authorize a joint derivative work. See FREDDY VS. JASON (New Line 
Cinema 2003).
119 All 870 pages of the most recent Harry Potter book can be yours in hardcover at the time of this writing for just $17.99. See
http://www.amazon.com (search for “Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix”) (last visited Aug. 5, 2003). This pricing 
strategy may seem surprising, considering the number of people who likely would be willing to pay $40 for the book. The 
strategy, however, may be dictated by a large number of anticipated marginal buyers. Or perhaps the publisher worries that a high 
price would lead even some who value Harry Potter at more than that price not to buy because they believe they are being 
cheated. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
121 Lawrence Lessig has argued for requiring de minimis copyright renewal fees to ensure that abandoned works are placed in the 
public domain. See http://eldred.cc/ea_faq.html (proposing the Eric Eldred Act); 4 WARREN’S WASH. INTERNET DAILY (June 25, 
2003), available at 2003 WL 16117616 (noting Lessig’s involvement).
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copyright law to the uninitiated is that individual components of works can enjoy independent 
copy  protection  that  extends  far  beyond  literal  copying.  At  the  beginning  of  the  semester, 
students in my intellectual property law class generally believe that copyright law prevents them 
from copying compact disks or taping television shows,
122 but they are skeptical of the possibility 
that copyright law might extend to protection of characters, plots, or themes. Perhaps those might 
receive protection under trademark, students who have a rudimentary sense of the distinction 
between  copyright  and  trademark  might  remark,
123 but  not  under  copyright.  They  may  back 
down when asked whether a minor change to a word or a note is sufficient to escape a charge of 
copyright infringement, but only a bit. The savviest students, indeed, will suggest that while the 
law in considering infringement may not forgive an infringer who seeks to evade the law through 
minor modifications, that does not mean that an author can receive protection for characters, 
plots, or themes. These intuitions, however, are wrong. Although copyrightability will often be a 
close  legal  question,  it  is  at  least  clear  that  copyright  protection  does  extend  beyond 
reproduction.
Consider,  for  example,  Anderson  v.  Stallone.
124 The  plaintiff  wrote  a  thirty-one  page 
outline for a possible Rocky IV. Unfortunately, there was a Rocky IV,
125 and it was quite similar 
to the plaintiff’s proposal, but the plaintiff received no compensation. Sylvester Stallone tellingly 
did  not  defend  on  the  ground  that  the  plot  outlined  in  the  plaintiff’s  treatment  was 
uncopyrightable.  Instead, Stallone slyly argued that the outline was not entitled to copyright 
protection because it itself infringed Rocky Balboa and the other characters from the series.
126
Stallone won this fight.
127 More significant, the strategy reflected what had long been clear, that 
characters are potentially the subject of protection. Judge Learned Hand had recognized this in 
122 Of course, it doesn’t clearly prevent them from doing either of these things. See infra Part I.B.2.d.
123 Indeed, there is substantial overlap between copyright and a variety of other doctrines in these areas. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, 
Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429 (1994).
124 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
125 Really don’t see ROCKY IV (United Artists 1985).
126 Copyright cannot be obtained for any part of a work using preexisting material unlawfully. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2002) 
(“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in 
which such material has been used unlawfully.”). Although § 103(a) denies protection only to “any part of the work” containing 
unauthorized material, it is broader than a refusal to extend copyright protection to the unauthorized material itself. A refusal of 
that nature would be redundant with § 103(b), which provides that copyright in a derivative work “does not imply any exclusive 
right in the preexisting material.” Section 103(a) thus requires courts to determine the meaning of the word “part.”
127  1989  WL  206431,  *8.  The  critics  concluded  that  Rocky  IV  was  derivative.  See,  e.g., 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/films/2000/06/11/rocky_iv_review.shtml  (“[T]his  derivative  and  shallow  sequel  might  weaken  the 
credibility of the series . . . .”).
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his famous opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
128 in which the principal allegation 
was that the plot infringed.
129 Judge Hand found no infringement, but he did conclude that both 
plots and characters could infringe, noting for the latter “that the less developed the characters, 
the less they can be copyrighted.”
130
Protection of characters and plots is difficult to understand on any traditional rationale. If 
the plot of Rocky is a good one, why shouldn’t we allow someone else to borrow that plot in 
another  context?  If  Balboa  is  an  interesting  character,  then  why  should  not  United  Artists’ 
competitors be allowed to use the character in their own movies? The best answer based on the 
incentive theory might be that there will be less investment in developing movies if third parties 
can steal the plots or characters in subsequent films. This seems specious, though, for the same 
reason  that  incentive  justifications  of  the  derivative  right  seem  specious:  Any  decrease  in 
investment would probably at least be offset by  the increase in investment in the derivative 
movies. An alternative theory might be that judges protect characters and plots based on some 
intuitive sense that reusing them amounts to misappropriation, but that begs the question. Why 
does borrowing of characters and plots trouble some jurists, when other forms of borrowing and 
allusion do not?
Rent dissipation theory squarely applies: If there is a rent from further development of a 
particular character or plot line, the law can eliminate dissipation of that rent by providing a 
property right to that development. It is one thing for Sylvester Stallone to subject us to Rocky II-
V, and possibly even a dreaded Rocky VI,
131 but quite another if several other studios got into the 
act. Such a development seems unlikely for the Rocky series, given that a Rocky movie without 
Stallone would likely not sell well, but Stallone can prevent the use of his image only because of 
present technological limitations
132 and because the right of publicity may similarly prevent rent 
dissipation.
133 In any event, copyright law can save us from unauthorized sequels to The Lion 
128 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
129 “The only matter common to the two,” Judge Hand summarized “is a quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish father, the 
marriage of their children, the birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation.” Id. at 122. That was not enough. 
130 Id. at 121.
131 See  Josh  Grossberg,  Stallone  Ready  for  “Rocky”  Redux,  EONLINE,  Dec.  12,  2002,  at
http://www.eonline.com/redirect;http://ad.doubleclick.net/adi/N2870.eo/B961809;sz=720x300;ord=10533?&seed=orbitz030101.
132 But cf. Rod Easdown, AGE, Jan. 16, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 6616628 (describing the use of digital effects to put 
dead actors in new movies). See generally Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of Deceased 
Entertainers — A  21st  Century  Challenge  for  Intellectual  Property  Law,  8  HIGH  TECH.  L.J.  101  (1993)  (considering  the 
intellectual property consequences of reanimation).
133 See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97 (1994).
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King or unauthorized James Bond movies starring a new actor as Bond,
134 even if trademark law 
somehow should turn out not to be up to the task. It can save us as well from unauthorized Lion 
King  stuffed  animals  and  007  martini  glasses.  If  free  competition  were  allowed,  additional 
studios would produce such derivative products until zero economic profit were expected, with 
marginal revenues equal to marginal cost. The property right ensures production of the number 
of adaptations that maximizes the difference between total revenues and total cost. 
Rent dissipation theory, of course, does not apply as far as it might. Sylvester Stallone did 
not receive a monopoly on boxing movies, and not just because pictures like On the Waterfront
established  the  genre  before  Stallone’s  involvement.  Copyright  law  will  not  extend  property 
rights  so  far  that  subsequent  authors’  freedom  to  express  ideas  and  pursue  broad  themes  is 
limited. This is reflected, for example, in the scènes à faire doctrine, which allows the use of 
“stock” literary devices, such as scenes in a beer hall and the singing of the German national 
anthem in a film about the Nazis,
135 even though some copyrightable work must have been the 
first to use such a device. As I will discuss below, case law on parody provides another important 
limit.
136 Once again, though, my claim is not that rent dissipation is copyright’s only concern. To 
the extent that copyright protection for characters is surprisingly broad, rent dissipation theory 
provides an explanation.
The challenge for courts is determining whether a finding that a copyright exists would 
amount to giving a monopoly over a genre, or whether it would only prevent rent dissipating 
uses of the plaintiff’s work. Copyright is relatively difficult to obtain for literary characters, 
because these characters are less developed and thus copyright might amount to a monopoly in a 
particular type of person.
137 A close case not involving copyright on characters is Roulo v. Russ 
134 The possibility that competitors might produce different Bondses is not altogether hypothetical. See Keith Poliakoff, Note, 
License to Copyright: The Ongoing Dispute Over the Ownership of James Bond, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387 (2000) 
(describing a controversy over ownership of the James Bond character).
135 Hoehling v. Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980).
136 See infra Part I.B.2.c.
137 Paul Goldstein suggests the following test for a literary character: “A literary character can be said to have a distinctive 
personality, and thus to be protectible, when it has been delineated to the point at which its behavior is relatively predictable so 
that, when placed in a new plot situation, it will react in ways that are at once distinctive and unsurprising.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT § 2.7.2 (1998). The test is not entirely satisfying. Certain stereotyped characters can be scarcely delineated and yet 
have  predictable  behavior,  while  others  may  be  well  delineated  and  yet  part  of  their  delineation  may  be  that  they  are 
unpredictable. Rent dissipation theory may suggest that the test should simply be whether the presence of the character is a 
significant factor in why people purchase the book. With this approach, any unauthorized Rocky movie would infringe, but a two-
minute peripheral scene involving Balboa would not.
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Berrie & Co., Inc.
138 The case concerned the copyrightability of a series of greeting cards. The 
allegedly  infringing  greeting  cards  were  stylistically  similar  to  the  originals,  with  respect  to 
variables such as size, border, and script typeface, and both sets of cards included sentimental 
phrases including the use of ellipses,
139 but the phrases themselves were not copied. The court 
found copyrightability in the arrangement and found infringement as well. The reason this case 
seems  troubling  is  that  it  might  seem  to  give  a  monopoly  over  the  most  obvious  style  for 
implementing the idea of sentimental phrase greeting cards. The court’s emphasis on alternative 
styles  that  the  infringer  might  have  adopted,
140 however,  reveals  that  the  court  at  least  was 
convinced that it was not granting a monopoly over the genre as a whole.
The questions of copyright law are often fact-specific, and rent dissipation theory cannot 
provide  general  answers.  Even  where  inquiries  are  not  fact-specific,  cases  can  be  close. 
Consider, for example, whether software manufacturers should be able to protect user interfaces. 
The case law is inconsistent,
141 and so is the rent dissipation analysis.
142 On one hand, once one 
company has developed an effective user interface, allowing other software companies to take it 
is likely to dissipate the rent from the interface. On the other hand, software companies would 
still be able to dissipate the rent by offering competing programs with alternative user interfaces, 
and requiring companies that will enter the market anyway to develop an alternative interface 
will increase the fixed costs of entry and thus rent dissipation. An additional consideration that 
might make this case different from others exhibiting a similar pattern
143 is the burden on users 
having to learn multiple interfaces. It is unclear which way this cuts. While the burden is itself a 
form of redundancy and thus akin to rent dissipation, it also may limit the number of firms that 
138 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989).
139 A particularly awful example: “‘I want to shout and tell the world how much I love you… but instead I’ll just… whisper.’” 
Id. at 935.
140 See, e.g., id. at 940 (“Berrie could have produced a non-infringing card with colored stripes, but Berrie used similar stripes 
flanking the verse on both the left and right side from top to bottom just as the FS cards did.”).
141 Compare Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that Lotus 1-2-3’s menu 
command hierarchy was not copyrightable and thus not infringed by rival spreadsheet program Quattro Pro), with Mitel, Inc. v.
Iqtel, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Lotus and finding command codes protectible). The technical issue in these cases 
was whether the menu commands were a “method of operation” and thus not copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Mitel
court argued that even if the commands were a method of operation, the expression within them could still be copyrighted. 124 
F.3d at 1372.
142 An  additional  complicating  factor  in  some  cases  is  the  difficulty  of  separating  the  user  interface  from  the  underlying 
functionality. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (1982) (addressing whether a 
game similar to Pac Man was infringing). 
143 See infra notes 405–408 and accompanying text. In these cases, no copyright was found.
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will choose to enter if a property right is found.
144 Given this complicated balancing, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that this remains a controversial area of copyright law.
145
The graphical user interface problem provides an example of a problem for which the 
reproduction right may be broader than the derivative right. Although it might be plausible to 
argue that Microsoft Excel’s user interface infringes Lotus 1-2-3’s, it seems less plausible to 
view  Excel  as  a  derivative  work  of  1-2-3.  In  many  of  the  other  examples  discussed  in  this 
section, the derivative and reproduction right are overlapping. In the Stallone case, for example, 
the unauthorized script not only infringed the copyright in Rocky Balboa and others, but also 
infringed the derivative right to the work as a whole.
146 While rent dissipation theory can provide 
explanations  of  both  the  derivative  right  and  the  broad  scope  of  what  in  a  work  can  be 
copyrighted,  it  cannot  offer  an  explanation  of  the  need  for  redundant  protections  against 
redundancy. I will return to this point below, by explaining how the derivative right and the 
reproduction right might be separated to serve distinct functions.
147
C. The Copyright Term
A corollary to rent dissipation theory’s explanation of the derivative right and of related 
issues  of  copyrightable  subject  matter  is  that  rent  dissipation  theory  can  help  provide  an 
explanation for the long copyright term.
148 The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 granted a 
20-year term extension both for existing and future works,
149 providing a term of life of the 
author plus 70 years, or, in the case of works made for hire, a fixed term of the lesser of 95 years 
144 A reverse balance exists in assessing the social welfare consequences of network externalities. See infra Part III.A.2.c. On one 
hand, network externalities confer a direct benefit on consumers, but they also may hurt consumers if they discourage new 
innovations. The twist here is that learning a new interface imposes a cost on consumers, but it may benefit society indirectly by 
discouraging redundant entry.
145 For recent assessments of protection for software generally, see Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software 
Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75,  123 & n.185 (2002); and 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection for Software: Still a Work in Progress, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445, 448 (2002).
146 Anderson v. Stallone, 1989 WL 206431, *8 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
147 See infra Part II.D.2.
148 A separate puzzle concerning the copyright term is that it is ordinarily based on the life of the author. For a behavioral 
economics resolution of this puzzle, see Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years” 
Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2002). 
Rent dissipation theory offers a complementary explanation, that a work is less likely to be commercialized far beyond the 
author’s death and that the author’s life thus helps identify the period in which use would likely amount to rent dissipation. 
Because authors often do not own copyrights in their creations, this factor will often not be significant, but it may have been more 
significant in earlier times.
149 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art237
from the year of first publication or 120 years from creation.
150 The Supreme Court upheld the 
Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
151 though even if the Court had struck it down, the copyright term 
would still be quite long, both by historical standards
152 and in comparison to the patent term.
153
The copyright term seems almost impossible to justify on traditional incentives grounds. 
A brief by prominent economists in support of the challenge to the term extension calculated that 
the term extension would produce a 0.33% increase in present value for a new work protected by 
copyright,
154 and even that is generous, given the economists’ assumption that the work produces 
equal revenues each year. Perhaps publishers are savvy enough to incorporate such anticipated 
future revenues into the payments they offer authors, but the amount is so small that it could lead 
to only a very small increase in the number of works.
155 The small increase in present value for 
new works, as the economists’ belief recognized, may not be dispositive, because the costs of a 
term extension would be borne in the future and thus should be discounted as well.
156 The ratio of 
deadweight loss to consumer surplus may be roughly comparable for both old and new works. 
But other costs, particularly  the  “tracing costs”  of identifying copyright owners  and seeking 
permission to reproduce works,
157 will become considerably higher over time.
It is thus the increase in certain costs, rather than the relatively small benefits to current 
producers,  that  makes  an  incentives  justification  of  a  long  copyright  term  vulnerable.  It  is, 
however, even more straightforward to conclude that the retroactive term extension cannot be 
150 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c).
151 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
152 For a brief history of the copyright term, see Joseph A. Lavigne, Comment, For Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer via 
the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 311, 315-21 (1996).
153 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (providing for a term of 20 years from the date the patent application was filed). For a criticism of 
this  disparity,  see  Edward  C.  Walterscheid,  The  Remarkable—and  Irrational—Disparity  Between  the  Patent  Term  and  the 
Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 233 (2001).
154 Brief of George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy F. Bresnahan, James M. Buchanan, Ronald H. Coase, Linda R. 
Cohen, Milton Friedman, Jerry R. Green, Robert W. Hahn, Thomas W. Hazlett, C. Scott Hemphill, Robert E. Litan, Roger G. 
Noll, Richard Schmalensee, Steven Shavell, Hal R. Varian, and Richard J. Zeckhauser as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft (No. 01-618). 
155 This consideration helps identify a problem with what might appear to be a case based on rent dissipation theory for a short
copyright term. At first blush, a rent dissipation theory of copyright might seem to predict a relatively short term. If many 
copyrighted works are redundant, then a short term would result in the production of fewer works, and rent dissipation theory 
suggests that the decrease in incentives to produce new works might be welfare-improving, or at least not as welfare-reducing as 
would  appear  in  the  absence of  the  theory.  This  consideration,  however,  is  small, because  the  present  discounted value of 
revenues from copyright many years in the future are small. 
156 Id. at 2 (“With respect to the term extension for new works, the present value of the additional cost is small, just as the present 
value of incremental benefits is small.”). Landes and Posner identify the possibility of an argument that the appropriate discount 
rate for the costs might be lower than that for the benefits. See Landes & Posner, supra note 360, at 9 n.20.
157 Landes & Posner, supra note 85 , at  361-62.
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supported by an incentives argument. A retroactive term extension cannot increase incentives to 
create works that already exist. At best, a retroactive term extension might lead publishers to 
anticipate future retroactive term extensions, but simply  granting an  even longer prospective 
extension would appear on an incentives rationale to be a more direct, if still flawed, approach. 
Meanwhile, there might appear to be several costs of a retroactive extension, as the economists’ 
brief argued. First, the term extension will produce deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.
158
Second, the extension will reduce innovation by restricting the production of new creative works 
using  existing  materials.
159  Third,  the  property  right  will  lead  to  costly  bargaining  and 
contracting.
160
The economists’ conclusion that the first and third arguments imply costs seem accurate, 
but the second argument is more problematic.
161 The economists seem to assume that production 
of new works using existing materials necessarily will be socially beneficial,
162 but they do not 
even  acknowledge  the  industrial  organization  literature  that  points  out  the  possibility  of 
excessive entry.
163 Nor do they recognize the possibility that even if entry is not excessive, new 
creative works produced from existing materials, even if representing commercially significant 
improvements over those materials, may tend to be redundant with one another. Rent dissipation 
theory, by contrast, identifies unrestricted use of existing materials to produce new ones, i.e. the 
unauthorized  creation  of  derivative  works,  as  precisely  the  type  of  use  most  likely  to  be 
economically inefficient.
The  debate  on  the  term  extension  act  has  focused  intensely  on  just  such  a  use,  as 
commentators have recognized that Disney has lobbied in favor of the extension in order to 
protect its copyright on Mickey Mouse.
164 The assumption that Mickey Mouse’s entry into the 
158 Landes & Posner, supra note 360, at 10-11.
159 Id. at 12-13 (“[T]he later innovator must pay for use of the earlier work, this will raise the innovator's cost of making new 
works, reducing the set of new works produced.”).
160 Id. at 13-14.
161 An additional complication is that the copyright extension may encourage investment in existing works, for example in the 
colorization of a black-and-white movie. See Landes & Posner, supra note 360, at 15-22. For an argument that the Copyright 
Clause is not concerned with this class of public goods problems, see Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: 
Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159 (2002).
162 The assumption is also clear elsewhere in the brief. See, e.g., id. at 8-9 (“One might argue that the windfall to authors of 
existing copyrights has a positive consequence, by providing them with more resources for additional creative projects.”).
163 See supra Part I.A.
164 See, e.g., Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
1998 (discussing the relevance of Mickey Mouse to debate over the copyright extension).
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public domain would be welfare-enhancing is perplexing, even absent the analysis in this article. 
Should Mickey Mouse enter the public domain, there might be reduced monopoly pricing of 
Steamboat Willie, but that benefit seems trivial and is not the focus of the statute’s critics.
165 The 
more significant effect would be to allow, subject to trademark limitations,
166 anyone to insert 
Mickey Mouse into their own films and comic books. Do we really need even more Mickey 
Mouse  movies  and  comic  books  than  we  already  have?  The  term  extension  critics  seem  to 
assume that we do, and perhaps they are right. Parodic uses of Mickey Mouse especially might 
be enriching,
167 but encouraging such uses seems more relevant to fair use analysis. 
Rent  dissipation  theory,  however,  suggests  that  the  benefits  to  even  devoted  fans  of 
Mickey of increased production are likely to be relatively small.
168 Consumer welfare might well 
rise  from  the  availability  of  additional  sources  for  Mickey  products,  even  though  many 
consumers would probably have interest only in Disney-certified products. But if there were a 
rent  to  be  made  from  unauthorized  Mickey  Mouse  T-shirts,  comic  books,  and  movies,  the 
competition among Disney competitors to produce such materials likely would dissipate that rent 
almost completely. At the same time, these unauthorized derivative works would compete with 
the authorized Disney derivative works, and the rent that Disney earns would be dissipated as 
well. Disney, of course, recognized this and presumably feared it, as royalties from Steamboat 
Willie seem unlikely to be sufficient to justify Disney’s lobbying. These costs are thus at least 
what animated Disney  and thus explain the long  copyright term,  regardless of whether they 
produce a sufficiently strong normative justification for it.
Even with the benefit of rent dissipation theory, the term extension question is not easy. It 
is possible that the deadweight costs of monopoly pricing for existing works and the transactions 
costs of negotiating licenses make the copyright term extension inefficient, and rent dissipation 
theory cannot prove that increases to consumer welfare from increased production of derivative 
165 A  proponent  of  the term  extension  makes  a  similar point.  See  Scott  M.  Martin,  The  Mythology  of  the  Public  Domain: 
Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 309-10 (2002) (“Is 
there a huge market anxiously awaiting the royalty-free distribution of a 1928 black-and-white cartoon over the Internet?”).
166 See id. at 317 n.184 (asserting that Disney has trademark rights to use of Mickey Mouse for numerous products).
167 But see Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving the use of Mickey Mouse in adult 
comic books). Perhaps the more accurate statement would be that parodic uses of Mickey Mouse especially have the potential to 
be enriching. 
168 It  is  possible  that  entry  could  produce  price  competition,  allowing  Mickey  fans  to  obtain  products  at  lower  prices  and 
reducing deadweight cost as well. Casual empiricism, however, suggests that such effects are likely to be small. All movies rent 
for the same price at Blockbuster, and comic book producers compete more on quality than on price.
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works will be less than the harm borne by producers. More generally, rent dissipation theory 
seems unlikely by itself to serve as a  general  purpose justification of monopolies. Allowing 
competition among utilities surely dissipates the rent that a single utility otherwise could enjoy, 
and  the  fixed  costs  associated  with  redundant  plants  has  figured  in  some  justifications  of 
governmental  regulation  of  utilities.
169 But  there  is  at  least  a  plausible  empirical  case  that 
consumers benefit from electricity competition,
170 and few favor unregulated monopolies over 
the alternatives of regulation and competition. The rent dissipation consideration is strongest 
where there are high fixed costs, where products face at least indirect competition, and where 
entry  seems  likely  to  have  only  modest  price  effects.  This  seems  plausible  in  the  case  of 
derivative works, and rent dissipation theory provides a plausible defense of a long copyright 
term,
171 but I mean only to suggest that rent dissipation theory provides a better explanation, not 
that it provides a convincing one.
172
Rent dissipation can provide at best only a defense of the lengthy protection that the 
derivative right enjoys. The rent dissipation cannot explain why there is also a long copyright 
term for reproduction. A superficially simple answer is that copyright law provides a single 
copyright term for all of the exclusive rights. Given that constraint, the determination of the 
copyright term, which requires a balancing of factors at different possible terminal dates, should 
depend  more  on  the  economics  associated  with  the  derivative  right  than  the  economics 
associated  with  the  reproduction  right.  The  derivative  right’s  relative  importance  increases 
throughout  the  copyright  term,  as  the  Mickey  Mouse  example  usefully  illustrates.  Rent 
dissipation theory provides some support for a copyright term that lasts until drawbacks like high 
169 John Duffy has recently noted parallels between the utility regulation literature and a more recent literature in patent law. See 
John Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
170 For an analysis of some of the difficulties inherent in electricity deregulation, see Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of 
Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435 (2002).
171 In the absence of a rent dissipation theory, the long copyright term seems explainable only as the worst form of political rent 
seeking. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, All Roads Lead to Rome, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25245660 (calling 
the CTEA “a state giveaway of public domain property, pure and simple”). Arguably, the term extension might reduce costs 
associated with political rent-seeking since the enactment of the statute will leave advocates with nothing more to lobby for. See
Landes & Posner, supra note 360, at 10-11. The success of the term extension movement, however, might encourage other rent 
seekers.
172 It seems particularly problematic that the term extension covers even works that are no longer being exploited by their 
owners, for use of such works is not likely to be rent dissipating. Such works individually are generally of little commercial 
value,  but  collectively  they  might  have  considerable  value,  and  a  regime  requiring  frequent  modest  payments  to  renew 
copyrights, as suggested recently by Landes and Posner, seems sensible. See Landes & Posner, supra note 360. Landes and 
Posner note that most copyrights become valueless by the time of the first renewal period, as evidenced by the high percentage of 
copyright holders who fail to pay the small renewal fee. See id. at 26. I criticize the argument that they raise in favor of a long 
copyright term infra Part III.A.2.b.
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tracing costs become overwhelming.
173 All of this, however, is on the assumption that it would be 
impossible to imagine a copyright law that provides a different tem for the reproduction and 
derivative rights. Providing a different term for the different rights would be simple as a matter 
of legislative drafting,but that masks an underlying complication. For copyright law to provide 
different  reproduction  and  derivative  terms,  it  would  need  to  find  a  conceptual  means  of 
distinguishing the reproduction and derivative rights. Development of an apparatus for making 
such a distinction is useful even if Congress continues to provide a single term for all rights, and 
we will now turn to that project.
D. Redefining the Derivative Right
We have already seen that the reproduction and derivative rights are closely related, often 
both applying on the same facts.
174 As Jed Rubenfeld has recently noted, “Under present law, the 
copyright owner’s “reproduction right” (the exclusive right to reproduce) is viewed as already 
encompassing much of what would otherwise be covered by the “derivative works right” (the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works).”
175 It is not merely that the rights are overlapping, 
or that those who commit the sin of transformation cannot resist the sin of reproduction. Rather, 
the  tests  for  violation  of  the  derivative  right  and  violation  of  the  reproduction  right  are 
themselves almost redundant. Although courts sometimes will return to the statutory definitions 
of the exclusive rights,
176 substantial similarity has emerged as an element of the infringement 
inquiry for alleged violations of both the reproduction right and the derivative right.
177 Except in 
cases  in  which  reproduction  is  authorized,
178 a  violation  of  the  derivative  right  will  almost 
automatically entail a violation of the reproduction right, because a derivative work will borrow 
some aspect of the original, and that aspect will be independently copyrightable.
173 This might provide a defense of a copyright term that becomes longer over time, as modern technology is likely to reduce the 
importance of tracing costs. There may well be competing considerations, however, and elsewhere I argue that there are strong 
reasons that copyright law should generally become weaker over time. See Abramowicz, supra note 12 (manuscript at 67-69).
174 See supra Part II.B.
175 Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 50 (2002). Rubenfeld adds, 
“Indeed,  it  has  been  claimed  that  the  derivative  works  right,  expansive  though  it  might  seem,  is  completely  superfluous,” 
commenting that the “claim is  an exaggeration, but a surprisingly modest one.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
177 See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Intern. Corp, --- F.3d --- (2d Cir. 2003) (following an earlier case that the court 
characterized as drawing “no distinction between the two forms of infringement,” and noting that the “substantially similar” test 
applied to both forms of infringement).
178 See infra notes 220-227 and accompanying text.
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In part, the similarity in definitions of the reproduction right and the derivative right may 
reflect that courts often simply do not have to distinguish them. Presumably, if Congress did ever 
create copyright terms of different lengths for the two rights, the courts would try harder to 
determine when each was implicated. There may be, however, a deeper explanation, which is 
that the justification for the reproduction right and the derivative right has essentially been the 
same, maximizing incentives to produce new works. Once rent dissipation theory provides an 
alternative basis,  it  may  become  possible  to  distinguish  these  rights.  The  purpose  of  such  a 
project, of course, is not to help Congress should it ever choose to mandate separate copyright 
terms, an unlikely prospect. Rather, in distinguishing the rights, we may be able to clarify their 
scope, and such clarification may be of use in hard cases.
1. Rubenfeld’s Approach
I am not the only commentator to suggest that copyright law could distinguish more 
clearly between the reproduction and derivative rights. Professor Rubenfeld has made a similar 
proposal, although his motive could not be more different. My argument above suggests that 
copyright’s protection of derivative rights might be justified even if the length of its protection of 
the  reproduction  right  is  not.  Rubenfeld,  by  contrast,  is  particularly  concerned  about  the 
derivative  right  and  neither  endorses  nor  questions  copyright’s  reproduction  right.  A 
consideration  of  Rubenfeld’s  analysis  will  be  useful  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  will  force  a 
confrontation between the partial defense of the derivative right that this Article has developed 
so far and the attacks on the derivative right from Rubenfeld and others.
179 Second, it will allow 
for  an  examination  of  Rubenfeld’s  doctrinal  proposal  as  a  prelude  to  my  own  suggested 
formulation of a test for derivative works.
Rubenfeld’s  approach  to  copyright  follows  from  a  broader  theory  of  the  First 
Amendment. Rubenfeld’s starting point is his observation that the First Amendment’s protection 
of art
180 cannot be explained by “giant-sized First Amendment theories”
181 based on some theory 
179 For another thoughtful critique of the derivative right, see Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 1213 (1997).
180 See generally National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) (“It goes without saying that artistic 
expression lies within this First Amendment protection.”); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569, (1995) (indicating that literature and arts are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment); Martin 
H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 601-04 (1982) (discussing First Amendment protection of art).
181 Rubenfeld, supra note 175, at 30. 
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of either democracy or expressive autonomy. Art has too small of an influence on the formation 
of political opinion for democratic theories to explain it,
182 and an expressive autonomy view 
fails  to  account  for  the  significance  of  the  right  to  view  art.
183 Rubenfeld’s  alternative  is  to 
propose that the First Amendment protects a “freedom of imagination,”
184 which includes “the 
freedom  to  explore  the  world  not  present,  creatively  and  communicatively.”
185  This 
reconceptualization,  Rubenfeld  argues,  both  explains  the  protection  of  art  and  reflects  the 
foundational point “that state actors cannot jail a person for holding the wrong political opinion 
or for believing in the wrong god.”
186
A potential criticism of Rubenfeld is that his endorsement of the freedom of imagination 
is  subject  to  the  same  criticism  that  he  levied  at  expressive  autonomy  theories.  Perhaps 
anticipating  this,  Rubenfeld  insists  that  the  communication  of  imagination  is  central  to  the 
freedom of imagination, but he does not explain why we should accept this view while rejecting 
the views of those who insist that the right to have a listener is essential to expressive autonomy.
I make this criticism not to attack Rubenfeld’s constitutional theory, which is beyond my scope 
here, but to identify the fundamental difficulty in applying it. The question is to what extent the 
law  must  protect  communication  of  imagination  to  honor  the  broader  freedom.  Rubenfeld’s 
answer is that “[i]f the alleged harms that the state seeks to redress by prohibiting or prosecuting 
the conduct in question can be fully, persuasively explained without any reference to anything 
the person communicated through that conduct, then the person is not punished for speaking.”
187
A “creative murder” thus cannot escape prosecution, because “to prosecute him is not to punish 
him for what he dared to imagine.”
188
182 Alexander Meiklejohn  argued  that  literature  and  art  help voters  acquire  “knowledge,”  “intelligence,”  and  “sensitivity  to 
human  values,”  all  of  which  contribute  to  decisions  at  the  ballot  box.  Alexander  Meiklejohn,  The  First  Amendment  Is  an 
Absolute, 1961 SUP.  CT. REV. 245, 256-57. Rubenfeld counters with an analogy to the First Amendment’s protection of religion: 
“Suppose someone said that prayer contributes to the formation of political opinion. This statement . . . would exaggerate 
prayer’s political significance while instrumentalizing it, making it carry democracy’s water.” Rubenfeld, supra note 175, at 33.
183 Rubenfeld recognizes that “[e]xpression requires an expressee as well as an expresser,” Rubenfeld, supra note 175, at 34, but 
he complains that “[t]he self-expression view of art comes to audience rights as a derivative thing, a kind of logical necessity 
implied secondarily if we are going to give artists the freedom to which they are entitled,” id.
184 Id. at 37.
185 Id. at 38.
186 Id. at 39.
187 Id. at 41.
188 Id. at 42.
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This explanation, however, cannot adequately distinguish the reproduction right from the 
derivative right, because if the reproduction right is not to be easily evaded, the courts must 
consider the content of allegedly infringing works that are not identical to the originals. “[N]ot 
just any change in the original work should suffice to evade the copyright holder’s reproduction 
right,” Rubenfeld acknowledges.
189 “Trivial or obvious modifications, or changes that involve no 
substantially new act of imagination, especially if introduced to evade the reproduction right, 
should not qualify.”
190 This threshold, however, is so low that courts either would have to inquire 
into motive
191 or allow works with only relatively modest injections of originality to qualify as 
derivative works. Rubenfeld takes the latter approach, recommending that copyright import into 
the definition of derivative works the separate case law concerning when a derivative work is 
sufficiently original to qualify for its own copyright.
192 “The required quantum of creativity is not 
large,” Rubenfeld notes, adding that “any ‘substantial’ or ‘distinguishable variation’ from the 
preexisting work will be sufficient.”
193
This  test  cannot  be  squared  with  Rubenfeld’s  concern  about  “trivial  or  obvious 
modifications” if triviality is to be measured against the work as a whole. Consider, for example, 
a version of Gone with the Wind in which a paragraph or a chapter was replaced. Such a change 
surely would involve an act of imagination, and a paragraph or chapter can be sufficiently long 
to merit independent copyright protection, yet it seems inconceivable that copyright law would 
or should tolerate distribution of such a work.
194 When Rubenfeld says “trivial,” he apparently 
means it, presumably counting even very minor substantive changes as enough to entitle a work 
to derivative status. This is an absolutist position, an insistence that copyright law cannot block 
189 Id. at 54.
190 Id.
191 In other writing, Rubenfeld has shown sympathy for judicial consideration of motives. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative 
Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 452-54 (1997) (justifying the school desegregation cases on the ground that the purpose, and not 
merely the effect, of the statutes was to degrade black people).
192 This standard is usually viewed as quite low. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 973, 976-77 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding a derivative works copyright in mezzotint engravings of works by old masters, because of the skill 
required for making the transformation). Some cases, however, apply a stricter standard. See, e.g., Batlin & Son, Inc., v. Snyder, 
536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to find an independent copyright in a transformation of an Uncle Sam bank from one 
medium to another).
193 Rubenfeld, supra note 175, at 55 (citing Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1998); Norma 
Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1995)).
194 One could imagine a copyright law that would tolerate distribution of the new portions alone along with indications of what 
text they should replace. But Rubenfeld appears to envision incorporation of expression into transformative works.
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the use of a large amount of previous authors’ expression to support a relatively modest exercise 
of imagination.
This criticism might seem a picky quibble about where to draw the constitutional line, but 
the objection is not a minor one, for if Rubenfeld does not take his absolutist position, he can 
offer no conclusive attack on the current state of the derivative right. Once we accept that it is 
sometimes proper to limit use of preexisting expression, then we need some rule determining just 
how much of previous authors’ expression can be copied in works that independently display 
imagination. Copyright law draws such a line, allowing authors to use without authorization the 
ideas but not the expression of their predecessors. Perhaps this is not the best line. Admittedly, it 
is notoriously imprecise.
195 But creating a more precise test, or a narrower but still not absolutist 
test, at least would require considerable effort. Moreover, the idea-expression dichotomy does 
pay some attention to the freedom of imagination. It allows anyone to exercise imagination as 
long as she does so without using others’ expression. No unauthorized party can distribute books 
containing alternative endings to Gone with the Wind,
196 but an author could express the same 
underlying ideas using different sets of characters. In addition, an author would remain free to 
criticize the original either directly or in a parody meeting the requirements of the fair use test.
197
In  the  end,  I  cannot  say  whether  the  constitutional  concern  with  the  freedom  of 
imagination is so weighty to render the existing regime inadequate. How to weigh the freedom of 
imagination with the Constitution’s encouragement of copyright generally depends on historical, 
value-laden and empirical concerns. Rubenfeld suggests that economic factors should necessarily 
yield to constitutional concern. Although economic interests and speech interests often may be 
aligned, Rubenfeld observes that the First Amendment would and should strike down a ban on 
195 As Judge Hand noted in developing the abstractions test for distinguishing ideas from expression, “Nobody has ever been able 
to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
196 See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1384 (N.D. Ga.), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir.) (per 
curiam), order vacated and opinion substituted, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (“When the reader of Gone with the Wind turns 
over the last page, he may well wonder what becomes of Ms. Mitchell’s beloved characters and their romantic, but tragic, world. 
. . . The right to answer those questions . . . legally belongs to Ms. Mitchell’s heirs . . . .”), quoted in Rubenfeld, supra note 175, 
at 54.
197 See infra Part IV.C. Rubenfeld argues that fair use cannot save the derivative right: “No court in the United States should 
need to wrestle through a set of complicated statutory factors (the factors of the fair use defense) before deciding whether to 
suppress  a  book  like  The  Wind  Done  Gone.  We  don’t  suppress  books  in  this  country.”  Rubenfeld,  supra note  175,  at  54. 
Rubenfeld, however, does not justify the premise that the complexity of copyright law itself constitutes a First Amendment 
violation. If copyright law creates a satisfactory line between permitted and prohibited uses of others’ expression, it should not 
matter that this line arises from the interaction of doctrine concerning the idea-expression dichotomy with the fair use test. 
Rubenfeld may believe that the parody exception may not be broad enough, a concern that I share. See infra text accompanying 
note 320. But if that is so, his criticism should be directed at fair use, not at the derivative right.
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speech  even  if  that  ban  were  thought  likely  to  maximize  the  amount  of  speech  produced 
overall.
198  In  contrast  to  Rubenfeld’s  accurate  account  of  the  general  law-and-economics 
approach to copyright,
199 this Article’s economic approach suggests that the goal of maximizing 
social  welfare  is  not  equivalent  to  the  goal  of  maximizing  speech.  This  qualification  only 
strengthens Rubenfeld’s point, though. Suppose that product differentiation theory implied that 
welfare, construed in a narrowly economic sense, would be maximized by a governmentally 
imposed limit on the number of newspapers. This economic conclusion seems unlikely,
200 but 
even if it were an uncontroversial empirical observation, we presumably would view such a 
governmental effort as a paridigmatic First Amendment violation.
Absolutism, however, is not the prevailing approach in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
and given the Constitution’s grant of the copyright power, economic  concerns seem at least 
tangentially relevant to the constitutional analysis. Perhaps anticipating this, Rubenfeld suggests 
an administrative scheme that he seems to believe would allow the freedom of imagination to 
exist without undue economic repercussions. Rather than allow free licenses to create derivative 
works, Rubenfeld suggests that a copyright holder “would have an action for profit allocation.”
201
Though Rubenfeld does not explain just how profits would be allocated,
202 he argues that such an 
action leaves “the author [of a derivative work] no worse off than he would have been had he 
chosen not to commercialize the derivative work.”
203 Such an author, after all, could choose to 
“offer[]  the  work  for  free.”
204 Rubenfeld  purports  to  offer  no  policy  defense  of  the  profit-
198 Rubenfeld invokes a slippery slope argument against the position that the First Amendment should seek to maximize the 
amount of speech:
Perhaps offensive speech and copyright infringement really do have a “silencing” effect, ultimately producing less 
speech overall. Come to think of it, perhaps a knockdown argument is also silencing. Are we to understand that a 
person can be jailed for making too good an argument . . . law, an argument so good it brings debate to an end, leaving 
its audience with little or nothing to say?
Rubenfeld, supra note 175, at 22-23.
199 See id. at 21 (“Copyright does not violate the First Amendment, the economic argument goes, because (and to the extent that) 
it provides incentives that maximize overall production of valuable speech. . . [E]x post restrictions are necessary to get the ex 
ante incentives right, and the result is an overall net First Amendment gain.”).
200 In An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright, I argue that if economics did suggest that there were too many works, 
First Amendment scholarship would not offer a definitive basis for ignoring this conclusion. See Abramowicz, supra note 12
(manuscript at 49-58). It is not clear that First Amendment values are best advanced by copyright doctrine that maximizes the 
number of works either, in part because ensuring access to existing copyrighted works also may be important for free speech. My 
point, however, was that changes to copyright law such as allowance of more copying could not be rejected immediately on First 
Amendment grounds, not that more active government intervention limiting the number of works would be acceptable.
201 Rubenfeld, supra note 175, at 54.
202 As Rubenfeld recognizes, “[a]pportioning profits in such cases would not be an obvious proposition; the share of profits 
owing to the original author might be very considerable.” Id. at 58.
203 Id. at 56.
204 Id.  at  57.  Allowing  authors  to  exercise  their  imagination  but  not  commercialize  the  results  (in  the  sense  of  profiting 
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allocation scheme,
205 though presumably he presents the scheme as a concession to those who 
worry that elimination of the derivative right would allow some unfairly or inefficiently to profit 
from the works of others.
The rent dissipation approach suggests that this profit allocation approach would have 
little effect. If anyone could make a derivative work, then entry would be expected to dissipate 
away economic profit in any event, so on average, unless there are other factors minimizing the 
dissipation of rents from unauthorized works, each author of a derivative work would earn zero 
economic profit. Profit allocations from creators of derivative works who average zero economic 
profit would not be high. Of course, zero economic profit is just a shorthand for a normal rate of 
return,  so  depending  on  the  accounting  scheme  employed,  the  original  author  might  receive 
something, especially since the author would enjoy a portion of the upside benefit of derivative 
works without assuming any of the risk that a derivative work might suffer a loss. Moreover, the 
original author might earn some rent by virtue of consumers’ preference for that author over 
others, assuming that trademark law allows the author to establish some reputation. But such 
royalties would generally be a fraction of the current economic value of the derivative right, and 
Rubenfeld’s  approach  thus  cannot  satisfy  an  incentive  theorist.  Nor  can  it  alleviate  rent 
dissipation concerns, which identify the right of exclusion as central to the derivative right. For 
those concerns to be vindicated, the derivative right demands clarification but not elimination.
2. An Alternative Approach
Rent dissipation theory provides for straightforward, though not mechanical, definitions 
of  the  reproduction  and  derivative  rights.  Recall  that  while  the  central  concern  of  the 
themselves from the expression resulting from the imagination) would be one means of vindicating the freedom of imagination 
without abolishing the derivative right. A profit-allocation suit would not be necessary; copyright law could simply provide that 
the author of an unauthorized derivative work is not liable for damages but forfeits the reproduction right for that work. Even 
with such an approach, however, copyright law would need to ensure that the derivative works do not violate the original work’s 
reproduction right, properly but not trivially conceived. The approach that I suggest below, see infra Part II.D.2, provides one 
means of doing this and would not be inconsistent with a rule allowing noncommercial exploitation of unauthorized derivative 
works.
205 “I make no claim about whether this result would be good or bad policy. The result is not supposed to follow from policy 
considerations. It is supposed to follow from constitutional considerations. . . . Copyrights acts as prior restraints.” Id. at 58-59. 
Rubenfeld may well be correct that injunctions are inappropriate in copyright cases. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, 
Free Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (arguing that the existence of intellectual 
property rights should not exempt copyright law from First Amendment scrutiny). To conclude that an author can receive no 
more than damages or unjust enrichment remedies, however, makes the common mistake of equating the distinction between 
property and liability rules with the distinction between injunctive and damage remedies. In theory, a property rule can be 
enforced with high monetary damages rather than injunctions. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for 
Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (1990) (offering a model in which supercompensatory damages define 
the difference between a property rule and a liability rule). 
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reproduction right is that an unauthorized reproduction might compete with the original, rent 
dissipation theory suggests that a central concern of the derivative right is that unauthorized 
derivative works might compete with one another.
206 Of course, rent dissipation alone cannot 
provide definitions of either right, as many works that clearly do not violate either right compete 
with both original works and their derivatives. Once it is established, however, that an allegedly 
infringing work is substantially similar to an original work, consideration of demand diversion 
can help determine whether the reproduction right, the derivative right, both or neither is or are 
violated.  If  the  allegedly  infringing  work  would  be  expected  to  cause  significant  demand 
diversion from the original, then the work would indeed infringe the reproduction right. If it 
would  be  expected  to  cause  significant  demand  diversion  from  actual  or  hypothetical 
transformations  that  the  original  author  plausibly  might  make  to  earn  significant  additional 
profits, then it would infringe the derivative right.
Let us begin with a simple application of the framework. Suppose that someone created 
an unauthorized sequel to the Harry Potter books, with the usual group of characters and the 
familiar if unpredictable setting of Hogwarts, but an entirely new plot. It seems far-fetched to 
imagine even a well-executed sequel taking away more than an insignificant amount of business 
from the original Harry Potter book. Even if the new work were priced at considerably less than 
the original, only an unusual customer would decide not to buy the original because there existed 
a cheap imitation. In this respect, books are not like handbags. But it is quite plausible to imagine 
that a sequel might interfere with sales of authorized sequels, especially  if the unauthorized 
sequel were to beat an authorized one to market, as customers grow tired of reading Harry Potter 
sequels. Similarly, an unauthorized movie version of Harry Potter probably would steal only a 
modest amount of business from the book, but it might steal a great deal of business from the 
authorized movie.
This analysis may seem to succeed only at taking exceptionally easy cases and making 
them more complicated. The copyright statute explicitly identifies a “motion picture version” of 
a work as a derivative work,
207 and a book sequel fits squarely within the more general definition 
of a derivative work, which includes “a work based upon one or more preexisting works.”
208 My 
206 See supra text accompanying note 115
207 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
208 Id.
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purpose, however, is to offer an economic cast to the definition for a derivati ve work. Because 
competition will always be a matter of degree, economic assessments will always be a matter of 
degree, but this adds little uncertainty. A test seeking to identify substantial similarity will not be 
mechanical in any event, and adding one subjective assessment into an already subjective inquiry 
will not greatly compound the problem. It is at least reassuring that paradigmatic examples of 
derivative  works  appear  to  fit  within  this  economic  approach.  Moreover,  the  definition  of 
reproduction does important work, because the unauthorized sequels and movies would probably 
count as unauthorized reproductions of characters and possibly settings under current law.
209 The 
economic test that I have offered is more consistent with the statutory text in this regard. The 
reproduction right is a right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords,”
210
and it is a stretch to consider the individual characters rather than the Harry Potter book as a 
whole to count as a “work.”
211
Let us now consider a slightly more difficult example. Suppose that someone without 
authorization  took  the  movie  Harry  Potter  and  the  Sorcerer’s  Stone and  electronically 
transformed it, creating a black-and-white version. This would be a violation of the reproduction 
right, because a significant portion of any revenues from the decolorized movie would likely 
come at the expense of the original. That the black-and-white version might draw only a few 
customers is not relevant, as the proper inquiry is whether these customers otherwise would have 
purchased the original. Some customers might choose the black-and-white version because they 
thought that it was truer to the theme, while others might favor the decolorized version because 
its producers sold it for less money to undercut the original. Either way, demand diversion seems 
likely  to  be  substantial  relative  to  sales  of  the  black-and-white  version.  Intuitively,  the 
modification of the original seems to be an attempt to evade the reproduction right. The above 
definition, however, makes it possible to identify such attempts without any direct inquiry into 
209 See supra Part II.B.
210 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
211 An implication of my approach is thus that characters ordinarily would not be independently copyrightable. Note that this 
would have little effect in the Stallone case, because in that case the script would have been an unauthorized derivative work. See 
supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text. The economic approach does not rule out altogether the possibility of copyright on 
characters, however. Suppose, for example, that some people were in the business of creating characters, which they would then 
sell to authors to incorporate in books. In that case, a character would be a work unto itself, but in the absence of independent 
marketing and sale of characters, characters would be part of other works. Moreover, this approach does not foreclose the 
possibility  that  independent  parts  of  a  work,  such  as  frames  of  a  movie,  would  be  independently  copyrightable.  While  a 
“character” does not seem to meet the plain language definition of a “work,” a movie still plausibly counts as an independent 
“work.” While an individual character ordinarily cannot be marketed independently of a broader work, a movie still can be 
marketed independently.
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motive. Perhaps the decolorization reflects solely artistic sensibilities, but that would not save the 
black-and-white version from violation of the reproduction right.
That is enough for the copyright holder to win, but let us consider the derivative right as 
well. Of course, if anyone were allowed to create decolorized videos and sell them, there would 
be  rent-dissipating  entry  of  decolorized  versions  and  cut-rate  prices.  But  that  is  why  the 
definition above looks for competition with actual and plausible authorized transformations, even 
though  the  overall  concern  of  the  derivative  right  is demand  diversion  among  all  derivative 
works. Similarly, if the Harry Potter producers did release a black-and-white version, the two 
black-and-white versions might compete with one another for that very small market segment. 
But that is why the definition above considers only hypothetical transformations that plausibly 
might have a significant effect on the original author’s profits. The inquiry thus avoids tautology 
and demands a practical consideration of the relevant market. In this case, it seems unlikely that 
the black-and-white Harry Potter would compete with other authorized transformations, in part 
because decolorization seems like a poor vehicle for commercial exploitation of Harry Potter. 
The result is based on empirical considerations, though, as it is possible to imagine evidence that 
decolorization  was  a  plausible  means  of  exploiting  the  original.  In  a  world  in  which  movie 
producers regularly released black-and-white versions to satisfy some portion of the viewing 
public,  the black -and-white version would violate the derivative right as well.
The decolorization example may appear to present a problem for this approach. Colorized 
versions of movies are generally considered to be derivative works, so why should decolorized 
versions not automatically be treated in the same way? The economic answer is that colorization, 
however artistically objectionable, often is a logical way to exploit a movie commercially, while 
decolorization seems, at least to me, far less likely to be commercially viable. The result is that 
unauthorized colorized versions plausibly might compete with authorized derivative adaptations, 
while unauthorized decolorized versions will not. This rent dissipation answer, however, may 
seem problematic from the perspective of the copyright statute. The definition of “derivative 
work”  includes  any  “form  in  which  a  work  may  be  recast,  transformed,  or  adapted.”
212 If 
colorization is a recasting, transformation, or adaptation, shouldn’t decolorization count as such 
as well?
212 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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What might appear to make for an easy answer would be to reply that decolorization 
requires  less  originality  or  skill  than  colorization.    Originality  of  the  modification  or 
modifications made to a work might appear to be all that is required under conventional glosses 
on the definition of “derivative work,”
213 and Rubenfeld endorses this definition as well.
214 But if 
I accept this answer, then the rent dissipation approach that I have suggested seems misplaced. 
The  conventional  approach  scrutinizes  the  modifications  themselves,  not  the  effect  of  the 
modifications on the work. The rent dissipation approach, in contrast, considers the effect of the 
modifications, specifically by assessing the demand diversion that the new work will effect from 
other authorized transformations (for the derivative right) or from the original work (for the 
reproduction right). Let us thus assume that colorization and decolorization are equally difficult 
tasks,  both  requiring  a  fair  amount  of  specifically  applied  artistic  expertise.  Given  this 
assumption, can we find some way of reconciling the economic test that I have proposed with the 
statutory text?
I believe that we can, and indeed that a reading of the definition of “derivative right” that 
considers  effects  is  more  consistent  with  the  statutory  text  than  one  that  seeks  to  identify 
originality  in  modifications  alone.  Consider  first  the  second  sentence  of  the  definition  of 
“derivative work”: “A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications  which,  as  a  whole,  represent  an  original  work  of  authorship,  is  a  ‘derivative 
work.’”
215 The words “represent . . . original work of authorship” are important indications of 
what  Congress  implicitly  envisioned.
216 The  modifications  to  a  work  must  themselves  be 
original,  for  a  nonoriginal  modification  can  never  create  something  original.  But  that  is  not 
213 See generally Steven S. Boyd, Deriving Originality in Derivative Works: Considering the Quantum of Originality Needed to 
Attain Copyright Protection in a Derivative Work, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325 (2000).
214 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
215 Id.
216 The approach of examining the modifications themselves for originality might appear to find support in the words “as a 
whole.” This phrase means that all of the modifications should be read together, not that the modifications should be read in 
isolation.  Indeed,  the  phrase  advances  the  interpretation  here.  The  phrase  “as  a  whole”  makes  clear  that  the  effect  of 
modifications must be examined as a whole on the original work. If the phrase meant only that all modifications must be 
considered together, then the phrase would be superfluous. See generally Platt v. Union Pacific R. Co., 99 U.S. 48 (1879) 
(applying the canon that “a legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words”). In the absence of the phrase “as a 
whole,” the sentence would refer to “modifications which represent an original work of authorship.” Had the definition simply 
read “which represent original authorship,” then the phrase “as a whole” would clarify, but “modifications which represent an 
original  work  of  authorship”  is  already  grammatically  distinct  from  “modifications  which  represent  original  works  of 
authorship.” The structure of the sentence thus already makes clear that the modifications must be considered cumulatively, and 
the phrase “as a whole” reflects that the cumulative effect of modifications can be assessed only through consideration of the 
work itself.
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enough.  The  word  “represent”  recognizes  that  modifications  are  not  of  interest  in  and  of 
themselves,  but  only  in  that  they  point  to  or  symbolize  something  broader.  That  something 
cannot just be an accumulation of incomprehensible expression, but itself must be an “original 
work of authorship.” To consider whether modifications make a derivative work, we cannot just 
look at the modifications themselves, but must look at whether the modifications represent an 
original work. 
Return now to the first sentence of the definition of “derivative right,” which reads in 
full:  “A  ‘derivative  work’  is  a  work  based  upon  one  or  more  preexisting  works,  such  as  a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted.”
217 This sentence too emphasizes the process of transformation. 
None  of  the  examples  envisions  a  simple  injection  of  expression,  and  although  two  of  the 
examples—“abridgment” and “condensation”—envision a removal of expression, those words 
are themselves different from “deletion” and plausibly can be read to exclude, for example, a 
version of a novel with a word removed. A holistic approach similarly can give significance to 
the words “recast, transformed, or adapted” in the first sentence of the definition of “derivative 
work,” serving to distinguish them from weaker alternatives like “modified” or “changed.” Here 
as well, Congress appeared to imagine both that the transformation would involve some degree 
of originality and that the result would be more than a merely altered work.
The most powerful argument, however, for considering the effects of modifications rather 
than the modifications alone is based on logical rather than linguistic analysis. It is nonsensical to 
assess modifications without at least some  consideration of the original work. Modifications 
have  meaning  only  with  respect  to  what  is  being  modified,  and  whether  modifications 
cumulatively represent an original work necessarily depends on the degree to which the modified 
work is transformed. An approach that assesses whether modifications are sufficient without 
considering the effect of those modifications on the work in effect looks at editing marks as if 
they were written on pages formed in invisible ink that has since disappeared. Such an analysis 
may  be  enough  to  determine  whether  the  modifications  themselves  are  original,  but  this  is 
irrelevant when what someone seeks to protect is not a set of modifications but a derivative 
217 Id.
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work. Copyright law may protect a haiku as completely as it protects an encyclopedia.
218 And a 
haiku may be sufficiently original on its own that when added to another haiku, the collection 
amounts to a derivative work of each haiku. But that does not mean that when a haiku is added to 
an encyclopedia, we have a new encyclopedia. Adding a haiku to an encyclopedia and then 
reselling the product might violate the reproduction right, but it should not be seen as violating 
the derivative right.
Because  of  the  overlap  in  existing  doctrine  governing the  reproduction  right  and  the 
derivative right, much of the case law concerning derivative works arises from unusual situations 
in which the reproduction right is not violated, but the derivative right is not in issue. This can 
occur,  for  example,  when  someone  purchases  the  original  work,  alters  it,  and  resells  it. 
Purchasing a work and reselling it unaltered would be protected by the first sale doctrine,
219 so 
the copyright holder relies on the derivative right instead. Such cases often seem to reflect novel 
forms of intellectual property protection in search of a textual hook in copyright law, and the 
derivative right may serve as a substitute for European-style moral rights. Perhaps the derivative 
right should serve a number of functions, though it also may be that the derivative right serves 
such functions only because it otherwise would seem to lack an independent justification. My 
purpose here, in any event, is to consider application of the derivative right pursuant to the core 
justification that I have developed here, not to contemplate the possibility that the derivative 
right might serve as the basis of a very different argument.
Let us start with the different results in Mirage  Editions,  Inc.  v.  Albuquerque  A.R.T. 
Co.,
220 and Lee v. A.R.T. Co.
221 In both cases, the defendant A.R.T. Co. was in the business of 
cutting up art reproductions, mounting the reproductions individually onto ceramic tiles, and 
selling the resulting tile art. In Mirage, the reproductions came from a commemorative book 
collecting the work of a single artist,
222 while in Lee, the reproductions appeared individually on 
notecards  and  lithographs.
223 The  Ninth  Circuit  found  a  violation  of  the  derivative  right  in 
218 Some phrases may be so short that they are denied copyright protection. See, e.g., Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods 
Corp.,  266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.1959)  (requiring an “appreciable amount of original text”). Such pronouncements may reflect 
an intuition similar to that animating the merger doctrine. See infra Part IV.C.
219 See infra notes 254–256 and accompanying text.
220 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
221 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
222 Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342.
223 Lee, 125 F.3d at 580.
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Mirage,
224 but the Seventh Circuit did not in Lee.
225 Although Judge Easterbrook in the Seventh 
Circuit  explicitly  declined  to  follow  the  Ninth  Circuit, the  analysis  in  this  paper  provides  a 
plausible, though not definitive, basis for distinguishing the two cases.
The plaintiffs in Mirage presumably were not concerned about the tiles interfering with 
sales of the book, but rather about the loss of possible sales from other derivative works of the 
underlying art.
226 This fits squarely within the proposed test for violation of the derivative right. 
In Lee, however, the concern presumably was that the tiles might compete directly with the 
original notecards and lithographs, perhaps even making the originals seem like cheaper less 
attractive products. A ceramic tile artwork may be a close substitute for a lithograph, which, 
unlike a book, a consumer is likely to hang on the wall. Such substitution is directly relevant 
under this Article’s test only for analysis of the reproduction right, but the reproduction right was 
irrelevant because no actual reproduction occurred. So far as the facts of Lee reveal, the only 
derivative  works  of  the  underlying  art  that  Lee  hoped  to  shield  from  competition  were  the 
notecards and lithographs themselves, but this type of competition is no greater than would have 
existed if A.R.T. had simply resold the notecards and lithographs, a type of competition that the 
first  sale  doctrine  protects.
227 While  in  Mirage  the  plaintiffs  appear  to  have  been  genuinely 
concerned with business stealing from authorized adaptations, in Lee the plaintiffs appear to be 
attempting to use the derivative right only as  a backstop to the reproduction right. A.R.T.’s 
actions might have seemed more troubling if Lee had separately been marketing tile versions of 
the art, or if such marketing would have been a likely avenue of commercial exploitation in the 
absence  of  A.R.T.’s  adaptation.  Under  this  hypothetical,  there  would  be  a  violation  of  the 
derivative right as defined here, but the possibility of such business stealing from authorized 
adaptations is not as apparent in Lee as in Mirage. 
224 Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1344.
225 Lee, 125 F.3d at 583. 
226 The Ninth Circuit noted that the artist’s work had appeared in many different forms. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342 (“Patrick 
Nagel was an artist whose works appeared in many media including lithographs, posters, serigraphs, and as graphic art in many 
magazines . . . .”). There was no similar statement in Lee.
227 Judge Easterbrook explicitly indicated concern that Lee’s theory seemed to imply that it would make criminal art purchasers 
who framed prints that they had bought. Lee, 125 F.3d at 583 (“If mounting works a ‘transformation,’ then changing a painting’s 
frame or a photograph’s mat equally produces a derivative work. Indeed, if Lee is right about the meaning of the definition's first 
sentence, then any alteration of a work, however slight, requires the author's permission.”).
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This analysis helps identify what should be the focus of the current controversy regarding 
CleanFlicks,
228 a company that purchases and then alters VHS and DVD movies to eliminate 
content that some consumers find offensive, such as foul language, nudity, and violence, and 
rents the videos to consumers.
229 Because the company purchases the videos, there is no violation 
of the reproduction right. Whether there is a violation of the derivative right as conceived here 
depends on whether the sanitized films might compete with alternative transformations that the 
copyright owners plausibly might create to generate profits. Where this is so, there is at least a 
possibility of economic harm. The copyright owner has an interest in controlling investments in 
improvements and alterations, and CleanFlicks plausibly might prevent a copyright owner from 
selling clean versions, including perhaps made-for-television versions, at as high a premium as it 
otherwise  would  be  able  to  obtain.  As  always,  there  are  benefits  to  such  competition,  but 
copyright law plausibly maximizes social welfare by preventing redundant creation of derivative 
works.  If  creation  of  an  authorized  clean  version  is  unlikely  to  be  a  profitable  means  of 
exploiting the original movie, and if the unauthorized clean version would not interfere with 
other potential authorized transformations, then the danger of rent dissipation from redundant 
adaptations is much lower.
Even more offensive to many consumers than sex and violence is advertising, and the 
scope of derivative works was an issue in the controversy over the automatic ad-skipping feature 
of ReplayTV.
230 Content producers feared this feature even more than they feared the remote 
control  and  the  fast-forward  button.  Those  features  similarly  allow  consumers  to  skip 
commercials but require television watchers to lift their fingers to achieve the desired effect and 
therefore may often be too much trouble. The content producers’ real concern, of course, was 
that consumers would not pay the time price that they levy for access to their content, but they 
did not focus on alleged violation of their reproduction right.
231 The content producers claimed 
228 See http://www.cleanflicks.com (last visited Aug. 10, 2003).
229 For a discussion of the litigation, see Mary Meehan, Cleaning Agents: Rental Companies ‘Scrub’ DVDs for G-Rated Viewing 
While the Issue Plays Through the Courts, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, July 12, 2003, at H1. See also Rick Lyman, Some Video 
Customers Want Tamer Films, and Entrepreneurs Rush to Comply, Sept. 19, 2002, at E1.
230 ReplayTV’s manufacturer eventually resolved the lawsuit by removing the ability to skip commercials automatically. See Eric 
A. Taub, New Owners Dropped Features That Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at C3. Owners of ReplayTV units, 
however, have filed a declaratory judgment suit against the plaintiffs in the original action. See Newmark v. Turner Broadcasting 
Network, 226  F.  Supp.  2d  1215  (C.D.  Cal.  2002)  (discussing  the  lawsuit,  which  also  involved  other  copyright  issues,  and 
resolving threshold motions).
231 The argument here would need to be that the ReplayTV contributorily infringed by encouraging consumer taping, but this 
argument has little to do with the ad-skipping feature. Moreover, it seems a stretch given Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 
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that the ReplayTV created an unauthorized derivative work, producing a television show minus 
the ads. Yet there could be little concern that this derivative work would interfere with any 
content producers might develop, except possibly as to content also available ad-free at the local 
video store. Thus, the ReplayTV would seem not to create an unauthorized derivative work on 
this Article’s analysis, though that conclusion would change if content producers began offering 
ad-free versions of programming on alternative premium cable television stations.
As a final example of the scope of the derivative right, consider the permissibility of 
unauthorized  appropriation  art,
232 which  involves  “incorporation  of  an  existing  image  into  a 
context different from the original in order to alter its meaning and to comment on originality.”
233
A recent case, for example, considered whether a sculpture of a photograph of puppies infringed 
the  photograph.
234 The  rent  dissipation  approach  would  emphasize  that  the  copyright  owners 
were extremely unlikely to exploit their photograph by creating a sculptural work that would 
make a presumably ironic comment on the original, and therefore no rent dissipating competition 
resulted. With other photographs—for example, the now famous photograph of firemen lifting 
the American flag at the World Trade Center site
235—exploitation by the author might have been
more likely. It is irrelevant that the puppy photograph copyright owners might have been willing 
to license the sculpture, for the concern is with destructive competition, not with the original 
copyright owners’ profits per se. We will see some of the same tensions recur in the context of 
parody  doctrine,
236 but  this  Article’s  conceptualization  of  the  derivative  right  might  make  it 
unnecessary to consider whether the fair use exception even applies.
Just as my approach to the derivative right could save appropriation art, so too might this 
Article’s approach to the reproduction right save artistic and musical genres that involve the 
combination  of  large  numbers  of  copyrighted  works.  Consider,  for  example,  collages  of 
copyrighted works, where the assembled works are owned by many copyright owners. There is a 
strong case based on transactions costs for allowing such works without permission, and perhaps 
464 U.S. 417 (1984), which held that “time shifting” on a Betamax was fair use.
232 For a discussion of copyright issues associated with appropriation art, see WILLIAM M. LANDES, COPYRIGHT, BORROWED 
IMAGES AND APPROPRIATION ART 15 (Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 113, 2001), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_101-25/113.WML.Copyright.pdf.
233 http://www.artsnashville.org/registry/stylendx/ appropriation_art0.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2003).
234 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
235 See Christine Temin, Memorializing an Iconic Moment, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16. 2002, at D1 (discussing the photography and 
a controversy over a plan to turn it into a sculpture).
236 See infra Part III.C.
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an application of fair use infused with transactions costs considerations might save such an art 
form  as  well.
237 In  the  ordinary  case,  however,  collages  will  not  substitute  for  the  original 
copyrighted work, and the reproduction right would not be violated under this Article’s test, even 
though  direct  copying  was  involved.  (At  the  same  time,  few  copyright  owners  will  exploit 
copyrighted works by creating or licensing collages, so the derivative right is not violated either.) 
Similarly, this interpretation could save “sound sampling,”
238 at least where the sound sampling 
combines a sufficiently large number of songs to make the end product neither a substitute for 
nor a competitor with any authorized transformation of any single work.
Although my primary purpose in developing this economic approach is to help determine 
whether the derivative and reproduction rights have been violated, the analysis also may be of 
direct use in case law considering the amount of originality required for a derivative work to 
obtain  an  independent  copyright.  Such  cases  typically  arise  when  works  are  created  from 
material in the public domain,
239 though they also could arise when a copyright owner copyrights 
a derivative work of an already copyrighted work and the first copyrighted work subsequently 
enters the public domain, or when the creator of the new work has a license to use preexisting 
work  and  seeks  to  obtain  an  independent  copyright.
240 The  doctrine  in  this  area  has  been 
inconsistent. While some courts have required no more than a “distinguishable variation” from 
the  original  for  a  work  to  obtain  copyright,
241 others  have  emphasized  that  merely  trivial 
variations will not be enough.
242
The  article  suggests  one  possibility:  An  authorized  work  should  count  as  an 
independently copyrightable derivative work if, had it not been authorized and had the earlier 
work been protected by copyright, the new work would violate the derivative right but not the 
reproduction right under this Article’s proposed definitions. Thus, an authorized work would be 
entitled to a copyright as a derivative work if it was sufficiently different from the original that it 
237 See infra notes 270–271 and accompanying text (discussing the transactions cost approach to fair use doctrine).
238 See generally Erick J. Bohlman, Comment, Squeezing the Square Peg of Sound Sampling into the Round Hold of Copyright 
Law: Who Will Pay the Piper?, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 797 (1992) (reviewing copyright law concerning sound sampling).
239 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491-92 (2d Cir.1976) (en banc).
240 See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
241 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951); see also Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ 
Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 565 & n.25 (3d Cir. 2002); Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th 
Cir. 1970).
242 See Boyd, supra note 213, at 353 & nn.193-94 (summarizing cases).
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would  not  significantly  compete  with  the  original  and  yet  sufficiently  similar  that  it  might 
compete with authorized transformations of the original.
243 Ensuring that a work would not be 
within the reproduction right may seem to be an obvious way of preventing trivial modifications 
from  entitling  a  work  to  an  independent  copyright.  Under  current  doctrine,  however,  the 
reproduction and derivative rights overlap to such an extent that this definition would mean that 
virtually no works would qualify. Regardless of whether courts enact this Article’s proposed 
reformulation  of  the  reproduction  right,  they  could  use  its  conceptualization  of  that  right  to 
identify works that are too similar to the original to qualify for an independent copyright.
Consider, for example, Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,
244 in which Judge Posner found 
insufficient originality in a painting, intended for use in a collector’s plate, combining characters 
and settings drawn from the movie The Wizard of Oz. Judge Posner concluded that “a derivative 
work must be substantially different from the underlying work to be copyrightable.”
245 Judge 
Posner, however, did not provide a framework for determining what counts as “substantially 
different.” A collector’s plate with an image adapted from the movie would not effect substantial 
demand diversion from the movie itself, so it would not violate the reproduction right, even 
though it would be a derivative work. Under the test proposed here, it therefore would be entitled 
to an independent copyright.
246 Of course, if owners of copyright in The Wizard of Oz previously 
had created a similar collector’s plate that would be a market substitute for the new collector’s 
243 The consequence of failing the second part of the test would be less severe than the consequence of failing the first. If a 
transformation were so radical that the new work would not compete with either the original or with authorized transformations 
of the original, then it would be entitled to a copyright as an independent work.
244 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
245 Id. at 305.
246 The same result probably would not obtain if the plate merely consisted of a frame from the movie, for two reasons. First, 
although the economic approach rejects the proposition that adding original content is sufficient to create a derivative work, it 
does not question the proposition that some originality is necessary for creation of a derivative work. Slapping a movie still on a 
plate encompasses only trivial originality. Second, each frame of a movie itself would be an independently copyrighted work. See 
supra note 211. It seems plausible that collector’s plates would interfere directly with any efforts to market individual movie stills 
in any form, and not solely with efforts to market transformations of these frames onto plates. That the company might choose 
not  to  market  certain  frames  is  of  no  relevance  to  assessment  of  the  reproduction  right,  even though  the  implausibility of 
hypothetical derivative markets is of relevance to the derivative right, for the same reason that a copyright owner in general need 
not market a work to claim an infringement of the reproduction right.
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plate,
247 then the new plate might well infringe the original plate, if the substantial similarity 
requirement is met.
248
III. USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
A. Copyright’s Exclusive Rights
Copyright law provides owners a range of exclusive rights in their works, including the 
right to reproduce the work,
249 to prepare derivative works,
250 to distribute copies,
251 to perform 
the  work  publicly,
252 and  to  display  the  work  publicly.
253 We  have  already  seen  that  rent 
dissipation provides a strong account of the derivative right. The rent dissipation perspective can 
provide an explanation of the other rights as well. Placing aside digital duplication, reproduction 
and marketing copies of an existing work entails considerable fixed costs; by placing control of 
reproduction in a single property owner, these fixed costs are reproduced. Simi larly, there may 
be large fixed costs associated with staging a play or creating an artistic exhibition, and the 
performance and display rights provide corresponding protections of rent dissipation. Of course, 
rent  dissipation  theory  adds  little  value  here,  as  these  rights  are  consistent  with  a  standard 
incentive theory of copyright law. Without the reproduction right, in particular, the incentive to 
produce copyrighted works would be markedly reduced. It is at least reassuring, however, that 
rent dissipation theory coheres with and does not contradict the central rights that copyright law 
provides.
247 Indeed, in Gracen, the Wizard of Oz copyright owners did market a separate collector’s plate, although it is not clear whether 
that plate was created first. 698 F.2d at 304. The issue was probably irrelevant in Gracen itself, because the court suggested, 
without reaching the issue, that Gracen, the creator of the purportedly derivative work, did not have the necessary permission to 
seek an independent copyright on the derivative work. Id. at 305 (“[W]e do not think the difference is enough to allow her to 
copyright her painting even if, as we very much doubt, she was authorized by Bradford to do so.”).
248 Posner justified the “substantially different” requirement by citing courts’ evidentiary need to determine whether subsequent 
works built on the original, the purportedly derivative work, or on other derivative works. Id. at 304. Judge Posner thus might 
lament that it will thus be necessary to consider the type of evidentiary question that he had sought to avoid. What he does not 
acknowledge, however, is that it often will be necessary to consider whether derivative works infringe one another or merely 
build on the original, when the original is in the public domain. He may ignore this point only because of the unusual posture of 
Gracen  itself,  where  Gracen’s  purported  derivative  work  was  an  authorized  licensee  of  the  original.  Judge  Posner  was 
understandably concerned that the Wizard of Oz copyright holders would have to defend themselves against allegations that they 
had copied Gracen’s plate, rather than making their own. But Gracen would bear the burden of proof on an infringement claim, 
and this factual scenario is sufficiently unusual that it should not determine the broader doctrine determining copyrightability of a 
derivative work.
249 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
250 Id. § 106(2).
251 Id. § 106(3).
252 Id. § 106(4). There is a separate right to perform a sound recording publicly “by means of a digital audio transmission.” Id. § 
106(6).
253 Id. § 106(5).
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What is perhaps more impressive than the breadth of copyright protection is the number 
of exceptions, and rent dissipation theory can help explain the limits on the exclusive rights. A 
significant  exception  to  the  distribution  right  is  the  first  sale  doctrine,
254 which  allows  the 
purchaser of a copy or phonorecord of a copyrighted work to sell that work in turn.
255 Sales of 
used books cut into the profits of the copyright owner, thus adversely affecting incentives to 
produce copyrighted works (unless the right of resale sufficiently increases the sales price of new 
books to make up for resale competition).
256 There are, however, no fixed costs associated with 
producing copies that already exist, so rent dissipation theory accurately predicts that copyright 
law  should  be  less  concerned  with  this  form  of  unauthorized  competition  than  with  others. 
Indeed a regime that did not allow resale likely would result in redundant production of new 
works, so the first sale doctrine succeeds in reducing rent dissipation by the copyright owner. 
Not surprisingly, perhaps the most difficult cases under the first sale doctrine are those in which 
it is in tension with the broad derivative right. Recall the cases in which courts have reached 
different  conclusions  where  legal  purchasers  of  books  have  cut  out  individual  pictures  and 
mounted them, competing with the original copyright owner in a different market.
257 In such a 
case, the production of the new work does involve the expenditure of fixed costs, and indeed 
such fixed costs may be higher than those undertaken by the initial copyright owner.
Rent  dissipation  theory  can  also  help  explain  what  would  otherwise  seem  to  be 
anomalies. Consider the idiosyncratic treatment of sound recordings. The owner of a copyright in 
a sound recording does not enjoy an exclusive performance right.
258 Moreover, the reproduction 
right is limited to direct duplication of “the actual sounds fixed in the recording.”
259 If Yo Yo Ma 
performs the uncopyrighted Bach Cello Suites and sells a compact disk of the performance, I am 
254 The distribution right is often seen as simply reinforcing the reproduction right. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital 
Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1280 & n.124 (2001). If this is 
correct, then the distribution right also combats rent dissipation. Given the first sale doctrine, it is not easy to conjure up scenarios 
in which the distribution right would be violated in the absence of a violation of the reproduction right.
255 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
256 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1245, 1248 (2001) (“[T]he ability to sell a copy of a book to another would appear to reduce the incentives to create 
works.”). Liu suggests that the bundle of copyright rights “are determined in part by certain conventions and understandings that 
we commonly hold about the ownership of physical property,” with the first sale doctrine thus reflecting the intuition that the 
owner of a book should have a right to dispose of it. Id.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 220-227.
258 17 U.S.C. § 114(a).
259 Id. § 114(b).
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free to play the compact disk publicly,
260 and if I had the talent, I also would be free to record my 
own version of the Bach Cello Suites imitating Ma’s interpretive choices.
261 By contrast, if I 
were to play the movie Dangerous Liaisons publicly or to make a new version of Les Liaisons 
Dangereuses that copied the interpretive choices of Dangerous Liaisons, I would be infringing 
the movie’s copyright.
262 The statutory scheme seems to find one type of redundancy—multiple 
performers of the same song, sometimes imitating one another—to be less of a concern than 
similar redundancies in other media. Presumably this is so because music fans tend to derive 
more pleasure from hearing covers of a song by different performers than, say, readers would 
derive from reading the same plot told in a number of different writing styles.
263 Product space in 
effect does not become as crowded by such adaptations in music as in other areas, because the 
adaptations are less likely to substitute for one another and for the original. The recognition that 
near redundancy could be less wasteful in one medium than in others allows rent dissipation to 
explain a phenomenon that alternative theories of copyright, ignoring the possibility that there 
could ever be a difference in social value based on the distinctiveness of the work, cannot.
Rent dissipation may explain not only the exclusive rights of copyright and exceptions to 
them, but also may contribute to an explanation for the absence of other imaginable exclusive 
rights.  While  a  more  robust  copyright  regime  presumably  would  lead  to  an  increase  in  the 
number of works produced, the addition of those works to the pool of works might add little if 
any  social  value.  Consider,  for  example,  the  right  of  libraries,  public  and  private,  to  lend 
copyrighted works. Some critics have urged that the copyright owner should hold an exclusive 
public lending right,
264 and it is easy to see why publishers might favor this. Some who borrow 
books presumably would have purchased the works if they could not have borrowed them, and 
260 The underlying musical work in this example is uncopyrighted. If it were copyrighted, then I would need to obtain permission 
from the owner of the copyright in the underlying musical work, but I also would be able to obtain a compulsory license in most 
cases. See 17 U.S.C. § 114-115.
261 But see Kent Milunovich, The Past, Present, and Future of Copyright Protection of Soundalike Recordings, 81 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 517 (1999) (arguing that soundalike recordings may infringe copyrights).
262 Dangerous Liaisons would have to differ sufficiently from Les Liaisons Dangereuses to be itself entitled to copyright. See 
generally  Gracen  v.  Bradford  Exch., 698 F.2d 300  (7th  Cir.  1983)  (discussing  the  originality  requirement  for  copyright in 
derivative works).
263 A student commentator has criticized compulsory licenses for musical works, arguing that cover artists may unduly change 
the nature of the work. See Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Good-Bye to Madonna’s American Pie: Why Mechanical 
Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285 (2001). This Article’s analysis, by contrast, 
suggests that such changes, and more broadly the pleasure that consumers take in listening to the same work expressed in 
different styles, help explain the compulsory license.
264 See, e.g., PUBLIC LENDING RIGHT: A MATTER OF JUSTICE (R. Findlater ed., 1971). But see Jennifer M. Schneck, Note, Closing 
the Book on the Public Lending Right, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (1988) (arguing against enactment of a public lending right).
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libraries thus may reduce publishers’ profits.
265 The public lending right likely cannot be justified 
by  incentive  factors  alone.  Presumably,  Congress,  prodded  by  lobbying  from  libraries,
266
concluded that the value to consumers from being able to borrow books from libraries was worth 
any cost. 
The standard economic approach accordingly might emphasize the deadweight loss that 
would exist if copyright owners had an exclusive public lending right. A public lending right 
would increase the cost of borrowing, and high prices might prevent access for some who would 
have obtained some positive value from a work. The standard economic analysis, however, has 
trouble explaining why this deadweight loss should be sufficient to justify limiting this potential 
right of the copyright owner, when it is not sufficient to justify other rights of the copyright 
holder.  Perhaps  the  most  appealing  explanation  is  that  the  public  lending  right  is  of  lesser 
economic significance than, for example, the reproduction right. But a comparison of magnitudes 
is not strictly relevant under a cost-benefit analysis, because the deadweight loss associated with 
a public lending right is likely to be smaller than that associated with the reproduction right as 
well. Copyright seems puzzlingly more willing to provide copyright owners rights when those 
rights will have dramatic effects on incentives to produce works, even if the costs of those rights 
are dramatically higher too.
Rent  dissipation  theory,  however,  helps  crystallize  an  intuition  about  why  copyright 
should grant the big rights but give consumers a break on the little ones: Marginal works, those 
that are on the borderline of being produced or not produced, are of less economic importance 
than inframarginal works that will be produced under a wide range of copyright regimes. An 
economic methodology that considers production of new works always to be a benefit will count 
even marginal  works,  because  they  benefit  consumers,  as  advancing  social  welfare  (though 
perhaps  not  as  beneficial  on  average  as  the  most  profitable  works). Rent  dissipation  theory, 
however, recognizes that the more works that exist, the more the marginal work is likely to be 
similar  to  existing  works,  and  thus  the  lower  the  value  of  the  marginal  work.  Thus,  once 
copyright law has already incentivized production of a large number of works with a set of 
265 Libraries, however, sometimes must pay higher prices than private parties for academic journals. See Owen R. Phillips & Lori 
J. Phillips, The Market for Academic Journals, 34 APPLIED ECONOMICS 1 (Jan.10, 2002), available at2002 WL 13808678.
266  The  American  Library  Association  has  been  active  in  supporting  exceptions  to  copyright.  See,  e.g., 
http://www.ala.org/washoff/copyright.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2002) (describing the ALA’s copyright agenda).
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exclusive rights to copyright holders, additional rights that might result in the production of a 
few more works are less attractive. This is so even if the ratio of works incentivized to increased 
deadweight loss is the same as for the more comprehensive rights.
This argument from rent dissipation theory, unlike some of the previous applications that 
honed in on one particular nuance of copyright law, is admittedly more of a complement to 
existing economic theories recognizing tradeoffs in copyright policy generally than a substitute 
for  those  theories.  By  conceptualizing  an  entire  market  for  copyrighted  works  (such  as  the 
market for music) as offering a rent that additional entrants might dissipate, rent dissipation 
theory  suggests  that  the  marginal  work  might  be  of  little  or  even  negative  social  value,  an 
intuition  that  I  will  develop  more  formally  through  discussion  of  the  product  differentiation 
literature.
267 A  policy  that  would  bring  about  a  relatively  small  decrease  in  the  number  of 
copyrighted  works,  along  with  some  benefit,  thus  becomes  far  more  attractive  once  rent 
dissipation  is  considered.  The  traditional  economic  approach  to  copyright  suggests  that  an 
exclusive  public  lending  right  would  have  a  benefit  (incentivizing  new  works)  and  a  cost 
(increased deadweight loss associated with those who cannot afford to purchase the works). Rent 
dissipation theory indicates that the benefit is smaller than it otherwise might appear, or perhaps 
even a cost.
268 It would thus predict that copyright law would allow for broad use of copyrighted 
works, even where such use might reduce the total number of works produced. This is not a bold 
prediction, but we will see that rent dissipation theory can help explain the contours of the most 
important limitation on copyright, fair use.
B. The Fair Use Test
The fair use defense excuses what would otherwise be infringement. The Copyright Act 
provides a nonexclusive four factor test to determine whether or not a use is fair.
269 Like most 
267 See infra Part II.
268 If lending libraries had a large effect on the market for a work, the benefit of the exclusive lending right might still be greater 
than the cost. This may explain why owners of copyrights in computer software do have a public lending right. See 17 U.S.C. § 
109(B).
269 The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is 
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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balancing tests, the fair use test reflects a range of policy goals, but scholars have focused on one 
underlying justification, first identified by Wendy Gordon,
270 as capable of explaining a wide 
range  of  fair  use  decisions:  transactions  costs.
271 The  increasing  ease  of  obtaining  copyright 
permissions,  for  example  through  the  Copyright  Clearance  Center
272  or  through  online 
transactions,  accordingly  has  led  some  to  suggest  that  the  Internet  might  facilitate  a  sharp 
constriction of fair use doctrine.
273 Some critics have argued that such a conclusion neglects the 
low  marginal  cost  of  reproducing  intellectual  property,
274 but  rather  than  enter  the  debate,  I 
would suggest that rent dissipation theory can provide a complementary understanding of fair 
use doctrine. Fair use tends to excuse infringement where the otherwise infringing activity is less 
likely to result in rent dissipation associated with the production of redundant works.
The first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” provides one example of how 
doctrine has incorporated rent dissipation concerns. The statute’s explicit dictate that “nonprofit 
educational uses” be considered in the first factor, along with the preamble’s reference to “news 
reporting,”
275 suggests that Congress was concerned about whether the use was beneficial to 
society.
276 As  one  court  noted,  however,  “publishers  of  educational  textbooks  are  as  profit-
motivated as publishers of scandal-mongering tabloid newspapers,”
277 and thus the statute might 
seem counterproductive from the view of incentive theory, discouraging production of just those 
270 Wendy  J.  Gordon,  Fair  Use  as  Market  Failure:  A  Structural  and  Economic  Analysis  of  the  Betamax  Case  and  Its 
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628-30 (1982). Gordon’s article also addresses other market failures that figure in fair 
use doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 1630-31 (discussing externalities). 
271 Landes and Posner emphasize transaction cost in their analysis of fair use. See Landes & Posner, supra note 85 , at 357 -61.
272 See generally Shannon S. Wagoner, Note, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco: Is the Second Circuit Playing Fair with 
the Fair Use Doctrine?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 181, 206-13 (1995) (discussing the Copyright Clearance Center and 
arguments that the availability of copyrighted materials from it should negate fair use).
273 Information Infrastructure Task Force, Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual Property and the National 
Information  Infrastructure:  The  Report  of  the  Working  Group  on  Intellectual  Property  Rights, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii (1995) (last visited Dec. 17, 2002); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco 
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering the relevance of the Copyright Clearance Center). One concern is that content 
producers may be able to use rights management systems to prevent even uses that courts would count as fair. See generally Dan 
L.  Burk  &  Julie  E.  Cohen,  Fair  Use  Infrastructure  for  Rights  Management  Systems,  15  HARV.  J.L.  &  TECH.  41  (2001) 
(considering the problem and possible legal responses).
274 See, e.g., Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (1998). 
275 The preamble specifically lists “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research” as being examples of fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
276 This assessment has produced some criticism. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.2.2, at 10:33 (2d ed. 2002) (“On 
principle, it is far from clear that the commercial-noncommercial distinction should receive any weight at all, except perhaps as a 
covert subsidy to worthy nonprofit enterprises such as schools and universities…. [T]he distinction has little direct bearing on 
either the benefits or the losses produced by a defendant’s use.”).
277 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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works  that  society  might  most  want  to  encourage.  Implicitly  recognizing  the  problem,  the 
Supreme Court has held that news reporting establishes no presumption of fair use,
278 stressing 
that  the  use  was  “commercial,”  making  the  touchstone  of  commercial  speech  different  for 
copyright than for First Amendment law.
279 The key, the Court held, is “whether the user stands 
to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”
280
In its hesitance to equate the first fair use factor with whether the work was generally 
beneficial, the Court has produced an analysis consistent with both the incentive theory and rent 
dissipation  theory.  If  the  user  profits,  such  profits  are  likely  coming  at  the  expense  of  the 
copyright holder, and this diversion of profits both decreases incentives to produce and dissipates 
the rent to be earned from the work. The Court’s further development of the factor, however, 
places  more  emphasis  on  the  concerns  of  rent  dissipation  theory.  The  Court,  adopting  a 
consideration emphasized by Judge Pierre Leval,
281 has identified the “central purpose” of the 
first factor as determining “whether the new work merely supersede[s] the objects of the original 
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering 
the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what 
extent the new work is transformative.”
282 The first factor thus addresses not just whether the 
user profits, but whether the user’s profits are attributable to something new and innovative. The 
extent to which a work is transformative seems irrelevant to incentive and transactions costs 
theories, but is central to rent dissipation theory, because a transformative work is less likely to 
be redundant. The focus on transformation is controversial,
283 because a general exception for 
transformative works would undo the exclusive right to create derivative works,
284 which I have 
278 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
279 News reporting for profit is not commercial speech under First Amendment doctrine. See Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (explaining that the for profit nature of speech does not make it 
commercial speech).
280 471 U.S. at 562.
281 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
282 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original). The Court added that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” Id. at 579. 
283 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, § 10.2.2, at 10:43 (“[T]he rule threatens to undermine the balance that Congress struck in 
section 106(2)’s derivative rights provision . . . .”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 198-99 (2002); Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 
283 (1996).
284 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
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already suggested reflects rent dissipation concerns.
285 I shall return to this issue in considering 
one particular application of fair use, parody.
286
The second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, reflects similar concerns. 
“Under this factor,” one treatise summarizes, “the more creative a work, the more protection it 
should be accorded from copying.”
287 Limiting fair use by consumers tends to increase the rent 
available  to  producers  and  thus  encourages  rent-dissipating  entry  into  copyright  markets. 
Copyright law is more likely to restrict fair use and tolerate rent dissipating entry for creative 
works, which are less likely to be redundant and thus rent dissipating, than for informational 
works. An additional consideration is that fair use is less likely to be found under this factor 
when the use would directly displace the intended market for the work. Thus, reproduction for 
classroom  use  is  less  likely  to  be  fair  use  if  the  reproduced  work  is  a  textbook  than  a 
newspaper.
288 Reproduction is more rent dissipating when a product already occupies the market 
niche that the use represents.
The relevance of rent dissipation concerns to the second factor is also manifest in the 
treatment of unpublished works. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
289 the 
Supreme  Court  found  that  the  unpublished  status  of  a  manuscript  counted  against  fair  use, 
because  “the  author’s  right  to  control  the  first  public  appearance  of  his  undisseminated 
expression  will  outweigh  a  claim  of  fair  use.”
290 Scooping  a  publication  is  even  more  rent-
dissipating  than  duplicating  an  existing  publication,  because  it  creates  an  inefficient  race  to 
publish.
291 The Second Circuit, however, extended the Court’s analysis to a context in which the 
rent dissipation concern was absent, because the original author had no intention of publishing 
the work.
292 This decision led to criticism, both in the Second Circuit
293 and elsewhere.
294 The 
285 See supra Part II.
286 See infra Part III.C.
287 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 374, § 13.05[A][2], at 13-171.
288 See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
289 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
290 Id. at 555.
291 For a discussion of how rent dissipation may prompt earlier than optimal marketing, see supra note 64 and accompanying 
text.
292 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95-97 (2d Cir. 1987) (involving a biography of the writer J.D. Salinger 
excerpting some of his letters).
293 See New Era Publications Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 593 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C.J, concurring) (following 
but criticizing Salinger); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding for defendant despite unpublished 
status of work).
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concern was sufficient that Congress amended § 107,
295 with the intention of undoing the Second 
Circuit decision.
296 While the Second Circuit’s initial action may have reflected concern about 
privacy rights,
297 the response to it reveals that Congress and critics were much more skeptical of 
privileging  unpublished  works  where  the  exploitation  of  such  works  would  not  lead  to  rent 
dissipation.
The rent dissipation theory interpretation of the third factor, the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used, is straightforward. The more of a copyrighted work is taken, the greater the 
rent dissipation is likely to be. A book review quoting a few paragraphs of a book, for example, 
might substitute for the original for a few readers,
298 but the rents accruing to authors of book 
reviews are generally independent of the rents for writing books. Lengthier summaries of books, 
by contrast, are more likely to substitute for the originals, and thus demand diversion is a more 
prominent factor in their production than in the writing of book reviews. Copyright doctrine 
avoids  mechanical  rules  for  assessing  the  third  factor,  with  the  qualitative  importance  of  an 
excerpted  section  relevant  to  the  analysis.
299 Even  if  only  a  small  portion  of  the  work  is 
excerpted, if the portion represents the heart of the work, then the excerpt may dissipate rents 
from the original. Rent dissipation theory would also predict that the importance of the excerpts 
to the defendant’s work is relevant, since the defendant’s work is less likely to be redundant, the 
less it relies on the plaintiff’s. The Supreme Court has noted that “‘no plagiarist can excuse the 
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate,’”
300 recognizing that a single work 
conceivably could dissipate rents from multiple other works. At the same time, though, the Court 
has been less willing to find fair use where the plaintiff’s work constitutes a large portion of the 
defendant’s.
301
294 See, e.g., Catherine A. Diviney, Comment, Guardian of the Public Interest: An Alternative Application of the Fair Use 
Doctrine in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 615 (1987).
295 Congress added the following sentence: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of the above factors.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (last sentence).
296 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 102-141, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1991) (“[W]e intend to roll back the virtual per se rule of Salinger
. . . .”).
297 The opinion itself, however, nowhere mentions the word “privacy” and focuses on the potential market for Salinger’s work. 
See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99.
298 A typical book review with limited quotations is one of the paradigmatic examples of fair use. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 
U.S. at 601 (“Had these quotations been used in the context of a critical book review of the Ford work, there is little question that 
such a use would be fair use within the meaning of § 107 of the Act.”) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299 See, e.g., id. at 565 (approving of the district court’s “evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking”).
300 Id. (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.))
301 In Nation Enterprises, despite having just quoted Judge Hand, the Court noted, “Stripped to the verbatim quotes, the direct 
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The fourth factor, the effect upon the plaintiff’s potential market, has been called the 
“most important” of the factors,
302 and it too fits squarely within rent dissipation theory. If there 
is  no  effect  on  the  plaintiff’s  potential  market,  there  is  no  rent  dissipation.  A  difficulty  in 
applying the test is the potential for circularity; as one treatise explains, “it is a given in every 
fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market if that potential is defined as the 
theoretical  market  for  licensing  the  very  use  at  bar.”
303 Rent  dissipation  theory,  however, 
provides an explanation of how this circularity can be overcome. The danger, rent dissipation 
theory suggests, is not the loss of plaintiff’s licensing revenues, but the possibility of redundant 
exploitation of opportunities by the plaintiff, defendant, and others. As long as the focus is on 
“traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets,”
304 the formulation of the Second 
Circuit, courts can largely avoid duplicative efforts, allowing fair use where the plaintiff likely 
would not have exploited the opportunity in the absence of the defendant’s actions and is thus 
unlikely to exploit the opportunity redundantly given the defendant’s actions.
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of fair use is not any of the factors themselves, but 
the consequence of a determination that the fair use requirements are met. Fair use is free use. 
This doctrinal outcome is hardly inevitable.
305 Maureen O’Rourke, for example, has advocated a 
fair use doctrine in patent law, but she has noted that it might be appropriate for payments to be 
made for a use.
306 The lack of required payment for copyright fair use is puzzling both from the 
perspective of a general incentive theory, since payment would improve incentives to produce 
copyrighted works, and from the perspective of transactions costs. Although transactions costs 
sometimes might prevent payment, it might seem that payment should be required if requested. 
At  least  where  the  defendant  has  bothered  to  bring  suit,  transactions  costs  do  not  seem  a 
takings from the unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the infringing article.” Id. at 565-66. The Court explained that 
“the fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied 
material . . . .” Id. Other courts have also looked at the portion of the infringing work that was taken. See, e.g., Wright v. Warner 
Books Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]his perspective gives an added dimension to the fair use inquiry.”).
302 Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830, 842 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
303 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 374, § 13.05[A][4], at 13-184. This circularity would not exist if the test did not demand 
assessment of a potential market, but only of an actual market. One possible consequence of the fair use test’s focus on a 
potential market is that uses toward the end of the copyright term may be more likely to be considered fair. See Justin Hughes, 
Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003).
304 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994).
305 For a recent proposal suggesting that a profit allocation suit, similar to compulsory licenses but depending on the profitability 
of the work, might help save copyright law’s constitutionality, see Rubenfeld, supra note 175, at 55. 
306 Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1209-10 (2000).
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significant barrier to payment.
307 From the perspective of rent dissipation theory, however, the 
absence of payment is not a concern. The concern is not with harm to the plaintiff per se, but the 
possibility of redundant exploitation. There is thus no inconsistency between a doctrine that 
focuses  on  interference  with  the  plaintiff’s  market,  both  in  the  fourth  factor  and  indirectly 
through  the  others,  yet  gives  no  compensation  at  all  where  not  quite enough  interference  is 
found.
C. Parody
Fair use embraces noneconomic as well as economic values, and nowhere are the former 
clearer than in parody law. The seminal Supreme Court parody case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music,  Inc.,
308 involving  2  Live  Crew’s  rap  imitation  of  Roy  Orbison’s  song  “Oh,  Pretty 
Woman,” makes clear that “when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for 
the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”
309 This conclusion, 
“reflected  in  the  rule  that  there  is  no  protectible  derivative  market  for  criticism,”
310 ascribes 
noneconomic value to criticism. Though this embrace of free speech considerations thus acts as a 
constraint  on  economic  factors,  Campbell’s  analysis  nonetheless  reflects  the  logic  of  rent 
dissipation. Indeed, it was in Campbell that the Court emphasized that transformative works are 
more likely to be found to be fair use under the first factor than nontransformative works.
311
Transformative parodies are less likely to be redundant than nontransformative parodies, and 
copyright  law  should  thus  be  less  concerned  about  rent  dissipation  from  parodic  derivative 
works.
What is perhaps most surprising about Campbell is not that the Court permitted a parody 
to engage in some borrowing from the original work,
312 but to the contrary that it refused to allow 
an evidentiary presumption in favor of parody
313 and remanded to the Sixth Circuit to apply the 
307 Litigation costs, however, could be a concern. Cf. Lichtman, supra note 89 , at 4 (arguing that a desire to avoid difficult 
evidentiary questions helps provide a positive account of copyright law).
308 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
309 Id. at 591-92.
310 Id. at 592.
311 See supra notes 282-285 and accompanying text.
312 See, e.g., 510 U.S. at 580-81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation 
of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination . . . .”).
313 The Court explained:
The Act has no hint of an evidentiary preference for parodists over their victims, and no workable presumption for 
parody could take account of the fact that parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its 
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four-factor test anew.
314 While the Court may well have not been generous enough to parody, 
rent dissipation theory contributes to an explanation of its lack of generosity. In applying the 
third factor, the Court acknowledged that “[c]opying does not become excessive in relation to 
parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original’s heart,” since it is the heart 
that “most readily conjures up the song for parody.”
315 The Court, however, emphasized that no
more may be taken than necessary, and remanded to permit consideration of “whether repetition 
of the bass riff is excessive copying.”
316 By encouraging musical parodists to take only as much 
of the melody as needed to conjure up the original, the Court sought to prevent parodies from 
substituting for the original. One cannot capture the portion of the market that cares about the 
tune but not about the lyrics (such as non-English speakers) merely by changing the lyrics and 
claiming the parody label.
317
An  even  more  substantial  obstacle  to  the  would-be  parodist  emerges  in  the  Court’s 
analysis of the fourth factor, the effect on the market for the relevant work. The Court could have 
concluded that where there is a genuine parody that does not take too much of the original work, 
any effect on the market for the original is more likely attributable to the effect of criticism than 
to market substitution. Instead, the Court remanded for a determination of the extent to which the 
parody would interfere with the derivative market for a nonparody rap version of the original, if 
indeed such a market existed.
318 Even a true parody in a genre other than the original’s, the 
Court’s analysis makes clear, could be found to violate the derivative right if it interferes with 
the original copyright holder’s ability to exploit that genre. This caveat is difficult to explain on 
incentive  grounds,
319 and  the  Court’s  interpretation  of  the  third  and  fourth  factors  together 
creative artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic elements. Accordingly, parody, like any 
other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged case by case, in light of the ends of the 
copyright law.
Id. at 581.
314 Id. at 594.
315 Id. at 588.
316 Id. at 589.
317 Rent dissipation theory also produces a countervailing consideration. Once a parodist will be able to enter by sufficiently 
changing the melody, the fixed costs of entry could be lowered by allowing the parodist simply to take the melody. See supra text 
accompanying notes 403-404. Given the relatively small cost of altering the melody, however, it is plausible that the first rent 
dissipation effect outweighs this one.
318 510 U.S. at 593-94.
319 This is so for the same reason that the derivative right is generally difficult to justify on incentive grounds. See supra Part 
II.A.
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arguably  place  an  excessive  burden  on  socially  useful  parody,
320 but  it  does  reflect  rent 
dissipation concerns. By dissipating the rents from a potential nonparody derivative, a parody 
may vitiate fair use, depending of course on the other factors in the fair use test.
D. Copying
Perhaps the most important issue in copyright law, at least from an economic perspective, 
is the extent to which copying will be permitted. The reproduction right, after all, is the most 
important  stick  in  the  copyright  bundle.  While  theorists  have  pointed  out  that  sharing  of 
copyrighted works could benefit producers,
321 copyright owners are always free in any event to 
allow limited sharing.
322 Content producers complain often that piracy hurts their bottom line,
323
and  while  they  may  exaggerate  the  effect,
324 they  presumably  would  not  complain  at  all  if 
copying benefited them. Copying is a particularly important issue today given technologies that 
make duplication, in particular digital duplication, ever easier. Lobbying on copying issues is 
320 A recent case testing the limits of parody involved The Wind Done Gone, which retold Gone with the Wind from a slave’s 
perspective. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). The novel seems a paradigmatic 
example of parody, but the work’s borrowing of extraneous material made the case close under the Campbell approach. See id. at 
1270 (noting the borrowing, but concluding that the parody could not have criticized the original “without depending heavily 
upon copyrighted elements of that book”).
321 See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 123 (1999); Stanley M. Besen & Sheila N. 
Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copyright Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255, 271 (1989).
322 Some authors explicitly encourage sharing, particularly in collaborative projects like the Linux operating system, where a 
final product is the result of numerous voluntary contributions. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature 
of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing “peer production” as an alternative production model); Dennis M. Kennedy, A 
Primer on Open Source Licensing Legal Issues: Copyright, Copyleft and Copyfuture, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 345 (2001) 
(discussing the “copyleft” license, which allows and encourages sharing). Collaborative projects could either reduce or increase 
redundancy. If a project were sufficiently successful, it might limit the need for market production; if Linux achieves a sufficient 
quality standard, then perhaps we won’t need Windows, or at least we won’t need specialized alternatives to Windows. On the 
other hand, collaborative projects themselves encourage redundant contributions from authors, which are then filtered into a final 
project. See, e.g., Benkler, supra, at 438, 441.
323 For  recent  studies  claiming  high dollar  losses  from pirating,  see  BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE,  U.S.  SOFTWARE STATE 
PIRACY STUDY  (2002),  available  at  http://www.bsa.org/piracystudy/press/State_Piracy_Study_2001.pdf  (last  visited  Dec.  27, 
2002), which breaks down software piracy rates by region and claims $5.65 billion in U.S. revenue losses; and INTERNATIONAL 
FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, MUSIC PIRACY REPORT (2002), available at http://www.ifpi.org (last visited Dec. 
27, 2002), which focuses solely on losses from pirated copies.
324 See, e.g., Mary Hodder, MacWizard's Analysis of Music Sales Refutes RIAA Arguments on Piracy (Dec. 23, 2002), available 
at http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/biplog/archive/000409.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2002) (challenging the methodology 
used by the Recording Industry Association of America to estimate losses from online copying). The Business Software Study 
calculates  losses  to  software  companies  by  multiplying  the piracy  rate  times  the  wholesale  cost  of  the  software.  BUSINESS 
SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 323, at 4. This approach assumes that users of pirated software all would have purchased the 
software if pirating were impossible. A recent literature has suggested that illegal copying of their own products can benefit 
producers in the presence of network externalities, which is most likely for computer software. See, e.g., Kathleen Reavis Conner 
& Richard Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protection Strategies, 37 MGMT. SCI. 125 (1991); Moshe Givon et al., 
Software Piracy: Estimation of Lost Sales and the Impact on Software Diffusion, 59 J. MARKETING 29 (1995); Lisa N. Takeyama, 
The  Welfare  Implications  of  Unauthorized  Reproduction  of  Intellectual  Property  in  the  Presence  of  Demand  Network 
Externalities, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 155 (1994). It is also possible that if pirating were impossible, some consumers would not 
purchase computers at all, and the software industry might lose some sales from such consumers. 
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likely to be more one-sided than on other issues, because no content producers is likely to benefit 
from a regime permitting unauthorized duplication, and we should thus be less confident that 
rent dissipation theo ry will predict the law .
Rent  dissipation  theory  complicates  the  standard  neoclassical  argument  that,  at  least 
where transactions costs are low, unauthorized copying should be prohibited.
325 If the number of 
works in a world  with no copying is too high, or even if the social value from creation of 
marginal works is positive but small, some copying may increase social welfare. The point is the 
same  as  that  in  the  context  of  library  lending.
326 Just  as  the  reduction  in  deadweight  loss 
attributable to lending seems all the more important once rent dissipation theory diminishes what 
otherwise would appear to be negative incentive effects from allowing lending, so too does rent 
dissipation theory tilt the balance toward the benefit from increasing consumers’ access to works. 
Copying enables consumers to amass large libraries of copyrighted works, particularly audio and 
audiovisual works, but presumably reduces the number of new works created. Rent dissipation 
theory  suggests  that  the  second  effect,  at  least  up  to  a  point,  may  not  be  a  large  cost,  and 
therefore  the  benefits  of  allowing  consumers  to  build  collections  loom  larger  in  the  social 
calculus than they otherwise would.
327
More pervasive copying than currently exists conceivably could increase social welfare. 
Nonetheless, it is remarkable, given the united front of content producers, how much copying is 
allowed. The Copyright Act, for example, makes explicit that fair use allows “multiple copies for 
classroom use.”
328 In addition, the Act grants libraries and archives limited rights “to reproduce 
no  more  than  one  copy  or  phonorecord  of  a  work”  and  even  “to  distribute  such  copy  or 
phonorecord.”
329 The  Supreme  Court  in  the  Sony  case  found  that  fair  use  entitled  Betamax 
owners to “time-shift” by taping shows for later viewing.
330 These provisions are all instances in 
325 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994) (arguing 
that there should generally be property rule protection for intellectual property).
326 See supra notes 264-268 and accompanying text.
327 Record companies have considered subscription plans allowing subscribers access during the subscription to unlimited music 
within the record companies’ libraries. See, e.g., Don Clark, E-Business: Music Sites Hope to Start Humming, WALL ST. J., July 
16, 2001, at B5. Such plans, however, will not eliminate deadweight loss. Even if all content providers joined together to offer a 
single plan, many consumers would not be able to afford it. These consumers thus would not be able to obtain music even where 
the cost of reproduction was less than the value to the consumers of listening to the music.
328 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Congress included in its conference report an agreement negotiated by publishers and advocates of an 
expansive fair use doctrine concerning the scope of the exemption, but these guidelines are only persuasive authority. See H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810-11.
329 17 U.S.C. § 108.
330 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). As Randal Picker argues, Sony does not merely allow machines 
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which a concentrated group in effect served as a proxy for the interest of consumers. That these 
groups were able to obtain exceptions, however, suggests that there is an intuitive appeal to the 
idea that copying sometimes may increase social welfare even if it decreases producer incentives.
Rent  dissipation  theory’s  strongest  statutory  reflection  may  be  in  the  Audio  Home 
Recording Act.
331 The Act was a congressionally enacted compromise among record companies, 
artists, and electronics companies,
332 and it allows importation and sale of digital audio recording 
devices.
333 The devices must contain a serial copy management system that prevents the making 
of  copies  of  copies,
334 and  makers  of  devices  are  required  to  pay  royalties  to  artists.
335 The 
compromise,  though  criticized  by  some  as  reflecting  industry  control  of  copyright  policy,
336
represented  a  recognition  that  Coasean  bargaining  could  maximize  the  combined  rent  to  be 
shared among the various industry groups. That the result of this bargaining was to allow home 
audio copying suggests that this was an efficient result despite any adverse effects on production 
incentives. This is a remarkable outcome especially considering that consumers were not directly 
represented.  Perhaps  even  more  remarkable  is  that  the  statute  arguably  immunizes  all  home 
audio copying,
337 including at least analog copying despite the absence of royalty payments for 
such  copying.
338  The  compromise  indicates  that  the  portion  of  consumer  surplus  that  is 
transferred  to  producers  through  higher  prices  for  equipment  and  thus  royalty  payments  is 
adequate  to  compensate  the  record  companies  and  artists  for  any  increased  copying  that 
facilitating copying where the benefits exceed the costs. By finding no contributory infringement where a device has substantial 
noninfringing uses, the Court “removes any reason to redesign to minimize copyright infringement.” Randal C. Picker, Copyright 
as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, ANTITRUST BULL., July 1, 2002, at 13.
331 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4244 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 ).
332 For a brief summary of the history and operation of the AHRA, see David M. Hornik, Recent Development Combating 
Software Privacy: The Softlifting Problem, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 377, 405-09 (1994).
333 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a), 1008.
334 Id. § 1002(a). Serial copying is defined as “the duplication in a digital format of a copyrighted musical work or sound 
recording from a digital reproduction of a digital musical recording.” Id. § 1001(11).
335 Id. §§ 1003-1007.
336 Lewis Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the Formation of Copyright Policy,
45 J. COPR. SOC’Y 497 (1998).
337 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (“No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on … [a digital or 
analog audio recording device] or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.”).
338 Whether the section immunizes all home copying from liability is somewhat uncertain. The principal complication is that a 
device may not qualify under the definition of a “digital audio recording device” and yet plainly not be an “analog audio 
recording device,” an undefined term. This is particularly problematic given the Ninth Circuit’s decision in RIAA v. Diamond 
Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999), construing “digital audio recording device” narrowly to exclude devices involving 
computers. The Senate Report on the bill, however, seems to suggest that Congress intended by referring to digital or analog 
recording to cover all home recording. See S. Rep. No. 102-294, 51 (1992), available at 1992 WL 133198 (“A central purpose of 
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991 is conclusively to resolve [the] debate” over “audio recording for noncommercial use.”). 
For a thorough treatment of this issue, see 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 374, § 8B.07[C][4], at 8B-94.
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results.
339 One reason for this may be that entry into the market for sound recordings dissipates 
much of the rents from sound recordings, and so any decrease in entry might have only a modest 
effect on the rents that record companies are able to capture. 
Copyright  law,  of  course,  is  not  uniformly  friendly  to  copying.  The  Copyright  Act 
imposes  criminal  sanctions  on  those  who  infringe  willfully  “for  purposes  of  commercial 
advantage or private financial gain.”
340 Piracy seems particularly likely to be rent-dissipating as 
pirates can produce perfect copies at lower prices than content producers and thus if legal would 
threaten, more than noncommercial copying, to have drastic effects on the incentive to produce 
and  market  new  works.
341 More  controversially,
342 the  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act 
(DMCA) criminalizes the evasion of technological measures employed by copyright owners to 
limit use of their works.
343 By reducing consumers’ ability to copy works, the DMCA seems to 
ignore consumers’ interests in obtaining broad access to works in favor of producers’ interests. 
Even the DMCA, however, reflects in part some of the concerns of rent dissipation theory. In 
particular, in the absence of a statute, there is a danger that content producers and software 
companies  would  engage  in  a  spy-versus-spy  rent  dissipating  contest,  with  the  software 
companies  at  each  turn  seeking  to  overcome  the  newest  form  of  copyright  protection.
344
Moreover, the effect of the DMCA on copying ultimately will be limited. There is, after all, no 
practical  way  to  prevent  consumers  from  making  analog  copies  of  digital  works.  What 
consumers can hear and see they can record, with greater or lesser fidelity depending on the 
sophistication of their equipment.
The  combination  of  the  various  permissions  and  restrictions  in  practice  mean  that
consumers can copy, but for-profit companies cannot facilitate piracy, and the copies sometimes 
339 An alternative explanation is that the record companies may have concluded that they were unlikely to win in court anyway 
and that the statute thus simply reflected an advantageous settlement. 
340 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
341 Pirated copies are cheaper to produce because pirates free-ride on the marketing expenses of the record companies. See 
generally Andrew Burke, How Effective Are International Copyright Conventions in the Music Industry?, 20 J. CULTURAL ECON.
51 (1996) (discussing the market for pirated works).
342 For a balanced assessment of the DMCA, see Orin Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in
COPY FIGHTS 163 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002).
343 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2360 (1998), codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
344 It is possible that some such contests will occur despite the DMCA. See Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window onto 
the Future of Copyright Law in the Internet Age, 18 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 755, 782-85 (2000) (suggesting 
that a similar “cat-and-mouse” game will occur between content providers and online file-sharing services).
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will be of lower quality,
345 or take longer to obtain, than the originals. At the same time, some 
consumers will be more likely to copy than others, either because some consumers are concerned 
about  violating  the  law
346 or  because  only  some  consumers  own  the  necessary  equipment.
347
Perhaps this is in the end a sensible compromise. A regime without a reproduction right at all 
presumably  would  cause  a  great  reduction  in  the  number  and  perhaps  quality  of  sound 
recordings.  Although  there  would  still  be  some  incentive  to  produce  copyrighted  works,  for 
example to increase concert ticket sales,
348 it seems at least plausible that there would be far 
fewer  works,  perhaps  so  many  fewer  that  social  welfare  would  decline.  A  regime in  which 
consumers were unable to copy, even assuming such a regime could be enforced at reasonable 
cost, could be equally unattractive. Though it would maximize the production of works, rent 
dissipation theory indicates that the marginal works produced might be of little or conceivably 
even  negative  social  value,  and  consumers  forced  to  pay  would  be  able  to  own  far  fewer 
phonorecords than they otherwise might. The existing regime is somewhere between these two 
extremes.
Many regimes, however, would be between the extremes, and rent dissipation theory 
alone cannot offer an unambiguous prediction or prescription as to how many copying issues 
should  be  resolved.  Napster  and  post-Napster  programs
349 that  facilitate  file  sharing  pose  a 
345 A recent study has suggested that because of the relatively low quality of bootlegs relative to pirated copies of officially 
released CDs, the bootlegs do not substitute for officially released products. See Jay Naghavi & Günther G. Schulze, Bootlegging 
in the Music Industry: A Note, 12 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 57, 64-68 (2001). If it were possible to make low-quality (or inconsistent-
quality) copies of CDs for free, such copying might similarly have only a modest effect on total sales and incentives to produce 
music.
346 Such concern may exist because of the uncertain scope of § 1008 or, much more likely, because consumers are simply 
unaware of the provision. Interestingly, § 1008 is drafted in such a way that even if its scope became clear, some law-abiding 
consumers might be hesitant to copy. The Act specifies that “[n]o action may be brought” for home copying, providing at least a 
basis for an argument that home copying is forbidden even if the ban is unenforceable. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (“No action may be 
brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright . . . .”). 
Arguably,  a  regime  in  which  some  consumers  break  the  law  (or  appear  to  break  the  law)  and  copy  while  other 
consumers do not copy is harmful because it might breed a disrespect for law. See, e.g., JANICE NADLER, FLOUTING THE LAW: 
DOES PERCEIVED INJUSTICE PROVOKE GENERAL NON-COMPLIANCE? (Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 02-9, Nov. 
27, 2002)  (reporting  an  experiment  indicating  that  subjects  exposed  to  laws  perceived  as  unjust  through newspaper  stories 
reported greater likelihood of engaging in criminal activity than other subjects in what subjects believed to be a second unrelated 
experiment).
347 For an economic model of copying that takes into account the possibility of differential costs of obtaining a reproduction, see 
Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach, 92 J. POL. ECON. 236 
(1984).
348 One  commentator  has  suggested  that  copyright’s  reproduction  right  may  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  output  of  new 
creations,  particularly  music,  because  copyright  protection  leads  to  large  marketing  expenditures.  See  Mark  S.  Nadel, 
Questioning the Economic Justification for (and thus Constitutionality of) Copyright Law’s Prohibition Against Unauthorized 
Copying: § 106 (Aug. 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at  www.ssrn.com/ab stract=322120).
349 For a discussion of the evolution of these programs, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the 
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 510-21 (2003). Strahilevitz observes that file-
swapping programs have managed to avoid a “tragedy of the digital commons” in which everyone would have an incentive to 
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danger to the music recording industry,
350 although there is little evidence that they have led to 
noticeable decreases in  the number of songs produced or on sales.
351 Progress and increased 
availability of technology, however, conceivably could mean that if Internet file sharing were 
unambiguously  legal,  eventually  no  one  would  pay  for  music.
352 On  the  other  hand,  these 
services allow users to accumulate large libraries of works, and absent a conclusion that users’ 
allegedly
353 illicit benefits should not count in a social welfare calculus,
354 such increased access 
is welfare-enhancing.
355 The uncertain empirics of technology development thus complicate what 
download files but no one would have an incentive to upload them. The programs’ success in overcoming this obstacle presents 
the danger that file-sharing might become too attractive, as pro-file swapping norms seem to defeat anti-file swapping norms in 
norm competition. Id. at 538-47. Thus, even if Napster-like programs are socially beneficial now once product differentiation 
concerns are taken into account, they could become so effective that they lead to an excessive decrease in the amount of new 
music, outweighing any benefits.
350 See Peter J. Alexander, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: The Case of the Music Recording Industry, 20 REV. INDUS. ORG. 151, 160 
(2002) (predicting that “major firms in the music recording industry will continue to face significant difficulties in controlling the 
reproduction and distribution of their products,” but noting that “the potential impact of peer-to-peer file sharing on market 
structure is ambiguous”).
351 See id. at 157 (“[I]t is not obvious that sharing music files over the internet has thus far had an adverse effect on sales.”).
352 Much of the success of peer-to-peer file-sharing so far might be attributed to the fact that its beneficiaries are only a segment 
of consumers. See TIM WU, PEER NETWORKS AND OTHER RESPONSES TO REGULATION (University of Virginia School of Law 
Working Paper Series No. 02-13, 2002). Wu’s analysis indicates that peer-to-peer file-sharing ironically might not have been as 
successful if it were more universally available, because “the logic of collective action suggests that the ideal strategy for an 
individual or sub-group under copyright law is to create a system that limits evasion of copyright to an ‘in-group,’ leaving 
everyone else to pay for the incentives to create.” Id. at 59.
353 The Ninth Circuit in the Napster case did not adequately address the argument that Napster users’ usage of the program was 
protected under the Audio Home Recording Act. The Court rejected the application of § 1008 on the ground that computers are 
not digital audio recording devices. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (following 
Recording  Indus.  Ass’n  v.  Diamond  Multimedia  Sys.,  Inc.,  180  F.3d  1072,  1078  (9th  Cir.  1999)).  This  argument  itself  is 
controversial, relying primarily on legislative history rather than statutory text. See generally 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
374, § 8B.02[A][3], at 8B-30 to 8B-32. But the court ignored altogether the separate argument, which has equal support in 
legislative history, that even if a computer is not a digital audio recording device, Congress intended to immunize all home 
copying. See supra note 346 (explaining this argument); cf. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 
356-60 (2002) (offering a comprehensive analysis of the § 1008 issue in the Napster case, concluding that the issue was a close 
one given that Congress did not foresee the possibility of Napster). 
Perhaps  the  court  could have  defended  its  ultimate  resolution by  arguing  that  the  consumers’  infringement  could 
provide a basis for a contributory infringement case even if consumers’ infringement is immunized. But the Act provides that 
“[n]o action may be brought … based on the noncommercial use by a consumer.” 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (emphasis added). The action 
against  Napster  was  surely  based  on  consumers’  use.  The  district  court  also  offered  an  additional  argument  against  the 
applicability of § 1008, that plaintiffs’ action was not under the Audio Home Recording Act. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 n.19 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court of 
Appeals mentioned this argument without assessing it, see 239 F.3d at 1024, but it is clearly frivolous, as § 1008 states that “[n]o 
action may be brought under this title,” a reference to the entire Copyright Act. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 374, § 
8B.02[A][1], at 8B-24 (noting that the Audio Home Recording Act comprises but one chapter, namely Chapter 10, of title 17). 
Probably the strongest argument, not considered by the Court of Appeals in construing § 1008, is that distributing files wholesale 
is not a “noncommercial” use. The anonymity and volume of the exchange, however, would not seem under ordinary usage of the 
word “noncommercial” to be relevant, given that no money was involved.
354 Some scholars have argued that wrongdoers’ utility sometimes should receive no weight in social welfare calculations. For 
example, the scholars argue, any pleasure that a rapist derives from his crime should be irrelevant even if it could be shown that 
this pleasure were greater than the victim’s pain. See, e.g. ,  Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary 
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM.L. REV. 1232, 1234 (1985) (disvaluing the offender's private gain in the social welfare 
analysis). Such arguments, however, do not extend easily to the gains an infringer obtains from copyright infringement, which is 
a malum prohibitum rather than malum in se offense.
355 It is possible that much of the benefit of increased access could be obtained even if there were some fee for use of file-sharing 
services. Neil Netanel has argued for the legalization of such programs subject to a fee, on the model of the Audio Home 
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would anyway be a complex social welfare calculation.
356 Rent dissipation theory, however, at 
least strengthens the case of those who would argue for greater copying.
E. Copyright Remedies
The winner of a copyright infringement suit ordinarily has a right, in addition to damages, 
to  enjoin  distribution  of  the  infringing  work.
357 At  times  the  right  to  an  injunction  seems 
comically inefficient, as when a preliminary injunction was issued against the distribution of the 
film Twelve Monkeys as a result of a single scene that allegedly infringed a copyright in the 
design  of  a  chair.
358 The  existence  of  property  rule  rather  than  liability  rule  protection  for 
copyright seems inconsistent with an incentive theory of copyright, since allowing a compulsory 
license at a price simulating a negotiation for all use of copyrighted works would allow for more 
adaptations of existing works.
359 Transactions costs considerations make property rule protection 
seem especially unattractive, since negotiation barriers, including the difficulty of locating the 
copyright owner,
360 may sometimes frustrate a beneficial use of a copyrighted work. Although 
litigation costs argue against a liability rule regime, where compulsory licenses exist, Congress 
has found administrative remedies that minimize such costs.
361
Rent dissipation theory, however, provides strong support for injunctive remedies. The 
justification is similar to that provided by Kitch in the patent context.
362 A prospecting system 
prevents a gold rush by providing property rights, and a liability rule alternative is unlikely to 
produce the optimal amount of entry. Perhaps the compulsory license will be too low, in which 
case there will still be excessive entry, or too high, in which case the liability rule in effect is a 
property rule, but there is little reason to expect the government to get it just right. The owner of 
a patent or copyright, meanwhile, has an incentive to maximize profits, the difference between 
Recording Act. See NEIL NETANEL, IMPOSE A NONCOMMERCIAL USE LEVY TO ALLOW FREE P2P FILE-SWAPPING AND REMIXING22 
(U. Tex. Public Law Research Paper No. 44, 2002). 
356 An additional consideration is the effort expended by consumers to make copies. See Novos & Waldman, supra note 347, at 
237.
357 See 17 U.S.C. § 502; see also Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 6-17 (1999) 
(providing a comprehensive overview of copyright remedies). But cf. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F.2d 
659, 661 (2d Cir.1989) (noting that an injunction is not an inevitable result of a finding of infringement).
358 See Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
359 For a defense of property rule protection, see Merges, supra note 325.
360 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (Aug. 1, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author) (manuscript at 5-7) (discussing tracing costs)
361 See, e.g. 17 U.S.C. §§ 115-116 (providing detailed compulsory licensing schemes).
362 See Kitch, supra note 58 .
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revenues and expenses. In theory, a suitably set fee for a compulsory license could achieve such 
maximization, but the intellectual property right owner is better situated than the government to 
determine how much the right should be exploited. To be sure, property rules have problems 
associated with abuse of monopoly power, and assorted copyright law provisions seek to prevent 
a  copyright  owner  from  leveraging  the  monopoly  right.
363 Rent  dissipation  theory,  however, 
helps explain why compulsory licenses are not more widespread.
364
IV. COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
We have already considered one aspect of copyrightable subject matter, the availability 
of copyright protection for elements of a work such as plot and characters.
365 The rent dissipation 
account may be most useful for these specific aspects of copyrightability, but the theory coheres 
more generally with the broad standards and doctrines determining whether works are eligible 
for copyright. The statute provides that copyright subsists “in original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression.”
366 Doctrine has elaborated this requirement, and I will 
explore the case law by considering the fixation requirement, the originality requirement, the 
merger doctrine, and the copyrightability of facts and compilations. Some of my analysis will 
reflect the same logic of entry deterrence that animated Part II, but this part will also introduce 
areas  in  which  copyright  law  reduces  rent  dissipation  with  the  opposite  strategy,  entry 
facilitation. Because it often will be difficult to determine which of these strategies best allows 
copyright to minimize rent dissipation, this Article’s account of copyrightable subject matter is 
not as explanatorily powerful as its account of the derivative right and the fair use test. It is 
useful, however, to see that the aspect of copyright doctrine that might seem most indifferent to 
reduction production at least plausibly reflect concerns about rent dissipation.
363 For a discussion of these provisions, see Jason S. Rooks, Note, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory Licenses 
in Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 266-68 (1995). A proposal to enact a new compulsory license 
provision along these lines is Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Blacked-Out Professional Team Sporting Event Telecasts 
(PTSETS): Using Copyright Law to Mitigate Monopolistic Behavior, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403 (1995).
364 We have already seen a justification for compulsory licenses of musical works. See supra text accompanying notes 258-263
(noting that differences in presentation make covers less redundant to consumers than the equivalent in other media would be).
365 See supra Part II.B.
366 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
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A. The Fixation Requirement
The requirement that a work be fixed in a “tangible medium of expression” is usually 
easily met. As the House Report on the Copyright Act makes clear, “it makes no difference what 
the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be.”
367 The only media that are excluded are those 
that  are  not  “sufficiently  permanent  or  stable  to  permit  it  to  be  perceived,  reproduced,  or 
otherwise  communicated  for  a  period  of  more  than  transitory  duration.”
368 The  stuff  of  law 
school exam hypotheticals, this would appear to include works like ice sculptures, sand castles, 
and skywriting.
369 Aside from an interesting question concerning fixation in computer media,
370
the  only  significant  exclusion  then  is  for  works  that  are  not  fixed  at  all.  For  example, 
extemporaneous speeches that are not simultaneously recorded by the speaker, even if there is a 
simultaneous recording by a third party,
371 are not fixed.
Rent dissipation theory provides a straightforward explanation. The failure of an author 
to  fix  a  work  suggests  that  the  author  does  not  intend  to  commercialize  the  work,  and 
reproduction or exploitation of the work by another is thus unlikely to lead to any redundancy in 
commercialization efforts. This is true both for exotic media like ice sculptures, where the failure 
to photograph or otherwise fix one’s creation suggests lack of an intent to commercialize it, and 
for speeches and the like. Many speakers and event organizers have no intent to commercialize 
their speeches or events, and indeed many may appreciate any free publicity that they receive.
Such  publicity  often  indirectly  benefits  other  commercialization  or  outreach  efforts  that 
organizations may undertake. Copyright law in effect provides a default rule for unfixed works 
that provides the works’ creators with the publicity that may follow from the works’ presence in 
the public domain. The copyright owners remain free to override the default rule by fixing the 
works. This default rule makes sense given the transactions costs that would result if the default 
rule were that even unfixed works were copyrighted.
367 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 52 (1976).
368 17 U.S.C. § 101.
369 Such works may be protected by state law. The House Report specifies, “Under the bill, the concept of fixation ... represents 
the dividing line between common law and statutory protection.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52.
370 See, e.g., Bradley J. Nicholson, The Ghost in the Machine: MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. and the Problem of 
Copying in RAM, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147 (1995) (exploring the issue).
371 Section 101 makes clear that a work is considered “fixed” only if the fixation is “by or under the authority of the author.”
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If copyright law were single-mindedly focused on rent dissipation, it presumably would 
provide that even unfixed works are copyrightable, but copyright law’s attention to factors such 
as transactions costs leads to a rule that takes into account the various economic considerations. 
As  a  result,  redundancy  remains  a  possibility  if  more  than  one  third  party  seeks  to  take 
commercial advantage of an unfixed work, for example if more than one radio station decides to 
broadcast a football game when the organizers of the game themselves did not seek to arrange 
for any recording of the game.
372 It will be rare, however, for the creators of a work not to exploit 
commercially a work so valuable that multiple other organizations will do so, unless of course 
the  creators  prefer  the  publicity  to  direct  commercial  exploitation.  But  the  assumption  that 
authors will seek to fix their works when they intend to exploit them commercially still holds, 
and it would be difficult to imagine a copyright regime that would choose which among the 
competing unauthorized radio stations should be entitled to the broadcast when the organizers of 
the  game  did  not  themselves  select  a  station.  Copyright  law  thus  permits  unauthorized 
dissemination, and provides for the attendant benefits for both the distributors and consumers of 
the work, in the circumstances that seem in general unlikely to produce competition that would 
dissipate producer rents.
373
B. The Originality Requirement
The originality  requirement, sometimes called the creativity  requirement,
374 imposes a 
low but nontrivial threshold to obtain a copyright. An author need not be particularly innovative 
to receive copyright protection against direct appropriation of the author’s work. Borrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony
375 offers a classic illustration. This case confronted a technological 
innovation, that of the photograph. Creation of a photograph, in the ordinary case, does not 
ordinarily  require  as  much  creativity  or  skill  as  creation  of  a  painting,  and  the  defendant 
372 The House Report makes clear that a televised football game ordinarily would be considered to be fixed if it were transmitted 
live and simultaneously recorded. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 53. The third-party broadcasters would have copyright in their sound 
recordings, but not in the underlying game. See 17 U.S.C. § 114.
373 I do not mean to suggest that rent dissipation is necessarily the best or sole explanation of the fixation requirement. A 
complementary explanation is that the fixation requirement serves an evidentiary purpose, saving the courts from having to 
entertain a difficult infringement inquiry when an allegedly copied unfixed work is unavailable. See Lichtman, supra note 89, at 
29-41.
374 A treatise offers the following distinction: 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B], at 2-
86 (“Where creativity refers to the nature of the work itself, originality refers to the nature of the author’s contribution to the 
work.”).
375 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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accordingly emphasized that “a photograph is the mere mechanical reproduction of the physical 
features  or  outlines  of  some  object,  animate  or  inanimate,  and  involves  no  originality  of 
thought.”
376 The  Supreme  Court,  however,  concluded  that  a  photograph  of  Oscar  Wilde  had 
enough creativity to enjoy copyright protection. It emphasized that the photograph emerged from 
the photographer’s “own original mental conception” and reflected decisions about costume and 
composition.
377  Though  the  case  left  open  the  possibility  that  only  carefully  constructed 
photographs would receive copyright protection, case law since suggests that the photographer 
need not do much more than point and click to earn an entitlement to a copyright.
378
Rent  dissipation  concerns  provide  a  straightforward  explanation  of  the  relatively  low 
threshold that an author must overcome to obtain copyright in a writing. If the creation of a 
copyrighted work produces a rent, then free appropriability of the work would lead to dissipation 
of the rent. Copyright protection for a creation of the human mind can do no harm, for if a work 
is so uninteresting that it produces no rent, whether or not because of lack of originality in the 
more general usage of the word, then there is no danger of rent dissipation. If a work is valuable, 
however, concentrating rights to exploit the work in the creator avoids redundancy and wasteful 
(though consumer-benefiting) competition. Traditional incentive theories of copyright, of course, 
also can provide an explanation for the low copyrightability threshold: Copyright is designed to 
induce production of works, and the lower the threshold, the more works that will be encouraged. 
The strength of this traditional theory depends on an evaluation of whether it is important for 
copyright to encourage production of works of relatively low originality.
A caveat to the rent dissipation explanation of the low originality requirement is that 
there is a competing rent dissipation effect. Just as the availability of a patent may lead to a 
patent race,
379 so too may the availability of copyright protection lead to excessive resources 
being  expended  in  the  production  of  copyrighted  works.  My  explanation  of  the  originality 
doctrine, one might argue, is a “just so” story; if there were a high standard for originality, the 
376 Id. at 59.
377 Id. at 54-55.
378 See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1075-77 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing the low threshold photographs 
must meet to be deemed sufficiently creative for copyright). The Copyright Office, at least, has made clear that it will issue 
copyrights  on  photographs.  See http://www.copyright.gov/faq.html  ¶  58  (last  visited  Jan.  20,  2002)  (noting  that  although 
copyright law does not protect sightings of Elvis, “copyright law will protect your photo (or other depiction) of your sighting of 
Elvis”).
379 See supra notes 66 - 70 and accompanying text.
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argument goes, I would have suggested that the high threshold discouraged redundant production 
of works of low originality. The argument sounds an important caution, but the message is that 
we must compare the effects of rent dissipation, just as patent scholars have done.
380 Here, any 
increased  rent  seeking  is  minimal.  Competitors  will  often  be  unable  to  create  acceptable 
substitutes for low originality works, for example works that capture a particular moment in 
time,
381 and when they can create substitutes, the low originality ensures that the investment will 
be relatively low. Thus, the availability of copyright for relatively unoriginal work probably 
leads  to  little  fixed  cost  in  the  production  of  redundant  works,  while  limiting  redundant 
exploitation of those few minimally original works that turn out to have enduring commercial 
value does reduce rent dissipation.
Rent dissipation theory therefore seems to provide an easy explanation for why many 
works of relatively low originality still meet the copyright threshold. The greater challenge, and 
the  greater  puzzle  for  scholars,  is  why  some  works  are  deemed  insufficiently  original  for 
copyright. Consider, for example, Magic Marketing v. Mailing Services.
382 The case concerned 
the copyrightability of letters, forms and envelopes produced by a mass marketing company. For 
example,  an  envelope  included  the  words  “PRIORITY  MESSAGE:  CONTENTS  REQUIRE 
IMMEDIATE ATTENTION” in large white letters on a black stripe running horizontally across 
the middle of the envelope.
383 The court held that the words on the envelope did “not exhibit the 
minimal level of creativity necessary to warrant copyright protection,”
384 and that the addition of 
a black stripe constituted “nothing more than a distinctive typeface, which is not protected.”
385
The case is potentially troubling to an incentive theorist, because even relatively simple designs 
may reflect substantial investment in consumer research. The problem is of particular concern in 
comparison to the availability of copyright in photographs, considering that the design of the 
envelope may demand considerably more investment than the design of many photos.
380 See supra notes 72 - 77 and accompanying text.
381 An example of a valuable work of low originality is the Zapruder film of President Kennedy’s assassination. The work simply 
could not be recreated, but if it were uncopyrightable, it could be commercially exploited in a way that would dissipate any rents 
from commercial development. Of course, the film also introduces a new wrinkle, because its newsworthiness helped advance a 
case that reproduction was fair use. Indeed, that is the issue on which litigation over the film focused. See Time Inc. v. Bernard 
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (D.C.N.Y. 1968).
382 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
383 Id. at 771.
384 Id. The Court added that the envelope amounted to a “mere listing of ingredients or contents, which the Copyright Office by 
regulation has determined to be not amenable to copyright. See id. at 771-72 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1985)).
385 Id. at 772.
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It might seem at first that the rent dissipation theory rationale for allowing copyright 
would  apply  here.  If  there  are  rents  to  be  gained  from  exploitation  of  even  these  relatively 
generic elements of the marketing materials, awarding a copyright will prevent dissipation of the 
rents. The problem, however, is that the envelope in this case, and more generally short phrases 
and slogans, are not marketed to consumers by themselves, but instead are used in marketing 
other products. The absence of copyright in a work that itself can be marketed may lead multiple 
entrants to sell the work and dissipate the profit, but granting a copyright in these marketing 
materials would do little to discourage rent dissipation in exploitation of any product. The total 
amount of marketing activity, or even of marketing of marketing activity, depends minimally if 
at all on the copyrightability of such elements in the marketing materials. 
The  conclusion  that  there  is  little  rent  dissipation  from  exploitation  of  the  work  for 
copyright to prevent is once again only half the story, however. After all, the fact that there will 
be minimal rent dissipation whether or not copyright is allowed does not by itself provide a 
strong  argument  for  or  against  copyright  protection.  We  must  also  consider  rent  dissipation 
associated with efforts to produce the work in the first place. If there were copyright protection 
for a work such as this, other marketing companies would likely not be dissuaded from entering 
the market. They would, however, have to engage in research to develop marketing slogans and 
designs of their own. Such research, even if it resulted in different marketing designs, would be 
of little social value. In this case, the most salient form of rent dissipation stems from attempts to 
“design around” the initial copyright.
386 The costs associated with entry into the market are thus 
minimized by allowing free appropriability. When entry is likely to occur regardless of whether 
something is copyrightable, allowing copyright reduces rent dissipation. 
C. The Merger Doctrine
The  rent  dissipation  associated  with  a  related  phenomenon,  which  we  might  term 
“writing around,” can explain copyright law’s merger doctrine. The doctrine provides that where 
there is only one way or a very small number of ways to express an idea, a work expressing that 
386 See supra note 67  (discussing how inventing around a patent can be a form of rent dissipation). Technically, there is no need 
to design around a copyright, as long as a work is independently created. See infra note 391 and accompanying text. In practice, 
however, concerns about litigation may lead authors to consult past works specifically so that they can ensure that their works are 
different.
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idea will be considered to be uncopyrightable.
387 Consider the case often identified as the source 
of the doctrine, Morrissey v. The Procter & Gamble Co.,
388 in which two companies held similar 
sales promotional contests, entry into which required contestants to send their social security 
numbers to the sponsor. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed its copyright by 
duplicating Rule 1 of its contest rules with only a few editing changes.
389 The court held that the 
rule was uncopyrightable, announcing a concern that “to permit copyrighting would mean that a 
party  or  parties  …  could  exhaust  all  possibilities  of  future  use”  by  obtain  rights  over  all 
permutations that would cover the underlying idea.
The court’s explanation makes little sense, however, for two reasons. First, at least in 
Morrissey itself, and surely in many other contexts in which courts would apply the merger 
doctrine, there are countless ways of making even pedestrian points. Variations in syntax, word 
choice, and organization mean that exact identity or even very close similarity of expression 
almost always indicates copying, at least when more than a very small number of words is at 
issue.
390 The merger doctrine by its own terms applies only when expression and idea merge, but 
if the doctrine were really so narrow, the cases to which the doctrine applied would be an empty 
set. Second, and more significant, in copyright law, independent origination is sufficient to avoid 
infringement and obtain copyright.
391 No company would be able to monopolize the rules for a 
contest by writing down all permutations, because a company that wanted to hold a similar 
contest, even if inspired by the original contest, could set about writing its own rule, and any 
387 Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905).
388 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
389 The defendant’s rule, with modifications (other than product name substitution) indicated with italics (additions) and brackets 
(subtractions), read as follows:
1. Entrants should print name, address and Social Security number on a Tide boxtop, or on [a] plain paper. Entries must 
be accompanied by Tide boxtop (any size) or by plain paper on which the name ‘Tide’ is copied from any source. 
Official rules are available on Tide Sweepstakes packages, or on leaflets at Tide dealers, or you can send a stamped, 
self-addressed envelope to: ….
Id. at 678. 
390 See John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 127 (1991) (noting that in Morrissey, 
“the number of equivalent rephrasings probably runs to the hundreds or thousands, but this quibble is at once digressive and 
fantastically tedious to verify”).
391 Judge Learned Hand famously encapsulated this rule: “[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose 
anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though 
they might of course copy Keats’s.” Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936); see also Alfred 
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the 
statute is that the author contributed something more than a merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The independent origination defense fits into rent dissipation theory, for if someone by happenstance 
infringes a copyright, most of the rent dissipation has already occurred, so there is no reason to prevent dissemination of the 
work.
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coincidental similarity to the original would be irrelevant. Thus, if idea and expression truly 
merged,  then  the  merger  doctrine  would  not  even  be  necessary,  so  long  as  the  allegedly 
infringing author expressed the idea independently without engaging in copying.
Rent  dissipation  theory,  however,  can  account  for  the  merger  doctrine.  It  would 
needlessly dissipate rents to require competitors to develop alternative formulations of a writing. 
Such rent dissipation may seem trivial in this context, though they could be greater elsewhere. 
For  example,  in  Kern  River  Gas  Transmission  Co.  v.  Coastal  Corp.,
392 the  merger  doctrine
applied to a map illustrating a proposed route for a pipeline. The court noted that copyright law 
could not give the mapmakers a monopoly in the proposed route,
393 though presumably it would 
not have been a copyright violation if the alleged infringer had somehow found out about the 
proposed route by inquiring of those who produced the route. But such investigation is entirely 
wasteful. A counterargument is that rent dissipation might be avoided even more completely if 
copyright did grant a monopoly in the contest or the set of maps illustrated the proposed route. 
The merger doctrine, however, provides the solution that minimizes rent dissipation given the 
constraint that no such monopoly will be awarded. Once entry is to be allowed, it might as well 
be allowed at low cost.
D. Facts and Compilations
Perhaps  the  most  controversial  issue  concerning  copyrightable  subject  matter  is  the 
protection of databases. Copyright law has long provided that there is no copyright in facts.
394
Compilations of facts, however, have a stronger claim on protection, as the copyright statute 
explicitly  provides  that  compilations  can  be  copyrightable  subject  matter.
395  In  Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service,
396 however, the Supreme Court found a telephone 
white pages directory, consisting of the usual information on names, addresses, and numbers, not 
to enjoy copyright protection. Factual compilations, the Court ruled, may be copyrighted, but 
only  if  they  “possess  the  requisite  originality,”
397 a  requirement  that  the  Court  found  to  be 
392 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1990).
393 Id. at 1464.
394 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 374, § 2.11[A]  (“No one may claim originality as to facts.”).
395 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
396 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
397 Id. at 348.
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constitutionally  mandated.
398 If  the  “selection  and  arrangement  are  original,”  the  Court  held, 
“these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection.”
399 The white pages, however, 
“do nothing more than list Rural’s subscribers in alphabetical order” and therefore are not even 
“remotely creative.”
400
A telephone directory might seem to be an appropriate candidate for copyright protection 
because of the  great amount of effort that it may take to  compile it.
401 The Supreme Court, 
however, concluded that the amount of work that it took to prepare a factual compilation was 
irrelevant, rejecting a “sweat of the brow” theory that would have allowed for protection. Justice 
O’Connor’s  explanation  of  why  the  Court  rejected  the  “sweat  of  the  brow”  theory  was 
undertheorized.  The  opinion  noted  that  “[s]weat  of  the  brow’  courts  . . .  eschewed  the  most 
fundamental  axiom  of  copyright  law—that  no  one  may  copyright  facts  or  ideas.”
402 This 
conclusion, however, begs the question of why a factual compilation should be treated as a fact. 
A  typical  newspaper  article,  after  all,  consists  of  a  list  of  facts,  and  others  may  report  the 
individual facts without infringing but cannot appropriate the whole article. Why shouldn’t a 
similar rule apply to telephone directories?
Rent dissipation theory, however, offers a plausible, if empirically uncertain, explanation 
for rejection of the “sweat of the brow” theory. If it would require considerable sweat for the first 
telephone  book  publisher  to  compile  a  directory,  then  it  will  require  considerable  sweat  for 
subsequent entrants to compile competing directories.
403 That sweat is rent dissipation. As long 
as new publishers are permitted to enter the market by redoing all the research of the original 
publisher, we can at least promote efficiency by allowing new publishers to save themselves the 
effort and simply copy the phone directory. The reasoning is exactly parallel to the concerns 
about  designing  or  writing  around  that  we  have  seen  can  explain  case  law  on  originality 
398 Id. at 351.
399 Id. at 349. The Court emphasized, however, that the principle of independent origination holds: “A compiler may settle upon 
a selection or arrangement that others have used; novelty is not required.” Id. at 358.
400 Id. at 363.
401 It may have taken relatively little work to compile the directory at issue, however. “[A]s the sole provider of telephone service 
in its service area,” the Supreme Court explained, “Rural obtains subscriber information quite easily.” Id. at 343.
402 Id. at 353.
403 The point seems particularly strong where the amount of sweat that it would take the second publisher is greater than the 
amount that it would take the first publisher, as in Feist .  See supra note 401. The Court, however, did not seem to place any 
evidence on the ease with which Rural had compiled its directory.
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generally  and  on  the  merger  doctrine.
404 Because  rent  dissipation  theory  is  concerned  about 
minimizing the social loss attributable to the fixed cost of entry, we may be able to reduce that 
loss by allowing entrants a short cut that dramatically lowers the fixed cost.
Feist and the copyrightability of factual compilations more broadly present close cases, 
both for copyright doctrine generally and for rent dissipation in particular. Arguably, the Court 
did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  the  danger  that  free  appropriability  of  unoriginal  factual 
compilations may mean that some compilations that are particularly labor-intensive to compile 
will no longer be compiled as a result of second-mover advantages.
405 My own view is that this is 
a  powerful  consideration,  but  the  Court’s  rejection  of  it  suggests  a  broader  hostility  to  the 
incentive rationale for copyright protection. Even from the narrow lens of rent dissipation, the 
social welfare balance is unclear. Allowing copying of directories conceivably could increase 
social investments in redundant works, as even more publishers will enter the market and bear a 
variety of other fixed costs. Whether the entry deterrence or entry facilitation effect dominates 
the other is difficult to evaluate. That rent dissipation theory does not unambiguously predict the 
result in Feist , however, should not strike as a count against it. Perhaps the ultimate test of a 
positive theory of law is in its ability to predict which cases are close and therefore will be 
controversial. The results of borderline cases are not strong data one way or the other, for in such 
cases some judges presumably would have rendered the opposite decision, the Supreme Court’s 
unanimity in Feist  notwithstanding.
It is also a useful test of a positive theory to assess whether that theory is consistent with 
distinctions developed in the case law. One set of post-Feist  cases has distinguished pre -existing 
facts from those that reflect some judgment on the part of the original compiler. For example, in 
CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.,
406 the Second Circuit 
found that the numbers in the Red Book, which consisted of listings of used car values, were 
protectable. The court emphasized that the “valuations were neither reports of historical prices 
nor mechanical derivations of historical prices or other data,” but involved some independent 
404 See supra Part I.B.1.b-c.
405 It is possible, however, that creators of databases may be able to find alternative means of protecting their creations. See, e.g., 
Paul T. Sheils & Robert Penchina, What’s All the Fuss About Feist? The Sky Is Not Falling on the Intellectual Property Rights of 
Online Database Proprietors, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 563 (1992).
406 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).
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professional  judgment.
407 A  separate  set  of  cases  has  established  that  the  threshold  for  a 
compilation to qualify for copyright is not high. The Second Circuit again, in Key Publications, 
Inc.  v.  Chinatown  Today  Publishing  Enterprises,  Inc.,
408 found  copyright  protection  in  a 
telephone directory intended for use by the Chinese-American community. The selection and 
arrangement of 9000 listings into 260 categories was sufficient.
That facts are created might not seem relevant under Feist, especially given the Court’s 
rejection of the sweat-of-the-brow theory. If it is not relevant that it might take time to find a 
fact, why should it be relevant that it took some effort and independent judgment to create a fact? 
The  distinction  might  seem  purely  metaphysical.
409 But  from  a  rent-seeking  perspective,  the 
efforts that go into creating facts are less likely to be redundant than the efforts that go into 
discovering facts. To be sure, the Red Book might not add much value to the Blue Book that does 
exactly the same thing but comes up with slightly different numbers. There is some value added, 
however, and competition might lead authors of both books to improve quality. Competition in 
finding facts, in contrast, is almost entirely redundant. While it is possible that one telephone 
directory  might  list  someone’s  number  erroneously  and  the  other  might  then  be  useful,  the 
requirement of independent judgment that the courts have applied does not merely prevent error 
but guarantees separate assessments of the fact (or, more accurately, non-fact) at issue. Copyright 
law  thus  requires  duplication  of  effort  precisely  where  such  duplication  is  less  likely  to  be 
duplicative.
V. CONCLUSION
Visible costs and visible benefits have a greater effect on public policy than invisible 
costs and invisible benefits. The benefits of the large number of partially redundant copyrighted 
works are visible, and as consumers, we enjoy the low prices and wide selection that competition 
in copyright markets can bring us. Sometimes, such competition can amount to rent dissipation, 
but  we  do  not  know  what  the  authors  of  largely  redundant  copyrighted  works  would  have 
contributed economically if a more robust copyright law pushed them into other fields. Nor do 
407 Id. at 67. A similar case in the Ninth Circuit is CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).
408 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
409 It  also  might  seem  inconsistent  with  case  law  not  allowing  copyright  protection  even  over  false  facts  where  they  are 
represented as truthful. See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to find copyright in the purported facts in 
a book that offered a conspiracy theory on John Dillinger’s death, where a television show was based on the theory).
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art289
we intuitively recognize that if copyright law permitted more redundancy, for example if the 
derivative works right were abolished, there would be very modest negative effects in many 
markets  as  more  resources  were  deployed  to  production  of  copyrighted  works.  Given  the 
invisibility of such costs, it should not be surprising that copyright law doctrines that discourage 
redundancy are not more visible. This Article, however, has sought to show that many aspects of 
copyright law can be better understood and justified through an understanding of rent dissipation 
concerns. That the benefits and costs of redundancy are now theoretically visible, however, does 
not  produce  unambiguous  implications  for  copyright  law.  The  question  remains  whether  the 
balance that copyright law strikes between rent dissipation and other concerns is the right one, 
and more work, both theoretical and empirical, is needed to improve on can for now be only 
tentative answers.
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